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STATE OF IDAHO 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
MALLORY E. LARSON nka MALLORY E. MARTINEZ, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Appealed from the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for Clearwater County 
Honorable CARL B. KERRICK, District Judge 
Ned A. Cannon 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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Date: 12/7/2012 Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County User: BARBIE 
Time: 11 :58 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 5 Case: CV-2009-0000420 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
Date Code User Judge 
1/6/2009 COMP BARBIE Complaint Filed Carl B. Kerrick 
1/7/2009 SMIS BARBIE Summons Issued Carl B. Kerrick 
6/9/2009 NOTC BARBIE Notice of Workers' Compensation Lien Carl B. Kerrick 
7/27/2009 ANSW BARBIE Answer and Demand for Jury Trial Carl B. Kerrick 
MOTN BARBIE Motion for Change of Venue to Clearwater County Carl B. Kerrick 
7/30/2009 AFSR BARBIE Affidavit Of Service Carl B. Kerrick 
8/5/2009 RESD BARBIE Defendant's Response in Opposition of Swift Carl 8. Kerrick 
Transportation's Workers' Compensation Lien 
8/12/2009 MOTN BARBIE Defendant's Motion to Strike Swift Carl B. Kerrick 
Transportation's Workers' Compenstation Lilen 
and Motion for Sanctions 
NOTH BARBIE Notice Of Hearing Carl 8. Kerrick 
8/19/2009 NOSV BARBIE Notice Of Service Carl B. Kerrick 
8/21/2009 NOTH BARBIE Amended Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
8/31/2009 NOTC BARBIE Notice of Withdrawal of Workers' Compensation Carl B. Kerrick 
Lien 
9/1/2009 MOTN BARBIE Withdrawal of Motion to Strike, Motion for Carl B. Kerrick 
Sanctions and Notice of Hearing 
9/3/2009 NOSV BARBIE Notice Of Service Carl B. Kerrick 
9/24/2009 NOTH BARBIE Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
10/6/2009 OBJC BARBIE Plaitniff's Partial Objection to Defendant's Motion Carl B. Kerrick 
for Change of Venue to Clearwater County 
AFFD BARBIE Affidavit of Ned A Cannon in Partial Opposition to Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue 
10/8/2009 AFFD BARBIE Affidavit of Mallory E. Larson Carl 8. Kerrick 
REPL BARBIE Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Partial Objection Carl B. Kerrick 
to Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue to 
Clearwater County 
10/13/2009 CMIN BARBIE Court Minutes Carl B. Kerrick 
11/4/2009 NOSV BARBIE Notice Of Service Carl B. Kerrick 
11/10/2009 NCOC RENEE New Case Filed - Other Claims John H. Bradbury 
APER RENEE Plaintiff: Teurlings, William P Appearance Ned A John H. Bradbury 
Cannon 
APER RENEE Defendant: Larson, Mallory E Appearance John H. Bradbury 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
RENEE Filing: K1 - Order granting change of venue (pay John H. Bradbury 
to new county). Paid by: clements, brown & 
mcnichols Receipt number: 0008612 Dated: 
11/13/2009 Amount: $9.00 (Cashiers Check) 
For: Larson, Mallory E (defendant) 
ORDR RENEE Order granting defendant's motion for change of John H. Bradbury 
venue 




Time: 11 :58 AM 
Page 2 of 5 
Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0000420 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
Date Code User 
11/16/2009 ORDQ RENEE Order Granting Disqualification 
CHJG SUE Change Assigned Judge 
11/19/2009 ORAJ SUE Order Assigning Judge 
11/24/2009 MOTN SUE Plaintiff's Rule 40 disqualification without cause 
11/25/2009 ORDR SUE Order assigning judge 
12/1/2009 ODQJ SUE Order granting motion for disqualification 
CHJG SUE Change Assigned Judge 
4/30/2010 NOSV VICKY Notice Of Service 
8/9/2010 MOTN COURTNEY Defendant's Motion For Stay Under The Militia 
Civil Relief Act 
MEMO COURTNEY Memorandum In Support Of Defendant's Motion 
For Stay Under The Militia Civil Relief Act 
AFFD COURTNEY Affidavit Of Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
AFFD COURTNEY Affidavit Of Mallory E. Martinez 
NOTH COURTNEY Notice Of Hearing 
HRSC COURTNEY Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/24/201 O 09:00 
AM) AT NEZ PERCE COUNTY 
8/18/2010 MOTN CAROLYNN Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavit Provisions of 
Mallory E. Martinez and Sonya Lee R. Nutsch, 
and Objection to Absolute Stay 
8/24/2010 HRHD CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
08/24/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
DCHH CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
08/24/2010 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing 
estimated: 
LESS THAN 100 
CMIN CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
08/24/2010 09:00 AM: Court Minutes 
8/25/2010 ORDR CHRISTY Order - Matter is STAYED until further Order of 
the Court. 
10/4/2011 STIP CHRISTY Stipulation to Lift Stay 
10/11/2011 ORDR BARBIE Order 
2/22/2012 NOSV KCONNOR Notice Of Service 
3/26/2012 NOTC BLEE Notice Of Taking Deposition Upon Oral 
Examination 
4/23/2012 NOSV BARBIE Notice Of Service 
AFFD BARBIE Affidavit of Service RE: Tony A Rice 
4/27/2012 MOTN CHRISTY Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO CHRISTY Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
AFFD CHRISTY Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice 
User: BARBIE 
Judge 
John H. Bradbury 
John R Stegner 
Jeff Brudie 
John R Stegner 
Carl B. Kerrick 
John R Stegner 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
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Date: 12/7/2012 Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County User: BARBIE 
Time: 11 :58 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 5 Case: CV-2009-0000420 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
Date Code User Judge 
4/27/2012 AFFD CHRISTY Affidavit of Mallory E. Martinez Carl B. Kerrick 
NOTC CHRISTY Notice of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
5/1/2012 HRSC CHRISTY Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Carl B. Kerrick 
Judgment 06/12/2012 09:00 AM) To be heard at 
NP County Courthouse 
5/11/2012 NOSV CHRISTY Notice Of Service Carl B. Kerrick 
5/29/2012 APER CHRISTY Other party: Swift Transportation Company, Carl B. Kerrick 
Appearance Mark C Peterson 
CHRISTY Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Carl B. Kerrick 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Peterson, 
Mark C (attorney for Swift Transportation 
Company,) Receipt number: 0001782 Dated: 
6/5/2012 Amount: $58.00 (Cashiers Check) For: 
Swift Transportation Company, (other party) 
MOTN CHRISTY Motion To Intervene Carl B. Kerrick 
MEMO CHRISTY Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Intervene Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD CHRISTY Affidavit Of Mark C. Peterson In Support Of Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion To Intervene 
NOTH CHRISTY Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion To Intervene Carl B. Kerrick 
5/30/2012 MEMO BARBIE Memorandum in Opposition to Motion For Carl B. Kerrick 
Summary Judgment 
MOTN BARBIE Motion to Stike Carl B. Kerrick 
MEMO BARBIE Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Strike Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD BARBIE Affidavit of Ned A Cannon Carl B. Kerrick 
NOHG BARBIE Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
6/5/2012 REPL NJOHNSTUN Reply In Support Of Defendant's Motion For Carl B. Kerrick 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD JALLAIN Affidavit of Sonyalee R Nutsch in support of Carl B. Kerrick 
defendant's response in opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion to Strike 
AFFD JALLAIN Affidavit of Sonyalee R. Nutsch in support of Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant's response in opposition to Swift 
Transportation's motion to intervene 
RESD JALLAIN Defendant's Response in opposition to Plaintiffs Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion to Strike 
RESD JALLAIN Defendant's Response in opposition to Swift Carl B. Kerrick 
Transportation's Motion to Intervene 
6/8/2012 MOTN HOLLIBAUGH Swift Trandportation Co., lnc.'s Reply In Support Carl B. Kerrick 
Of Motion To Intervene 
6/12/2012 MOTN CHRISTY Motion for Summary Judgment Carl B. Kerrick 
HRHD CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Carl B. Kerrick 
scheduled on 06/12/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing 




Time: 11 :58 AM 
Page 4 of 5 
Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0000420 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
Date Code User 
6/12/2012 DCHH CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
scheduled on 06/12/2012 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Keith Evans 
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing 
estimated: 
LESS THAN 100 
CMIN CHRISTY Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
scheduled on 06/12/2012 09:00 AM: Court 
Minutes 
7/13/2012 MEMO CHRISTY Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Swift 
Transportation Comany's Motion to Intervene 
SCAN CHRISTY Scanned:7-24-12 
7/19/2012 JDMT CHRISTY Judgment (Dismissed with Prejudice) 
SCAN CHRISTY Scanned:7-24-12 
CDIS CHRISTY Civil Disposition entered for: Larson, Mallory E, 
Defendant; Swift Transportation Company,, Other 
Party; Teurlings, William P, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
7/19/2012 
CSCL CHRISTY Case Status CLOSED 
7/27/2012 MOTN CHRISTY Motion to Reconsider 
MEMO BARBIE Memorandum In Support Of Motion To 
Reconsider 
8/1/2012 MOTN KBR OWNING Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
NOHG KBR OWNING Notice Of Hearing 
8/13/2012 AFFD JALLAIN Supplemental Affidavit of SSF Tony Rice 
NOHG JALLAIN Amended Notice Of Hearing 
HRSC JALLAIN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/28/2012 09:00 
AM) Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment - hearing at NezPerce County 
Courthouse 
RESP JALLAIN Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment 
AFFD JALLAIN Affidavit of Mallory E. Martinez in Support of 
Defendant's Response in Oppostion to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment 
8/15/2012 NOHG TEMP Second Amended Notice of Hearing 
8/16/2012 HRVC TEMP Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
08/28/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
to Reconsider and Motion to Alter or Amend 




Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0000420 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
User: BARBIE 
























Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/11/2012 09:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment 
Court Minutes Carl 8. Kerrick 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Carl 8. Kerrick 
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Carl B. Kerrick 
Supreme Court Paid by: Smith & Cannon PLLC 
Receipt number: 0003614 Dated: 11/15/2012 
Amount: $109.00 (Cashiers Check) For: 
Teurlings, William P (plaintiff) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Carl 8. Kerrick 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3641 Dated 
11/19/2012 for 10.00) 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Mailed to Counsel 
and Supreme Court 
Carl 8. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
r ' 
,-.,.1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
C \ I ti 9 ·o (l O 2 ,... 1,tfJ .. . ,.i 1'J 
Case No.: 
COMPLAINT 
Fee Category: A.1. 
Filing Fee: $88.00 
COMES NOW plaintiff, and for cause of action against defendant, alleges as follows: 
I. 
Plaintiff William P. Teurlings is a resident of the state of California. 
II. 
Defendant Mallory E. Larson was the time of collision a resident of Clearwater County, 






On or about January 7, 2007, plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle proceeding north on 
Highway 95 near Milepost 257 in Idaho County, Idaho. At such time and place, defendant 
Driskell was operating a motor vehicle proceeding south on Highway 95. 
IV. 
At the date and place alleged, defendant negligently caused her motor vehicle to cross the 
centerline of Highway 95 and collide with the motor vehicle operated by plaintiff resulting in 
injuries sustained by plaintiff. 
V. 
The negligence of defendant proximately caused damages to be sustained by plaintiff for 
which defendant is liable under Idaho law. 
VI. 
Damages sustained by plaintiff for personal injury include, but are not limited to, bodily 
injury, emotional distress, medical expenses, and economic losses, together with future damages 
for personal injury proximately caused by defendant's negligence. 
VII. 
By reason of the negligence of defendant, plaintiff has been required to employ the firm 
of Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC, Attorneys at Law, Lewiston, Idaho to prosecute this action. 
Plaintiff should be awarded attorney's fees in this action pursuant Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule 
54( e )(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in addition to costs and disbursements otherwise 
provided by law. 




1. For special and general damages in an amount to be proven at time of trial, 
exceeding the jurisdictional limits of $10,000.00. 
2. For plaintiffs costs and disbursements as provided by law together reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
3. For such other, further and general relief as to the court may see warranted upon a 
hearing. 
DATED this 6th day of January, 2009. 
By:~~~~~.Ji:::::.4\..-~~~1...&,'~~- -
Ned A. Cannon, 
Of Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Pursuant to Rule 3 8(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff demands a trial by 
jury consisting of not fewer than 12 persons. 
DATED this 6th day of January, 2009. 
A. Cannon, 




jl' 7 r ') ,-
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV09-00025 
SUMMONS 
NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF. THE COURT 
MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE UNLESS YOU 
RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF SERVICE. READ THE 
INFORMATION BELOW. 
TO: MALLORY E. LARSON. 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written 
response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this 
Summons upon you. If you fail to respond the court may enter judgment against you as 




A copy of the Complaint is served with the Summons. If you wish to seek the advice of 
or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written 
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule l0(a)(l) and other Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or 
denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you 
may claim. 
3. Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, 
mailing address and telephone number of your attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiff's attorney, 
as designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk of 
the above-named court. 
DA TED this ~ day of January, 2009. 
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i • 
1 ANTHONY J. GODFREY, ESQ. i 
Calif. State Bar No.: 166250 
2 GODFREY, GODFREY & LAMB, LLP 
2119 W. Orangewood A venue 
2009 JUN 9 Arl 10 18 
3 Orange, California 92868 
uU1~f»ifVl0-\. Telephone: (714) 935-0444 4 Facsimile: (714) 935-9944 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF NEZ PERCE 



















MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
CASE No.: CV09-00025 
NOTICE OF WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION LIEN 
TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Swift Transportation and its Workers' Compensation 
adjusting agency, Gallagher Bassett Services, by and through their attorneys of record, the law office 
of Godfrey, Godfrey & Lamb, LLP, submit the following lien claim in intervention in the above-
captioned matter. 
I. On or about January 7, 2007, William Teurlings was employed as a truck driver for Swift 
Transportation. 
2. On or about January 7, 2007, William Teurlings sustained injury to his head, neck, hand, 
back and sexual dysfunction as a result of a head on collision in Idaho. 
3. William Teurlings proceeded with a Workers ' Compensation Claim in the State of 
28 California for injuries sustained as a direct result of the motor vehicle accident on January 7, 2007 . 
- 1 -
F: \DATA\ Teurl ings, William\ Teurl ings Pldgs\009-5-15 Lien In Intervention . doc 
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1 4. William Teurlings recovered both medical treatment and indemnity from the Workers' 
2 Compensation claim. Mr. Teurlings' claim was settled by Compromise and Release at $55,000.00. 
3 5. The amount of said lien claim is as follows: 
4 Temporary Disability: $6,841.86 
























Medical Care: $30,427.88 
TOTAL AMOUNT OF LIEN: $92,269.74 
6. On January 6, 2009, William Teurlings filed a Complaint against Mallory Larson for 
injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on January 7, 2007 in Idaho. 
7. Swift Transportation hereby submits the following lien claim in intervention in the above 
matter totaling $92,269.74. Lien claimant reserves the right to amend, modify or supplement this 
claim according to proof. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dated: June 5, 2009 
-2-
F: \DATA\Teurlings, William\Teurlings Pldgs\009-5-15 Lien In Intervention.doc 
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1 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE 
3 I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a 
party to the within action; my business address is GODFREY, GODFREY & LAMB, LLP, 2119 W. 
4 Orangewood Avenue, Orange, California, 92868. 
5 On June 5, 2009, I served the foregoing document(s) described as NOTICE OF WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION LIEN on the interested parties in this action addressed as follows: 
6 
7 DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COLE, FISHER, BOSQUEZ-FLORES, COLE 
&O'KEEFE 
8 123 0 Main Street 
P.O. Box 896 
Post Office Box 391 
Fresno, CA 93708 
9 Lewiston, ID 83501 Attn: Joseph G. O'Keefe, Esq. 
10 GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC. SMITH, CANNON & BOND, PLLC 
508 Eighth Street P.O. Box 255397 
11 Sacramento, CA 95865 
Attn: Ted Kuhl 
Lewiston, ID 83501 



















Attn: Mindi Robb (E-Mail Only) 
P.O. Box 29243 
Phoenix, AZ 85038 
Said service was made by placing true copies thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope(s) 
addressed as stated above AND, 
Placing the envelope for collection and mailing on the date and at our business address 
following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice 
for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that 
correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of 
business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. 
Executed on June 5, 2009 at Orange, California. 
lEl (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 




F:\DATA\Teurlings, William\Teurlings Pldgs\009-5-15 Lien In Intervention.doc 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 













Case No: CV09-0025 
ANSWER AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Defendant, by and through her attorney of record, Sonyalee R. Nutsch of 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., answers plaintiffs Complaint as follows: 
I. Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truth 
of the allegations of paragraph I, and therefore denies them. 
IL Answering paragraph II, defendant admits that defendant 1s a 
resident of Clearwater County, Idaho. 
III. Answering paragraph III, defendant admits that on January 7, 2007, 
ANSWER AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL -1-
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plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle proceeding north on Highway 
95 near Milepost 257 in Idaho County, Idaho. Defendant does not 
know who "Driskell" is and therefore lacks sufficient knowledge to 
form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of paragraph 
III, and denies them. 
IV. Defendant denies paragraph IV. 
V. Defendant denies paragraph V. 
VI. Defendant denies paragraph VI. 
VIL Defendant admits that plaintiff has retained Smith, Cannon & Bond 
PLLC, Attorneys at Law to represent her in this matter but defendant 
denies the remaining allegations and inferences contained in 
paragraph VII. 
Defendant denies any allegations and potential allegations alleged m 
plaintiffs prayer for relief. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. Further investigation and discovery may reveal that the accident was· 
caused by the negligence of plaintiff, whose negligence equals or exceeds that of 
defendant, if any. 
2. Further investigation and discovery may reveal that the accident was 
caused by the negligence of others, for whose negligence defendant cannot be held liable. 
ANSWER AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL -2-
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3. Further investigation and discovery may reveal that plaintiff has 
failed to mitigate his damages. 
4. At all times material to plaintiffs Complaint, defendant was on-duty 
serving with the HHC 145th BSB unit of the Idaho National Guard. Further investigation 
and discovery may reveal that plaintiff has failed to comply with LC. § 6-905. 
5. Further investigation and discovery may r~veal that certain statutory 
defenses are available to defendant pursuant to I.C. § 6-901 et. seq. which include but are 
not limited to, immunity under Idaho Code§§ 6-904(4). 
6. Further investigation and discovery may reveal that defendant is 
immune from liability pursuant to LC. § 46-402. 
7. Pursuant to IRCP 12 (b) (3), plaintiff has failed to file this case in the 
proper venue. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed 
with prejudice and that defendant be awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred in this 
matter. 
DATED this 24th day of July 2009. 
ANSWER AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~A ~CL.,.._':?( ' t-~:9--s. 
SONY AL R. NUTSCH 




DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Demand is hereby made for a trial of all issues which may appropriately be 
tried to a jury. Defendant will not stipulate to a jury less than twelve (12) persons. 
DATED this 24th day of July 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BRO\VN & McNICHOLS, P .A. 
~~~~A, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th of July 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 8th Street 





ANSWER AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 




Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

















Case No: CV09-0025 
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF 
VENUE TO CLEARWATER 
COUNTY 
Category I. l .a. 
Fee Category: 58.00 
Defendant moves the Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b )(3), to change the venue from Nez Perce County to Clearwater County, on the grounds 
that the defendant is and was at the time plaintiff filed his Complaint, a resident of Orofino, 
Clearwater County, Idaho. Additionally, the incident that is the subject matter of plaintiffs 
Complaint occurred in Idaho County so there is no proper basis for the venue of this matter to 
be in Nez Perce County. (See Plaintiffs Complaint, 1/6/2009). 
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE 
TO CLEARWATER COUNTY -1-
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DATED this 24th day of July 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~~~- tJ .. =-L 
SO EE R. NUTSCH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th of July 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 8th Street 





MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE 




L l r- D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND ·. IC-IAr'. DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Nfi PERCE 
?.009 JUL 30 Ar1 lO iJ 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS , 
PLAINTIFF (S), 
vs 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
DEFENDANT (S), 
STATE OF IDAHO 




The undersigned, being duly sworn, on oath deposes and says: That he is now and at all times herein mentioned was a 
citizen of the United States, over the age of twenty-one years, not a party to or interested in the above-entitled action 
and competent to be a witness therein; 
That on JULY 9, 2009 , at 9:04 A.M. , at the address of 12878 VISTA, OROFINO, ID 83544 ,being the dwe~g 
house and/or the usual place of abode of the defendant MALLORY E. LARSON this affiant duly served a 
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT in the above-entitled action upon said defendant, MALLORY E. LARSON by then 
and there personally delivering a true and correct copy thereof into the hands of and leaving same with JESUS 
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'/ 1/,,-11'. 'yo~,-~ 
~ ~7.'111 111111\1'\Q\~ 
~<at'i,f i~\ and for t e State of Idaho, 
Residing at LEWISTON 36?~ My commission expires : _..,.AP~RI=L'-'1,_,0c,..,=2-"--0=12~----- ---
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
' . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 














Case No: CV09-0025 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 




On June 9, 2009, Swift Transportation ("Swift"), by and through its attorney 
Anthony J. Godfrey, filed a Notice of Workers' Compensation Lien. As explained below, 
Swift's Notice should be stricken from the record. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 







A. SWIFT'S NOTICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LIEN SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
FROM THE RECORD BECAUSE IT WAS FILED BY AN ATTORNEY WHO IS NOT 
LICENSED TO PRACTICE LA WIN THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)( 1) requires that"( e ]very pleading, motion, 
and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one (1) 
licensed attorney of record of the state of Idaho, in the attorney's individual name, whose 
address shall be stated before the same may be filed." Id. 
Swift's Workers' Compensation Lien was filed by Anthony J. Godfrey, Esq. 
Mr. Godfrey listed his California address and his California bar number on the pleading. Mr. 
Godfrey is not listed in the Idaho bar directory as an attorney currently licensed to practice 
law in the state ofldaho. As a result, Swift's notice was filed in violation ofIRCP 11 (a)(l). 
Pursuant to IRCP 1 l(a)(l), "[i]f a pleading motion or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading , motion or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee." Id. 
Because Swift has filed its Notice in violation of IRCP 11, defendant 
respectfully requests that the Notice be stricken from the record and Swift ordered to pay the 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 





reasonable attorney fees incurred by defendant because of the filing of the Notice. 
B. FILING A LIEN IN TIDS LAWSUIT IS PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER 
Swift claims in its Notice of Worker's Compensation Lien that it has paid a 
total of $92,269.74 for a worker's compensation claim that William Teurlings ("plaintiff') 
filed in the state of California. Defendant in this matter was obviously not a party to the 
California workers compensation claim nor did she have an opportunity to participate in the 
settlement reached by the parties in that matter. 
Although Swift may have a contractual or statutory right of subrogation, filing 
a lien in this case is not the procedurally proper way for Swift to preserve its right of 
subrogation. Idaho law does not provide for a statutory lien for worker's compensation 
benefits paid. See LC. § 72-223. If California law allows for such a lien or plaintiff has 
contractually agreed to the lien, Swift will need to go through the legal processes necessary to 
record a foreign lien in Idaho. Filing the lien in this lawsuit is not legally or procedurally 
proper and the Notice should be stricken by the Court. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that Swift's Notice of 
Workers' Compensation Lien be stricken from the record and Swift ordered to pay the 
reasonable attorney fees incurred by defendant because of the filing of the Notice. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 





DATED this 4th day of August 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~~E~~ls~iF L, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th of August 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Anthony J. Godfrey, ESQ. 
Godfrey, Godfrey & Lamb, LLP 
2119 W. Orangewood Avenue 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
- , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













Case No: CV09-0025 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE SWIFT TRANSPORTATION'S 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LIEN 
AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
Defendant, by and through her attorney of record, Sonyalee R. Nutsch of 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11, moves 
to strike Swift Transportations' Workers' Compensation lien filed with this Court on June 9, 
2009 and further moves for Rule 11 sanctions. 
This Motion is supported by Defendant's Response in Opposition of Swift 
Transportation' s Workers' Compensation Lien filed on August 4, 2009. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE SWIFT TRANSPORTATION'S 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LIEN 
AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS -1-
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DATED this 11 th day of August 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~ ~ O...&Sl ~ - £\~ ~ #\ L 
- .;--=---~LEER. NUTSCH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 11 th of August 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-8421 - facsimile 
Anthony J. Godfrey, ESQ. 
Godfrey, Godfrey & Lamb, LLP 
2119 W. Orangewood Avenue 
Orange, California 92868 




X TELECOPY (FAX) 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE SWIFT TRANSPORTATION'S 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LIEN 
AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS -2-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 2%9 f ',; 12 Rrl 9 S~ 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
















Case No: CV09-00025 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned will call up for hearing, 
defendant's MOTION TO STRIKE before The Honorable Carl B. Kerrick at the Nez 
Perce County Courthouse on Tuesday, the 25th day of August, 2009, at 9:00a.m., or as 
soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
NOTICE OF HEARING -1-
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DATED this 11th day of August 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~ NY~ E~ -~ S~ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 11 th of August 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-8421 - facsimile 
Anthony J. Godfrey, ESQ. 
Godfrey, Godfrey & Lamb, LLP 
2119 W. Orangewood Avenue 
Orange, California 92868 
(714) 935-9944 - facsimile 
X U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
X TELECOPY (FAX) 
~~ ~~- t.:::i •. =b 
Sonyal~e R~ utsch · 
NOTICE OF HEARING -2-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLE1\1ENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB#6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
Of THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF :NEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No: CV09-00025 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I, Sonyalee R. Nutsch, attorney for defendant, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 33(a)(5), 
and 34(d) certify that on the 18th day of August, 2009, DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
PLAINTIFF were served on counsel for plaintiff, Ned A. Cannon. 
DATED this 18th day of August 2009. 
CLE1\1ENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August 2009, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
U.S.MAIL 
X HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -2-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
- ---- -- - - - --
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 1'JEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No: CV09-00025 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned will call up for hearing, 
defendant's MOTION TO STRIKE before The Honorable Carl B. Kerrick at the Nez 
Perce County Courthouse on Tuesday, the 29th day of September, 2009, at 9:00a.m., or 
as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 




DATED this 21st day of August 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
B~ ~-~tJ~ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certi:£)1 that on the 21 st of August 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-8421 - facsimile 
Anthony J. Godfrey, ESQ. 
Godfrey, Godfrey & Lamb, LLP 
2119 W. Orangewood Avenue 
Orange, California 92868 
(714) 935-9944 - facsimile 
X U.S.MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
X TELECOPY (FAX) 




1 ANTHONY J. GODFREY, ESQ. 
Calif. State Bar No.: 166250 
2 GODFREY, GODFREY & LAMB, LLP 
2119 W. Orangewood A venue 
3 Orange, California 92868 
Telephone : (714) 935-0444 
4 Facsimile: (714) 935-9944 






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
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MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
CASE No.: CV09-00025 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAW AL OF 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LIEN 
TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Swift Transportation and its Workers ' Compensation 
adjusting agency, Gallagher Bassett Services, by and through their attorneys of record, the law office 
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1 The withdrawal of the Workers' Compensation lien is not intended to waive any rights Swift 
2 may have for seeking subrogation rights in Mr. Teurlings' civil claim against Mallory Larson. 
3 Respectfully submitted, 
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1 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
2 ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE 
3 I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a 
party to the within action; my business address is GODFREY, GODFREY & LAMB, LLP, 2119 W. 
4 Orange wood A venue, Orange, California, 92868. 

























WORKERS' COMPENSATION LIEN on the interested parties in this action addressed as follows: 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
1230 Main Street 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC. 
P.O. Box 255397 
Sacramento, CA 95865 
Attn: Ted Kuhl 
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 
Attn: Mindi Robb (E-Mail Only) 
P.O. Box 29243 
Phoenix, AZ 85038 
COLE, FISHER, BOSQUEZ-FLORES, COLE 
& O'KEEFE 
Post Office Box 391 
Fresno, CA 93 708 
Attn: Joseph G. O'Keefe, Esq. 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND, PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attn: Ned A. Cannon, Esq. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attn: Marc A. Lyons 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13 th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attn: Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Said service was made by placing true copies thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope(s) 
addressed as stated above AND, 
Placing the envelope for collection and mailing on the date and at our business address 
following our ordinary business practices. lam readiiy fam1iiar with this business's practice 
for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that 
correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of 
business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. 
Executed on August 27, 2009 at Orange, California. 
~ (ST ATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 
above is true and correct. 
-1-
F:\:1r,T!-.\Teurl;ngs 1 l!>J1ll1am\Teurlings !:-'ldg~\009-8-ri Lien WJ_thdrawal.doc 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













Case No: CV09-0025 
WITHDRAW AL OF MOTION 
TO STRIKE, MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS AND NOTICE OF 
HEARING 
Mr. Godfrey, having filed on August 31, 2009, the Notice of Withdrawal of 
Workers' Compensation lien filed on June 9, 2009, defendant hereby withdraws her Motion 
to Strike and Motion for Sanctions filed on August 11, 2009, as well as the Amended Notice 
of Hearing on defendants motions filed on August 21, 2009. 
WITHDRAW AL OF MOTION TO 
STRIKE, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 1-
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Dated this 1st day of September 2009 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By ~ \-f(. LJ:,, .L, 
SONYA ER. NlJTSCH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of September 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-8421 - facsimile 
Anthony J. Godfrey, ESQ. 
Godfrey, Godfrey & Lamb, LLP 
2119 W. Orangewood Avenue 
Orange, California 92868 
(714) 935-9944- facsimile 
X U.S.MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
X TELECOPY (FAX) 
WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO 
STRIKE, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 2-
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
r I I . r\ 
..- I 
' 
2009 SEP l 3 APl 9 L)2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 




MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 09-00025 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served true and correct 
copies of Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to 
Defendant on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method indicated below: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
D( U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Email (pdf attachment) 
Signed this 1st day of September, 2009, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
NOTIC E OF SERVICE. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents and 
Notice of Service on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method( s) indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
(~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this I" day of September, 2009, at Lewiston, Id~ 
~ 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 2 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB#6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Cl l 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 1\TEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No: CV09-00025 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: Plaintiff, WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, and to your attorney of record, NED 
A.CANNON: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned will call up for hearing, 
defendant's MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE before The Honorable Carl B. 
Kerrick at the Nez Perce County Courthouse on Tuesday, the 13 th day of October, 2009, 
at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1-
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DATED this 23rd day of September 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd of September 2009, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-8421 - facsimile 
X U.S.MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
NOTICE OF HEARING -2-
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Fl LED 
2309 OCT 6 PfTI ~ S 5 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
CLERK OF -E DLST. C URT ., 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLIN GS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 09-00025 
PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE 
OF VENUE TO CLEARWATER COUNTY 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff by and through his attorney of record, Ned A. Cannon, of 
the firm Smith &Cannon PLLC, Lewiston, Idaho, and hereby files his Partial Objection to 
Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue to Clearwater County. 
This Action stems from an automobile collision purportedly caused by Defendant in 
Idaho County, Idaho, in January 2007. Defendant was cited for a moving infraction under and 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-14013 and was processed through the Courts of Idaho County, 
Idaho. 
Under and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and Idaho Code§§ 5-401, 
PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 




et seq. and as shown by the case law referenced below this Court has discretion regarding the 
venue. 
This objection is noted as partial objection in that Defendant's Motion is correct that the 
venue of this Action should be located in Idaho County, Idaho, or Clearwater County, Idaho. 
Filed contemporaneously herewith is an Affidavit of Ned A. Cannon, attaching the Idaho 
Vehicle Collision Report and driver/witness statements for this Court's review. It is referenced 
on Defendant Mallory Larson's driver's statement that her address was 11692 W Trinity Avenue, 
Nampa, Idaho 83651. It is also noted that Defendant Larson's passenger, Danielle R. Poe, 
resides in Boise, Idaho, and thus is more conveniently located to the Courts of Idaho County 
rather than Clearwater County. 
Furthermore, on said Affidavit it is noted that witness Joe Byrd resides at 416 Elk Street, 
Grangeville, Idaho. Plaintiff William Teurlings lives in Fresno, California. Witness Peter 
Molton resides in Burbank, Washington. 
In the case of Richards v. Anderson Erickson Dairy Co. v. Estate of Sarah Dahlke, et al., 
699 N.W.2d 676, a true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto, The Court, in dealing with 
venue statutes similar to those in the case at bar, held, among other things, " ... when venue is 
proper in multiple counties, the Plaintiff may choose where to file and the District Court lacks 
the discretion to transfer the case ... ". Such holding was similar to that Idaho case of Hayes v. 
Kingston, 140 Idaho 5 51, wherein the Court, under a different fact pattern, dealt with, among 
other things, venue being proper in the County "the cause of action arose in". 
In this case, Defendant asks this Court to find proper and controlling venue in Clearwater 
County, notwithstanding that the only contact this action has to Clearwater County is that the 
PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE TO 
CLEARWATER COUNTY 2 
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Defendant currently resides in said county. 
Based upon the foregoing and upon the files and records herein it is requested that venue 
be found appropriate in Idaho County, Idaho, and the case files be transferred from Nez Perce 
County for further proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of October, 2009. 
PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE TO 
Ned A. Cannon, of attorney for Plaintiff 
CLEARWATER COUNTY 3 
 
46
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiff's Partial Objection to Defendants Motion For Change of Venue to Clearwater 
County and on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method(s) indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Signed this 6th day of October, 2009, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
PLAINTIFF ' S PARTIAL OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE TO 




699 N.W.2d 676 
(Cite as: 699 N.W.2d 676) 
H 
Supreme Court oflowa. 
Lorraine RICHARDS and Ward Richards, Appel-
lants, 
V. 
ANDERSON ERICKSON DAIRY CO., Gary Link, 
Kellie Barney and Mary Barney, Appellees. 
Anderson Erickson Dairy Co. and Gary Link, Ap-
pellees, 
V. 
Estate of Sarah Dahlke, Connie Dahlke, Rodney 
Naber, Charles Funke, Henry Brunsman, Lavern 
Willenborg, Brian Buhrow and Janet Buhrow, Ap-
pellees. 
No. 04-0644. 
July 8, 2005. 
Rehearing Denied July 28, 2005. 
Background: Motorists who were involved in 
chain-reaction collision sued owner of semi-truck, 
truck driver, and operator and owner of another car 
involved in accident. After granting motion for 
change of venue filed by owner of semi-truck and 
truck driver, the District Court, Grundy County, 
Bruce B. Zager, J., entered judgment on jury ver-
dict in favor of defendants, and denied motorists' 
motion for new trial. Motorists appealed. 
Holding: The Supreme Court, Streit, J., held that 
semi-truck driver was entitled to have case moved 
to a proper venue, even though owner of semi-truck 




[1[ Appeal and Error 30 ~867(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
Page 2 of 13 
Page I 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
30k867 On Appeal from Decision on 
Motion for New Trial or After Grant of New Trial 
30k867(]) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 ~977(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k976 New Trial or Rehearing 
30k977 In General 
30k977(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
The scope of the Supreme Court's review of a dis-
trict court's ruling on a motion for new trial de-
pends on the grounds raised in the motion; to the 
extent the motion is based on a discretionary 
ground, the Court reviews it for an abuse of discre-
tion, but if the motion is based on a legal question, 
review is on error. 
[2) Appeal and Error 30 ~840(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k840 Review of Specific Questions 
and Particular Decisions 
30k840(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 ~965 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k963 Proceedings Preliminary to Trial 
30k965 k. Change of Venue. Most 
Cited Cases 
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Venue 401 ~46 
401 Venue 
401 III Change of Venue or Place of Trial 
40lk46 k. Action Not Brought in Proper 
County or District. Most Cited Cases 
Court rule requiring a district court to move the 
case to another county if it was brought in the 
wrong county does not implicate the discretionary 
judgment of the district court and, therefore, the Su-
preme Court's review in case involving change of 
venue under rule is for errors at law, not an abuse 
of discretion. LC.A Rule 1.808. 
[3] Venue 401 ~32(1) 
401 Venue 
401II Domicile or Residence of Parties 
40lk32 Objections and Exceptions, Estoppel, 
and Waiver 
401 k32(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
In Iowa, there is a long-standing preference for try-
ing cases in the county of a defendant's residence. 
LC.A.§ 616.17. 
[4] Venue 401 ~22(6) 
401 Venue 
401II Domicile or Residence of Parties 
40 I k20 Privileges of Defendants 
401 k22 Codefendants 
401 k22(6) k. Particular Actions, Ap-
plication To. Most Cited Cases 
A personal-injury lawsuit arising from a chain-
reaction collision was a "personal action" for pur-
poses of Iowa's general venue statute and, thus, 
venue was proper in both counties in which at least 
one defendant resided. LC.A.§ 616.17. 
(5] Venue 401 ~8.2 
401 Venue 
401 I Nature or Subject of Action 
40lk8 Actions for Torts 
401k8.2 k. Particular Torts. Most Cited 
Cases 
Page 3 of 13 
Venue 401 ~22(6) 
401 Venue 
401II Domicile or Residence of Parties 
401 k20 Privileges of Defendants 
401 k22 Co defendants 
Page 2 
401 k22(6) k. Particular Actions, Ap-
plication To. Most Cited Cases 
Venue in personal-injury lawsuit arising from a 
chain-reaction collision was not only proper in 
counties of the residences of various defendants, 
but also proper in county that was the scene of the 
collision. LC.A.§§ 616.17, 616.18. 
[6] Venue 401 ~46 
401 Venue 
401 III Change of Venue or Place of Trial 
40lk46 k. Action Not Brought in Proper 
County or District. Most Cited Cases 
Even though owner of semi-truck was suable in any 
county through which semi-truck was operated, un-
der common carrier statute, owner was not a resid-
ent of county that otherwise had no other connec-
tion with chain-reaction collision giving rise to per-
sonal injury action and, therefore, semi-truck driver 
was entitled to have case moved to a proper venue. 
LC.A. § 616.8; LC.A. Rule 1.808. 
[7) Venue 401 ~52(1) 
401 Venue 
401III Change of Venue or Place of Trial 
401 k52 Convenience of Witnesses 
401 k52( 1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Venue statutes are statutes of convenience. 
[8] Venue 401 ~22(7.1) 
401 Venue 
401 II Domicile or Residence of Parties 
401 k20 Privileges of Defendants 
40 I k22 Codefendants 
40lk22(7) Particular Classes of 
Parties, Application to 
40 I k22(7.1) k. In General. Most 
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Cited Cases 
At least as with respect to non-common carrier de-
fendants, the common carrier statute, which allows 
a common carrier to be sued in any county through 
which its roads or lines pass or operate, does not 
fall within the except-as-otherwise-provided excep-
tion to the general venue statute, which generally 
requires personal actions to be brought in a county 
in which at least one defendant resides. LC.A. §§ 
616.8, 616.17. 
*677 David P. McManus of Glasson, Sole, Mc-
Manus & Pearson, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appel-
lants. 
Richard S. Fry and Heather L. Fleming of Shuttle-
worth & Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for ap-
pellees Anderson Erickson and Link. 
Scott E. McLeod and Todd Slagter of Lynch Dallas, 
P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees Dahlke. 
Natalie Burris of Swisher & Cohrt, P.L.C., Water-
loo, for appellees Naber and Funke. 
Matthew Petrzelka of Simmons, Perrine, Albright 
& Ellwood, Cedar Rapids, for appellees Barney. 
James P. Craig of Moyer & Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar 
Rapids, for appellees Brunsman and Willenborg. 
STREIT, Justice. 
Iowa City must be a special place. The plaintiffs in 
this personal-injury action filed suit in Johnson 
County, notwithstanding the fact that it hardly had 
any connection to the case. The district court gran-
ted the defendants' motion for a change of venue. 
The plaintiffs lost their trial and now appeal the 
venue change. Because we agree venue was not 
proper in Johnson County, we affirm. 
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings 
This appeal stems from a chain-reaction collision 
on a highway in Grundy County in *678 early 
2001. The accident involved a semi-truck owned by 
Page 4 of 13 
Page 3 
the Anderson Erickson Dairy Company ("AE"). 
Lorraine and Ward Richards suffered injuries in the 
accident and sued AE for negligence. They also 
sued Gary Link, the AE employee driving the semi-
truck, and Kellie and Mary Barney, the operator 
and the owner of another car involved in the acci-
dent. 
The Richards filed their lawsuit in Johnson County, 
even though none of the parties resided there. The 
Richards are residents of Grundy County; Link is a 
resident of Story County; the Barneys are residents 
of Polk County; and AE is an Iowa corporation 
whose principal place of business is in Polk 
County. Although the motivation for filing in John-
son County remains unknown/N 1 the Richards 
claimed venue was proper there because AE regu-
larly drove its trucks through Johnson County. 
FNl. In their reply brief, however, the 
Richards state "Of course this court is fully 
aware of the strategy reasons that are back 
[sic] of this litigation." 
Before filing an answer, AE and Link moved for a 
change of venue.FN2 See Iowa R. Civ. P. l.808(1). 
They sought to have the trial moved to Grundy 
County, where the accident occurred. The district 
court granted the motion. 
FN2. The same law firm represents AE and 
Link. Although in the motion for a change 
of venue the firm only referenced AE, on 
appeal the parties appear to agree that both 
AE and Link sought the change of venue to 
Grundy County. We assume the same. The 
Barneys did not join in this motion until 
after filing their answer. But see Iowa R. 
Civ. P. 1.808(1) (requiring defendants to 
object to venue before filing answer). 
At trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. 
The Richards filed a motion for a new trial. They 
argued the district court should not have transferred 
the case to Grundy County. The district court 
denied the motion, and the Richards appealed. FN3 
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FN3. After the case was transferred to 
Grundy County, AE and Link cross-
petitioned against a number of third-party 
defendants. These defendants resisted the 
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and are 
also parties to this appeal. But see Cooley 
v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 209 N.W.2d 100, 
101-02 (Iowa 1973) (third-party defendant 
ordinarily has no right to a change of ven-
ue to county of residence); Mahaska 
County State Bank v. Crist, 87 Iowa 415, 
422-24, 54 N. W. 450, 452-53 (1893) 
(similar). We omit all further reference to 
them. 
II. Principles of Review 
[l] "The scope of our review of a district court's 
ruling on a motion for new trial depends on the 
grounds raised in the motion." Channon v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 859 (Iowa 
2001). That is, 
[t]o the extent the motion is based on a discretion-
ary ground, we review it for an abuse of discre-
tion. But if the motion is based on a legal ques-
tion, our review is on error. 
Roling v. Daily, 596 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 1999). 
The parties disagree about what standard of review 
should be applied. The disagreement stems from the 
fact that some motions for a change of venue re-
quire the district court to exercise its discretion, 
whereas others do not. 
[2] For example, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 
1.801 (3) permits the district court to change the 
venue of a trial if the inhabitants of the county are 
prejudiced against the moving party. In a number of 
appeals concerning this and similar rules, we have 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 
Peters ex rel. Peters v. Vander Kooi, 494 N.W.2d 
708, 711 (Iowa 1993) (reviewing district court's ap-
plication of what is now rule 1.801); see also 
*679State v. Evans, 671 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Iowa 
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2003) (reviewing application of Iowa Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 2.11 to a claim of excessive pretrial 
publicity). In the case at bar, however, we are asked 
to assess the district court's grant of a motion for 
change of venue pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.808. Unlike rule 1.801, rule 1.808 re-
quires the district court to move the case to another 
county if it was brought in the wrong county. See 
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.808(1) (stating that the district 
court "shall" move the trial to a "proper" county). 
To determine whether or not the plaintiff filed suit 
in an improper place, the court only makes a legal 
determination based upon the venue provisions of 
Iowa Code chapter 616. Slattery v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
442 N.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Iowa 1989). Rule 1.808 
does not implicate the discretionary judgment of the 
district court. Id. Therefore our review in this case 
is for errors at law, not an abuse of discretion. 
III. The Merits 
The primary issue is whether venue was proper in 
Johnson County. If venue was proper there, we as-
sume the district court lacked authority to transfer 
the case elsewhere; when venue is proper in mul-
tiple counties, the plaintiff may choose where to 
file and the district court lacks the discretion to 
transfer the case pursuant to rule 1.808. See id. FN4 
If venue was not proper in Johnson County, we 
must decide whether it was proper in Grundy 
County. Id. 
FN4. As in Slattery, the defendants in this 
case did not ask the court to move the trial 
for non-statutory reasons. 442 N. W.2d at 84. 
To answer the foregoing questions, we must apply 
the various provisions of Iowa Code chapter 616. 
Id. We first analyze Iowa Code section 616.17, our 
general venue statute. We then consider two specif-
ic venue provisions, which the parties variously 
claim have applicability in this case. 
A. Iowa Code§ 616.17 
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[3][4] In Iowa, there is a long-standing preference 
for trying cases in the county of a defendant's resid-
ence. Tull v. Honda Research & Dev., Ltd., 469 
N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 1991) (tracing preference 
back to 1851 ). Today this preference is found in 
Iowa Code section 616.17, our general venue stat-
ute. See id. That statute provides: 
Personal actions, except as otherwise provided, 
must be brought in a county in which some of the 
defendants actually reside, but if neither of them 
have a residence in the state, they may be sued in 
any county in which either of them may be found. 
Iowa Code § 616.17 (2001). Although renumbered 
several times over the years, the substance of the 
statute has remained unchanged for over a century. 
Compare Iowa Code § 2586 (1873), with Iowa 
Code § 616.17 (200 I). Clearly, the present person-
al-injury lawsuit is a "personal action" for purposes 
of the statute. See, e.g., Tull, 469 N.W.2d at 686 
(holding a negligence action arising out of an all-
terrain vehicle accident was a "personal action"); 
Baker v. Ryan, 67 Iowa 708, 710, 25 N.W. 890, 890 
(1885) (holding petition alleging negligence was a 
"personal action"). Here venue was proper in both 
Story and Polk counties because at least one de-
fendant resided in each locale. Iowa Code § 616.17. 
Having applied the general venue statute to the 
facts of this case, we now turn to examine two spe-
cific venue provisions the parties have brought to 
our attention, Iowa Code sections 616.18 and 616.8. 
We must determine whether they fit within the 
"except as otherwise provided" proviso in the gen-
eral venue statute and also make venue *680 proper 
in other counties. Id.; see, e.g., Tull, 469 N. W.2d at 
686. 
B. Iowa Code§ 616.18 
[5] In 1941, the legislature enacted a law permitting 
plaintiffs in motor vehicle accidents to sue in the 
county in which the mJury was sustained. 1941 
Iowa Acts ch. 298, § I (codified at Iowa Code § 
Page 6 of 13 
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616.18 (1946)). In 1972, the legislature broadened 
this special venue provision to plaintiffs in all per-
sonal-injury lawsuits. 1972 Iowa Acts ch. 1127, § I 
(codified at Iowa Code § 616.18 (1973)). We sub-
sequently held Iowa Code section 6 I 6.18 falls with-
in the "except as otherwise provided" proviso of 
Iowa Code section 616.17. Tull, 469 N.W.2d at 
686. For this reason, the defendants are correct 
when they assert that venue in this case was not 
only proper in Polk and Story counties, the resid-
ences of various defendants, but also proper in 
Grundy County, the scene of the collision. Iowa 
Code § 616.18 (Iowa 2001); see also Becker v. 
Wright, 540 N.W.2d 250. 253 (Iowa 1995) (holding 
venue proper under Iowa Code section 616.17 
where alleged injury was "triggered"). 
C. Iowa Code § 616.8 
[6] To show venue was proper in Johnson County, 
the plaintiffs cite another special venue statute, 
Iowa Code section 616.8. Like our general venue 
statute, section 616.8, known as our common carri-
er statute, has also remained virtually unchanged 
for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 
(1873), with Iowa Code§ 616.8 (2001). It provides: 
A.n action may be brought against any railway cor-
poration, the owner of stages, or other line of 
coaches or cars, express, canal, steam boat and 
other river crafts, telegraph and telephone com-
panies ... in any county through which such road 
or line passes or is operated. 
Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly men-
tioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying 
freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with 
fixed termini constitute a "line of ... cars" for pur-
poses of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. John-
ston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 
(1939) (holding the fact legislature could not have 
foreseen rise of semi-trucks when it enacted com-
mon carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not 
foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its 
intent). 
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The Richards contend section 616.8, like section 
6 I 6.18, falls within the "except as otherwise 
provided" language of section 616.17 and thereby 
authorized venue in Johnson County. Prior preced-
ent holds otherwise. We were presented with simil-
ar facts and identical statutes in 1926 and held our 
common carrier statute did not fall within the ex-
ception to the general venue statute. For this reason, 
today we hold venue was not proper in Johnson 
County and affirm the district court. 
Nickell I 
In Nickell v. District Court ("Nickell I"), the 
plaintiff was killed when his automobile collided 
with a train in Wayne County. 202 Iowa 408, 409, 
210 N.W. 563. 563 (1926). His estate sued the rail-
road and its engineer in Clarke County. Id. The rail-
road was an Illinois corporation with its principal 
place of business in Illinois. Id. The engineer was a 
resident of Appanoose County. Id. The railroad had 
routes in Wayne, Clarke, and Appanoose Counties. 
Id. 
The engineer filed a motion to change venue to Ap-
panoose County. Id. The plaintiff resisted the mo-
tion. Id. The plaintiff claimed Iowa's common carri-
er statute fit within the "except otherwise provided" 
language of the general venue statute and therefore 
permitted him to sue both the railroad and the en-
gineer anywhere*681 the railroad had tracks in the 
state. Id. at 410,210 N.W. at 563. It is important to 
note that notwithstanding the passage of time, the 
general venue and common carrier statutes in Nick-
ell I, although renumbered, are identical to those in 
the case at bar. Compare Iowa Code §§ 11041, 
11049 (1924), with Iowa Code~§ 616.8, .17 (2001). 
The district court denied the engineer's motion, but 
on appeal we reversed. We held "the exception 
provided for in [the general venue statute] does not 
cover the conditions provided for in [the common 
carrier statute]." Nickell I, 202 Iowa at 411, 210 
N.W. at 564. We further held that because the rail-
Page 7 of 13 
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road was not a resident of Clarke County, the dis-
trict court properly granted the engineer's motion 
for a change of venue to the county of his resid-
ence. Id. 
Our holding in Nickell I was premised upon a dis-
tinction between suability and residence. Id. at 
410-11, 210 N.W. at 563-64. Even though the com-
mon carrier statute rendered the railroad suable 
anywhere it had tracks, that did not make it a resid-
ent of all those counties for purposes of a codefend-
ant Iowa resident's motion for a change of venue 
predicated upon the general venue statute. Id. That 
is, the mere fact the common carrier is suable in 
any county where its tracks run does not trump the 
right of other Iowa residents-defendants to have the 
trial held in a county where at least one of them 
resides. See id. In harmonizing the two statutes in 
this way, we emphasized that venue statutes are 
statutes of convenience and must be construed to 
effectuate the same. See id. at 411, 210 N.W. at 564 
(noting "it was undoubtedly as convenient" for the 
railroad to have the case tried in Appanoose County 
as in Clarke County). 
Nickell II 
We further explained and reaffirmed our holding in 
Nickell I the next year in Hinchcl/ff v. Dist. Ct .. 204 
Iowa 470, 215 N.W. 605 (1927) ("Nickell If'), a 
subsequent appeal taken from the same case. FNs 
See Recent Cases, 13 Iowa L. Rev. 217, 230-31 
( 1928) ( digesting Nickell I and II). After we de-
cided Nickell I, on remand the district court ordered 
the entire case transferred to Appanoose County. 
Nickell JI, 204 Iowa at 471, 215 N.W. at 605. The 
plaintiff objected. Id. Although the plaintiff admit-
ted transfer of the case was proper as to the engin-
eer, he resisted transfer of the railroad company. Id. 
FN5. The parties here do not discuss Nick-
ell II. 
In Nickell II, we reaffirmed our holding in Nickell I 
and again ordered the entire case transferred to Ap-
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panoose County. Id. at 472-73, 215 N.W. at 605-06. 
In doing so, we further explained our reasoning in 
Nickell I. We reiterated transfer of the case as to the 
engineer was proper because of the distinction 
between suability and residence, i.e., the common 
carrier statute did not make the railroad a "resident" 
of Clarke County to satisfy the engineer's right un-
der the general venue statute to have the case tried 
where at least one Iowan-defendant resided. See id. 
The engineer was therefore entitled to have the case 
transferred to Appanoose County. As for the rail-
road company, we held that once it was determined 
the engineer was entitled to a transfer to Appanoose 
County, the entire case should be moved there for 
the sake of convenience. See id. ( citing the prin-
ciple that "[a] case should be, if possible, kept to-
gether, and find disposition on one trial" and noting 
it was equally convenient for the railroad to try the 
case in either venue). 
When reading Nickell I and II together, it becomes 
manifest that it was the engineer's*682 interest to 
be sued in his county of residence that controlled 
the analysis in Nickell l Put simply, Nickell I held 
that Iowa Code section 616.8 does not fall within 
the "except as otherwise provided" proviso of sec-
tion 616.18 when the plaintiff also sues other Iowa 
residents. See also Halse v. La Crescent Grain Co., 
231 Iowa 231,235.1 N.W.2d 202. 204 (1941) 
(adhering to Nickell I and II on analogous facts). 
In light of Nickell I and II, it is clear in the case at 
bar that venue was not proper in Johnson County. 
AE was suable in Johnson County but not a resident 
thereof. Link was entitled to have the case moved 
to a proper venue. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.808. As indic-
ated, venue was proper in either Polk or Story 
counties, the counties wherein at least one defend-
ant was resident, as well as Grundy County because 
the injury was allegedly sustained there. Iowa Code 
§§ 616.17, .18; see also Tull, 469 N.W.2d at 686. 
Therefore the district court did not err when it 
moved the entire case to Grundy County. Iowa 
Code § 616.18; see Halse, 231 Iowa at 235, I 
N.W.2d at 204; Nickell If, 204 Iowa at 472-73, 215 
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N.W. at 605-06; Nickell 1, 202 Iowa at 411, 210 
N.W. at 564.FN6 
FN6. As in Nickell 11, we expressly do not 
decide whether venue would have been 
proper in Johnson County had the plaintiffs 
only sued AE or had settled with Link. See 
Nickell II, 204 Iowa at 472, 215 N.W. at 
606. There is some support for the view 
that it would be proper. See Bruce Trans-
fer, 227 Iowa at 52-55, 287 N.W. at 278-81 
(although not asked to decide its relation-
ship with the general venue statute, hold-
ing under the common carrier statute that a 
common carrier-the sole defendant in the 
case-was not permitted a change of venue 
to its principal place of business); see also 
The Distinction Between Suability and 
Residence in Venue Statutes, 13 Iowa 
L.Rev. 212, 216 (1928) (opining that "[i]t 
is granted that if the railroad company had 
been sued alone, the venue would have 
been properly laid" in Nickell I). 
Reaffirming Statutes of Convenience 
[7] To overrule Nickell I and II after nearly eight 
decades would frustrate legislative intent in two re-
spects. First, the legislature's silence over the years 
is evidence of its tacit approval of our construction 
of the statutory framework. State v. Anderson, 517 
N.W.2d 208, 214 (Iowa 1994); accord Ronald 
Dworkin, Law's Empire 318-19 (1986) ("A statute 
owes its existence not only to the decision people 
made to enact it but also to the decision of other 
people later not to amend or repeal it."). Second, it 
must be remembered that venue statutes are statutes 
of convenience, and to hold otherwise would pro-
mote inconvenience. See Nickell 1, 202 Iowa at 411, 
210 N.W. at 564. On this latter point, some further 
explanation of the common carrier statute is neces-
sary. 
As enacted, the common carrier statute both expan-
ded and restricted venue for suits brought against 
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common carriers. In each instance, however, the 
statute promoted convenience. 
The common carrier statute expanded the venue op-
tions for plaintiffs suing a resident common carrier 
by itself. At the time, of course, there was not a 
special venue statute such as Iowa Code section 
616.18 permitting plaintiffs to bring suit in the 
county where the injury occurred. Instead of for-
cing the plaintiff to sue the resident common carrier 
at its principal place of business, the plaintiff could 
sue it wherever its lines ran. See Bruce Transfer, 
227 Iowa at 52, 287 N.W. at 280 ("The statute was 
apparently based upon the thought that the public 
interest and convenience would be promoted by 
permitting suits against common carriers in any 
county on their lines."). This was undoubtedly util-
ized by plaintiffs to file suit where the injury oc-
curred, which, in turn, was likely *683 to be where 
evidence, the witnesses, and possibly even the 
plaintiff resided. 
The common carrier statute restricted venue for 
plaintiffs suing a nonresident common carrier by it-
self. In its absence, the general venue statute per-
mitted plaintiffs to sue the common carrier any-
where it could "be found." Iowa Code § 11041 
(1924) (now codified at Iowa Code § 616.18). 
Again, the common carrier statute promoted con-
venience because the common carrier 
~an more easily procure its witnesses, and carry on 
the process of the trial [when sued where its lines 
run] than if it were forced to defend in some re-
mote corner of the state where one of its officers 
may be served, but where it does not carry on its 
business of transportation. 
The Distinction Between Suability and Residence in 
Venue Statutes, 13 Iowa L. Rev. 212, 214 (1928); 
see, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Mers-
hon, 181 Iowa 892, 894, 165 N.W. 86, 87 (1917) 
(sanctioning change of venue pursuant to common 
carrier statute from a county in which one of the 
railroad's agents was served to a county in which it 
ran its lines). 
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The Richards would have us overrule our preced-
ents and reinterpret chapter 616 to permit a plaintiff 
to sue any Iowa resident who happens to have a 
common carrier as a codefendant in the remotest 
parts of the state, even though the chosen venue had 
no connection with the case. This interpretation 
would clearly promote forum shopping and incon-
venience, and thereby frustrate legislative intent. It 
would also foster injustice because it would encour-
age plaintiffs to sue defendants in inconvenient 
venues as leverage in the settlement process. We 
will not sanction an interpretation of chapter 616 
that would permit a plaintiff to transform statutes of 
convenience into statutes of inconvenience. 
[8] We are obligated to consider the common carri-
er statute in pari materia with other pertinent stat-
utes. Niles v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 683 N.W.2d 539, 541 
(Iowa 2004). That is precisely what we did in Nick-
ell I and Nickell JI, when we held the common car-
rier statute does not fall within the exception to the 
general venue statute, at least with respect to a non-
common carrier defendant. We adhere to those 
holdings today. 
IV. Conclusion 
Venue was proper in Polk, Story, and Grundy 
counties. The plaintiffs filed suit in Johnson 
County, which was not a proper venue. The district 
court rightly transferred the entire case to Grundy 
County. 
AFFIRMED. 
All justices concur except CARTER, J., who takes 
no part. 
Iowa,2005. 
Richards v. Anderson Erickson Dairy Co. 
699 N.W.2d 676 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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I, Ned A. Cannon, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, and make this 
Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
That attached hereto are true and accurate copies of the Idaho Vehicle Collision 
Report relating to the collision in this action that caused injury and property damage to 
Plaintiff. 
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That excluded from the attachment are the photos and photo logs associated with 
the Idaho State Police' s investigation. 
DATED: This 6th day of October, 2009. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 6th day of October, 2009. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Lewiston therein. 
My commission expires: June 11 , 2014 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of an Affidavit of Ned A. Cannon in Partial Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Change of Venue on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method 
indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) 
Signed this 6
th 
day of October, 2009, at Lewiston, I~ 
---d:Cannon 
AFFIDAVIT OF NED A. CANNON IN 
PARTIAL OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
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Idaho Vehic e o 1s1on Repvrt I Agency I Officer Reper. I Case 
L07000031 I Page 1 IID-90 5-95M 27-010500-0 Revised 11 /29/96 Code SP02 # 2462 District 2 No. 
I Date of Collision I Day of Collision Time Police Police EMS EMS Location I]! N OE 0 IN City or Town 
I 
Dispatched Arrived Dispatched Arrived 
1/7/2007 Sunday (1) 12:43 12:43 12:4€ 12:4313:062 Miles OS Ow I]! e'"ot tonwood 
If Collision Complete Name of Street 0 On Private Property # of Posted Speed County Interchange # 
location is in: Box# 
1 Lanes Intersection ON U.S. Hiahwav 95 2 65 Idaho of 2 streets 1, 2 -u 
In the Intersection with: R. R. Crossing # Latitude (GPS) 
Intersection of Posted Speed 
Street and: 2 -u 
Parking Lot / 1, 2,3 
Driveway I Outside an Intersection Name of Cross Street or# of Ref. Mile Post Marker Collision Loe Mile Point Longitude (GPS) 
Alley 3 Oil Miles N s E w 
Non-Intersection 1, 3 0.7 0 Feet IX 0 0 D OF MP 257 
UNIT 1 cg Vehicle D Pedestrian D Pedalcyclist Vehicle Owner Last First M.I. Unit IX Same as Type 
Driver Last First M.I. Driver Larson Mallory E 6 
Mallory Address 12877 Hartford Ave 0 Hit& Larson E IX As Driver nrof .i no. ID 83544 -Run Unit Use 
Vehicle Year Make (Dodge-Chev.) I Model (Dart-Nova) Style (2 Dr.) 0 
 2002 Ford Focus 4 Door -
Attach 1 
Vehicle Color 
I Lice;~;e;; S S State 0  Maroon ID ~ 
Driver's License No. State Idaho Code#/ Violation Q!!Cited Yehicle Identification No. Est. Cost of Damage 
Attach 2 
ID 49-14013 12000 0 
SF I I Prot Dev. lnjB I Eje:t I Tral,ed I Tranlorted Insurance Carrier Name Policy Number 10 IE Yes Fann Bureau 01-A-024225-01 0 No 
Passenger Names and Addresses (Unit 1 only, additional Same Address 
Prot Trans-
oassenoers on oaae 3) as Driver Seating Sex Date of Birth Dev. Injury Ejection Trapped ported 
Poe, Danielle R 
0 3 F  10 0 1 1 5 
0 
0 
UNIT2 cg Vehicle D Pedestrian D Pedalcyclist Vehicle Owner Last First M.I. Unit 
I]! Same as Type 
Driver Last First M.I. Driver Byrd Joe E 6 
0 Hit& Byrd Joe E Address 416 Elk Street -Run Q!!AsDriver Granaeville ID 83530 Unit Use 
Vehicle Year Make (Dodge-Chev.) Model (Dart-Nova) Style (2 Dr.) 0 
 1997 Buick Skylark 4 Door --
I Lice;e;l;e ~06 S 
Attach 1 
Vehicle Color State 0 
Green ID --




I Prot Dev. lnjB IEject I Trard Traniorted Policy Number 
 7 DI Yes State Fann L03 7487-D07-12F 0 No 
Passenger Names and Addresses (Unit 2 only, additional Same Address Prot Trans-




Injured Transported To: St. Marys Hospital - Cottonwood By: St. Marys Hospital A:mb - Cottonwood 
Front Seating Front Protective Devices Injury Unit Type 
~ 
0 None 4 Child Safety K Dead 1 Pedestrian 8 Pickup with Camper 1 O Motorhome 
1 2 3 Vehicle 1 Shoulder Belt Only Seat A Incapacitating 2 Pedalcycle 7 Pickup/ Van/ Panel/ 11 Snowmobile 
2 Lap Belt Only 5 Helmet Used B Non-lncapacitaling 3 Motorcycle Sport Utiltty Vehicle 5 ATV 
4 5 6 3 Shoulder & Lap 6 Nonmotorist C Possible 4 Moped 12 Equestrian 28 Train 
Air Bag Equipped O None Evident 6 Car 
30 Farm Equipment (List) 99 Other Non-
7 8 10 Motorcycle 7 Non-Activated Air Bag, Belts in Use U Unknown 
40 Construction Equip. (List) Motor Veh. 
8 Non-Activated Air Bag, No Belts in Use Commercial 
14 Trailing Unit 1 8 Equestrian 1 O Air Bag Activated, Belts in Use 15 Bus 24 Bobtail 
· , Pedestrian 99 Other 11 Air Bag Activated, No Belts in Use Transported For 21 Single Unit Truck - 2 axle/6 Tires 25 Tractor w/Semi Trailer 
Pedalcycle U Unknown Ejection Trapped Medical Care By 
22 Single Unit Truck - 3 axle 26 Tractor w/Double Trailer 
23 Truck with Trailer 27 Tractor wfTriple Trailer 
Passenger Codes - Non Trailing Unit 1 Not Ejected 1 Not Trapped 
1 Ambulance 
Unit Use Attachments 2 Totally Ejected 2 Trapped / Extrication 2 Police Car 11 Sleeper Sect.(Truck Cab) unit used 3 Helicopter 1 Police 5 Taxi 1 Boat Trailer 5 Mobile Home 
12 Other enclosed Passngr./Cargo area 3 Partially Ejected 3 Trapped/ other 2 Ambulance 6 Fire 2 Utility Trailer 9 Other T Thrown from 4 Private Vehicle 13 Unenclosed Passngr./Cargo area extrication method 5 Not Transported 3 Driver Tmg. 7 Wrecker 3 Travel Trailer 
15 Riding on Vehicle Exterior cycle etc. 4 Government 8 School Bus 4 Towed Vehicle 









1 Business/Commercial 3 School/Playgrou .. d 5 Agricultural 7 Residential 
2 Industrial/Manufacturing 4 Recreational Area 6 Undeveloped 
Light Conditions 
1 Day 3 Dark - Street Lights On 5 Dark - No Street Lights 
2 Dawn/Dusk 4 Dark - Street Lights Off 
Weather Conditions - Two Selections Possible 
·1 Clear 3 Rain 5 Sleet/Hail 7 Blowing Dust/Sand 
2 Cloudy 4 Snow 6 Fog 8 Severe Cross Winds 







Other Road Conditions 
0 None 4 High/Low Shoulder 
1 Ruts/Bumps/Holes 5 Loose Gravel/Seal Coat 
2 Slick Asphalt (Bleeding) 6 Under Construction 









# 2462 ). L07000031 
Road Type 
2-Way & Raised/Depressed Divider 
2 2-Way & 2-Way Left Turn Lane Divider 
3 One-Way 
4 2-Way & No Divider 
A 2-Way & 2 Double Yellow Painted Divider 
5 Ramp 
6 Alley 
7 Rest Area 
8 Port of Entry 
9 Other 
Road Surface Type 
1 Concrete 2 Paved (Asphalt/Brick) 3 Gravel/Stone 4 Dirt 
Roadway 1 Straight 2 Curve 
Geometrics 1 Upgrade/Downgrade 3 Hillcrest 5 Level 
Traffic Control 
0 None 4 Flashing Beacon 8 Officer/Flagg er 
1 Stop Sign 5 Traffic Signal-Ped. Only A School Bus Signal 
2 Yield 6 R. R. Gates/Signal B No-Pass Barrier Line 
3 Traffic Signal 7 R. R. Flashing Beacon C Construction Signing 
SPECIFY Functioning 2 Not Functioning 3 Removed 
CONTRIBUTING CIRCUMSTANCES- 3 Possible 
O None 5 Improper Lane Change 
1 Exceeded Posted Speed 6 Following Too Close 
2 Speed Too Fast 
for Conditions 
3 Too Slow for Traffic 
4 Improper Overtaking 
0 None 
1 Curve in Road 
2 Hill Crest 
7 Drove Left of Center 
8 Off Roadway/ 
Over Corrected 
1 0 Improper Backing 
3 Roadway Slope/Snowbank 
4 Trees/Crop/Brush 
5 Reflection from Surface 
6 Bright Sunlight 
11 Improper Tum 17 Wheel Defect 22 Inattention 
12 Failed t-0 Signal 18 Light Defect 23 Vision Obstruction 
13 Failed to Yield 19 Other Vehicle 24 Asleep/Drowsy 
14 Passed Stop Sign Defect 25 Sick 
15 Disregarded Signal 21 Alcohol Impaired 26 Fatigued 
1 6 Tire Defect 34 Drug Impaired 27 Physical Impairment 
VISION OBSTRUCTION 
7 Bright Headlights 
8 Weather Conditions 
1 O Rain/Snow/Ice on Windows 
11 Cracked/Dirty Windows 
12 Splash/Spray from Other Vehicle 
18 Vehicle Stopped on Roadway 
13 Moving Vehicle 
14 Parked Vehicle 
28 Improperly Parked 
31 Previous Accident 
32 Distraction in/on 
Vehicle (List) 
35 Improper use of 
Tum Lane 
99 Other 




r.;-:;i~ _ INITIAL 
:;.r- Point of 
Impact 
'i'i1---PRINCIPLE 
I::.::)-.- Point of 13 Top & Windows 33 Top 53 Top 
Impact 
14 Undercarriage 34 Undercarriage 54 Undercarriage i...;_.;.;.;.:;.;,;.;;,,;;.;,;,,;;:a.:._ _______ ...1.. ____ ..::... ______ ..L.._;__ __ ..::.;:.. ____ _.i Impact 
Page 2 
'6L-J EXTENT OF DEFORMITY J+fil 1..::: .. r 1"""!0-.N~o-n""e--1-V'!'e""ry""!"!M~in'"o'"r --'!'2'"M!'!"'in""or ............ 3_M'!'i!"'n""m-./M'!'od;.;.;e,.ra"'te;.;...;;;;.;.4~M'!-o"'!d-er·at""e.;.;,;,;,;.;."'"'!'5~M!"'od'!'e'"r-at""e/~S!"'e""ve""r'"e .... ..,. .. 6'!'""S~e-v .. e""re--""""7!""!'V!'"e-ry~S!"'e""v""er..1; L:J 
Towed Due to Damage 
l:i Yes D No I Towed By: I Towed By: I Towed Due to Damage . Dale ' s Towing . C&:B Towing . Cl!t Yes D No 
Driver of UNIT # 1 ALCOHOL/DRUG INVOLVEMENT Driver of UNIT # 2 
1 Neither Alcohol or Drugs Detected 2 Yes - Alcohol 3 Yes - Drugs 4 Yes - Both II] 
Alcohol Test 
Drug Test 1 None Given 
SAC Test Results: 
I 
Drug Used (if known): 
UNIT# 1 
1 Bus 2 Van/Enclosed Box 3 Cargo Tank 
Alcohol/ Drug Test 
2 Test Refused 3 Blood Test 4 Urine Test 5 Breath Test 6 Field Test 
Drug Test Results BAC Test Results: 
I 
Drug Used (it known): 
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE 
Refer to Instruction Sheet before completing 
CarQo Body 
4 Flatbed 5 Dump 6 Concrete Mixer 7 Auto Transporter 8 Garbage/Refuse 
I Alcohol Test ~m 
! Drug Test ~[!] 
Drug Test Results 
UNIT#2r-D 
9 Other 1 O Pickup Bed 
# Axles I GVWR-Power I GVWR-AII Trailers 
I 
ICC # For Load I DOT# For Load # Axles I GVWR-Power I GVWR-AII Trailers , ,cc# For Load I DOT# For Load 
Hazardous Placard: DYes Spilled: DYes IHaz-Mat # Hazardous Placard: § ~; Spilled: DYes IHaz-Mat# 
Material D No D No Material D No 
rLJ Carrier Name & ICC# or DOT# for Load obtained from ... l~D r 1 Shipping Papers 2 Vehicle Side 3 Driver 4 Log Book 9 Other 
(11 Carrier Carrier Name (It Carrier Carrier Name 
different different 
from Address from Address 
Vehicle Vehicle 
Owner) City State Zip Owner) City State Zip 





Even Involved tion 
10 1 1 
72 1 1 
53 1 2 1 
10 2 1 
72 2 1 
53 2 4 1 
10 4 1 
5 4 3 
UNIT# 1 
IT] O Nonjunction 
1 In Intersection 
1 s 31 FIRST Harmful Event 
1 s olMOST Harmful Event 
0oriver / Ped Action 
Sketch the scene 
Property Damage 
None 
I EVENTS- Lir vents for ALL units in the order they occurre, _II 2~_se L07000031 Page 3 
1 Overturn 
2 Separation of Units One Veh. Collision With 
3 Cargo Loss/Shift 14 Pedestrian 24 Bridge Rail 
4 Jack-Knifed 15 Pedalcycle 25 Overpass 
5 Ran off Road 16 Railroad Train 26 Guardrail Face 
6 Down Hill Runaway 17 Domestic Animal 27 Guardrail End 
7 Fire/Explosion 18 Wild Animal 28 Median Barrier 
8 Gas/Inhalation 19 Other Object 30 Highway Traffic 
9 Other Noncollision Not Fixed Sign Post 
1 0 Loss of Control 20 Parked Vehicle 31 Overhead Sign support 
11 Fell/Pushed/Jumped on Private Property 32 Street Light Support 
12 Non-Collision Injury 21 Impact Attenuator 33 Utility Pole 
13 Immersion 22 Bridge/Pier/ Abutment 39 Other Pole 
71 Came Back on Road 23 Bridge Parapet End 40 Delineator Post 
72 Drove UR of Center I THE EVENT 1 On Roadway 4 Roadside (Includes Sidewalk) 
LOCATION 
2 Left Shoulder 5 Outside Right of Way 
3 Right Shoulder 6 Off Roadway - Loe Unknown 
Sideswiped Sideswipe 
Same Opposite 
41 Culvert 52 '-.__,/ 53 
42 Curb --43 Ditch 
44 Embankment Turning Events 
45 Fence 
~-~ I r+ Angle 46 Mailbox 
47 Tree -r 59 Ji 48 Building Wall 




7 Median A In Parking Lot 
8 Gore B Parking Lot Access Road 




60 Backed Into 
61 Parked Veh. 
99 Other 
FIRST EVENT RELATIONSHIP TO JUNCTION 
2 Intersection Related 
3 At Driveway/Alley 
4 Driveway/ Alley Related 
5 On Ramp 
6 Ramp Related 8 Railroad Crossing Related 
7 At Railroad Crossing 9 Other 
GENERAL DIRECTION OF TRAVEL (If turning, select direction before turning) 
FIRST Harmful Event ls3I 
General Direction of Street Unit Direc lion 
Q[ South / North D North Q!I South 
D West/ East D East D West 
On Street 
U.S. Highway 95 
I 
U.S.HlghNay95 
I I . 
(Name of Object Struck - Owner Name and Address) 
General Direction of Street 
Q[ South / North 
D West/ East 
On Street 
U.S. Highway 95 
Unit Direc lion 
Qg: North D South 
MOST Harmful Event ls3I 
Driver/ Ped Action IT] 
D East D West 
Driver Actions 
1 Going Straight 14 Starting in Traffic 
2 Turning Right 15 Parking 
3 Right Turn on Red 16 Entering Drivwy./Alley 
4 Turning Left 17 Leaving Drivwy./Alley 
5 Left Turn on Red 18 Backing 
6 U-Turn 20 Avoiding Obstacle 
7 Merging 21 Avoiding Veh./Ped. 
8 Changing Lanes 22 Pursuing Vehicle 
10 Passing 23 Fleeing Pursuit 
11 Negotiating Curve 24 Racing 
12 Stopped in Traffic 25 Parked Vehicle 
13 Slowing in Traffic 26 Driverless Vehicle 
in Motion 
Pedestrian/Pedalcycle Actions 
30 Crossing at Painted Intersection 
31 Crossing at Unpainted Intersection 
35 Crossing at Non-Intersection X-walk 
36 Crossing Not at Intersection 
40 Walk/Ride with Traffic in Bike Lane 
41 Walk/Ride with Traffic No Bike Lane 
42 Walk/Ride Facing Traffic in Bike Lane 
43 Walk/Ride Facing Traffic No Bike Lane 
50 Standing on Roadway 
51 Playing on Roadway 
52 Working on Roadway 
60 Enter/Leave School Bus 
70 Not on Roadway 
99 Other 
Not to Scale 
Estimated Damage 
$ 
Narrative I Additional Information/ Additional Passengers (indicate unit# and all information for additional passengers) 
NOTE: See addendum page for crash narrative. 
WITNESSES Name 
Investigating Officer's Name and # 
X James Brouwer 2462 
Address 
Date of Report 
1/10/2007 
Photos Approved By 
y IX! N o bdoty 
Send ORIGINAL to: Office of Highway Safety, P. 0. Box 7129, Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 






Impact 2K 2.0.0 
 
63
Idaho Vehicle Collision Report Date of Collision Time Ager-· Officer# Case No. 
Additional Units 
ITD-90A 10-9-96 Pg 
27-010505·9 1/7/2007 12:43 SPl...:. 2462 L07000031 
I UNIT 3 tl[Vehicle D Pedestrian D Pedalcyclist Vehicle Owner Last First M.I. Unit 
·iver 
O Same as 
Swift Transoortation 
Type 
Last First M.I. Driver 
D Hit& William Address 9 4 0 0 NW 10th St. 
25 
Run Teurlings p D As Driver Oklahoma Citv. OK 73127 Unit Use 
Vehicle Year I Make (Dodge-Chev.) Model (Dart-Nova) Style (2 Dr.) 0 
2006 Volvo Conventional Truck Tractor 
Attach 1 









Date of Birth I Prot Dev. In~ I Eje:t I Traied I Tran1orted Insurance I Carrier Name Policy Number 3 IX Yes N07QA00120 o~ Self-Insured 
Passenger Names and Addresses (This unit only, additional 
Same Address Prot Trans-




UNIT 4 Ct Vehicle D Pedestrian D Pedalcyclist Vehicle Owner Last First M.I. Unit 
15{ Same as 
Molton Peter M 
Type 
Driver Last First M.I. Driver 6 
0Hit& Address 227 Lakeview Dr. r----
Run Molton Peter M [gt As Driver Burbank, WA 99323 Unit Use 
Vehicle Year I Make (Dodge-Chev.) I Model (Dart-Nova) Style (2 Dr.) 0 
2005 Honda S2000 2 Door -
I Licen;e ~l;e ;~U Attach 1 Vehicle Color State 0 
White WA -




Date of Birth I Prot Dev. lnjo I Ejelon I Trard I Trasorted lnsurancelcarrier Name Policy Number 10 ~ 1~ Pemco Insurance Co. CA 0692269 




#3 CONTRIBUTING CIRCUMSTANCES- 3 Possible UNIT #4 
'o_N_ol.n .. e _________ 5_1m-pr-o-pe_r_L_a-ne~C;.ha;.;n;.;g;.;e~1:;1.;;;.lm;.p;,;.ro.;.p;;;e;.r,;;;Tu;,.;r.;.n;,;;;;,,;;;;,.;;.;1,;;;7;.W:.;.;he:;.e;.;l:;D,;;;ef;;.;ec:;t....;:.;..: .. 2:;2,:;;l,:;;na,:,:;t;;.:te,;;;n~tio .. n--------2-8-lm-p-ro-p-e-rly-P-ar .. ke-d--, I ~o I 
4 
7 
1 Exceeded Posted Speed 6 Following Too Close 12 Failed to Signal 18 Light Defect 23 Vision Obstruction 31 Previous Accident 
2 Speed Too Fast 7 Drove Left of Center 13 Failed to Yield 19 Other Vehicle 24 Asleep/Drowsy 32 Distraction in/on 
for Conditions 8 Off Roadway/ 14 Passed Stop Sign Defect 25 Sick Vehicle (List) 
3 Too Slow for Traffic Over Corrected 15 Disregarded Signal 21 Alcohol Impaired 26 Fatigued 35 Improper use of 
Turn Lane 
4 Improper Overtaking 10 Improper Backing 16 Tire Defect 34 Drug Impaired 27 Physical Impairment 99 Other 
0 None 
1 Curve in Road 
2 Hill Crest 
3 Roadway Slope/Snowbank 
4 Trees/Crop/Brush 
5 Reflection from Surface 
6 Bright Sunlight 
VISION OBSTRUCTION 
7 Bright Headlights 
8 Weather Conditions 
10 Rain/Snow/Ice on Windows 
11 Cracked/Dirty Windows 
12 Splash/Spray from Other Vehicle 
1 B Vehicle Stopped on Roadway 
13 Moving Vehicle 
14 Parked Vehicle 




Front Seating Front 
ffi 
Protective Devices 







8 Pickup with Camper 
7 Pickup/ Van/ Panel/ 
1 O Motorhome 
11 Snowmobile 
5 ATV 
2 3 Vehicle 1 Shoulder Belt Only Seat 
2 Lap Belt Only 5 Helmet Used 
5 6 3 Shoulder & Lap 6 Nonmotorist 
Air Bag Equipped 
8 10 Motorcycle 7 Non-Activated Air Bag, Belts In Use 





0 None Evident 
U Unknown 
6 Car 
Sport Utility Vehicle 
12 Equestrian 
30 Farm Equipment (List) 











1 O Air Bag Activated, Belts in Use 15 Bus 
11 Air Bag Activated, No Belts in Use -T-ra_n_s-po_rt_e_d-Fo_r_~ 21 Single Unit Truck· 2 axle/6 Tires ---------.------------1 22 Single Unit Truck· 3 axle 
Ejection Trapped Medical Care By 23 Truck with Trailer 
24 Bobtail 
25 Tractor w/Semi Trailer 
26 Tractor w/Double Trailer 
27 Tractor w/Triole Trailer 
r'assenger Codes • Non Trailing Unit 
1 Sleeper Sect.(fruck Cab) 
2 Other enclosed Passngr./Cargo area 
3 Unenclosed Passngr./Cargo area 
5 Riding on Vehicle Exterior 
1 Not Ejected 1 Not Trapped 1 Ambulance Unit Use 
2 Totally Ejected 2 Trapped/ Extrication 2 Police Car 1 Police 5 Taxi 
3 Partially Ejected urnt used 3 Helicopter 2 Ambulance 6 Fire 
T Thrown from 3 Tra~pe~ 1 0ther 4 Private Vehicle 
extrication method 3 Driver Trng. 7 Wrecker 
5 Not Transported 4 Government 8 School Bus cycle etc. 
Note: -u indicates Unknown 
Attachments 
1 Boat Trailer 5 Mobile Home 
2 UtilityTrailer 9 Other 
3 Travel Trailer 









E!:.!J-..- Point of 
Impact 
L07000031 .,I _o_ffi_ce_r_#_2_4_6_2 _____ ,.I ~ase ...=====--- Page 5 UNIT #4 
-+Iii] 
~-------------E_X_T_E_N_T_O_F_D_E_F_O_R_M_IT_Y ______________ ....,.HI] 
o None 1 Very Minor 2 Minor 3 Minor/Moderate 4 Moderate 5 Moderate/Severe 6 Severe 7 Very Severe 
Towed Due to Damage 
Oll Yes D No I 
Towed By: I Towed By: 
_ Forest Towing _ C&B Towing 
Towed Due to Damage 
[XI Yes D No 
of UNIT #3 ALCOHOL/DRUG INVOLVEMENT Driver of UNIT #4 
Neither Alcohol or Drugs Detected 2 Yes - Alcohol 3 Yes - Drugs 4 Yes - Both 
Alcohol Test Alcohol/ Dru Test Alcohol Test 
Drug Test 1 None Given 2 Test Refused 3 Blood Test 4 Urine Test 5 Breath Test 6 Field Test Drug Test 
BAC Test Results: Drug Used (if known): Drug Test Results BAC Test Results: Drug Used (if known): Drug Test Results 
I I 
#3 COMMERCIAL VEHICLE Refer to Instruction Sheet before com letin UNIT #4 
Cargo Body 
2 Van/Enclosed Box 3 Cargo Tank 4 Flatbed 5 Dump 6 Concrete•M-ix_e_r_.,..7_A_u.,.to.,..Tr_a_ns.,.p_o .. rt_er_...,a_G.,.a.,.rb .. a_.g.,.e!_R_e.,.tu_s_e_...,9_0.,t_he_r __ 1.,.o_P_i_ck_u_p_B_e_d _ __, 
GVWR-Power GVWR-AII Trailers ICC # For Load DOT# For Load # Axles GVWR-Power GVWR-AII Trailers ICC# For Load DOT# For Load 
50351 68000 136818 54283 
Placard: 8 ~~s Spilled: 8 ~~s Haz-Mat # Hazardous 
Material 
Placard: D Yes 
D No 
Spilled: D Yes 
0No 
Haz-Mat# 
arrier Name & ICC# or DOT# for Load obtained from ... 
1 Shipping Papers 2 Vehicle Side 3 Driver 4 Log Book 9 Other 





50 1 3 1 
5 3 3 
72 1 1 
J.l\JJ.'l ff3 
EVENTS - List events for ALL units on page 3. Use this area only for events which do not fit on page 3. 
1 Overturn 
2 Separation of Units 
3 Cargo Loss/Shift 
4 Jack-Knifed 
5 Ran off Road 
6 Down Hill Runaway 
7 Fire/Explosion 
8 Gas/Inhalation 
9 Other Noncollision 
1 O Loss of Control 
11 FelVPushed/Jumped 
12 Non-Collision Injury 
13 Immersion 
71 Came Back on Road 
72 Drove UR of Center 
THE EVENT 
LOCATION 
One Veh. Collision With 
14 Pedestrian 
15 Pedalcycle 
16 Railroad Train 
17 Domestic Animal 
18 Wild Animal 
19 Other Object 
Not Fixed 
20 Parked Vehicle 
on Private Property 
21 Impact Attenuator 
22 Bridge/Pier/Abutment 
23 Bridge Parapet End 
24 Bridge Rail 
25 Overpass 
26 Guardrail Face 
27 Guardrail End 
28 Median Barrier 
30 Highway Traffic 
Sign Post 
31 Overhead Sign support 
32 Street Light Support 
33 Utility Pole 
39 Other Pole 
40 Delineator Post 
1 On Roadway 
2 Left Shoulder 
3 Right Shoulder 
4 Roadside (Includes Sidewalk) 
5 Outside Right of Way 








48 Building Wall 












B Parking Lot Access Road 
P Private Property 
FIRST EVENT RELATIONSHIP TO JUNCTION 
o Nonjunction 2 Intersection Related 
3 At Driveway/Alley 
4 Driveway/Alley Related 
5 On Ramp 
6 Ramp Related 8 Railroad Crossing Related 
1 In Intersection 7 At Railroad Crossing 9 Other 
I 5 OIFIRST Harmful Event GENERAL DIRECTION OF TRAVEL (If turning, select direction before turning) FIRST Harmful Event IS 31 
Gen1r' Direction of Street Unit Direction Gene' Direction of Street Unit Direction I 5 OIMOST Harmful Event 
[I)oriver / Ped Action 
South I North iffi North O South South I North D North iffi South 
MOST Harmful Event 5 3 
1 Going Straight 
• '"urning Right 
-light Tum on Red 
·4 Turning Left 
5 Left Turn on Red 
6 U-Turn 
D West/ East D East 
On Street 
U.S. Highway 95 
Driver Actions 
7 Merging 
8 Changing Lanes 
10 Passing 
11 Negotiating Curve 
12 Stopped in Traffic 
13 Slowing in Traffic 
14 Starting in Traffic 
15 Parking 
16 Entering Drivwy./ Alley 
17 Leaving Drivwy./ Alley 
18 Backing 
20 Avoiding Obstacle 
Note: -u indicates Unknown 
D West D West/East D East D West 
On Street 
U.S. 
21 Avoiding Veh./Ped. 
22 Pursuing Vehicle 
23 Fleeing Pursuit 
24 Racing 
25 Parked Vehicle 
26 Driverless Vehicle 
in Motion 
Highway 95 Driver/ Ped Action 1 
Pedestrian/Pedalcycle Actions 
30 Crossing at Painted Intersection 50 Standing on Roadway 
31 Crossing at Unpainted Intersection 51 Playing on Roadway 
35 Crossing at Non-Intersection X-walk 52 Working on Roadway 
36 Crossing Not at Intersection 60 Enter/Leave School Bus 
40 Walk/Ride with Traffic in Bike Lane 70 Not on Roadway 
41 Walk/Ride with Traffic No Bike Lane 99 Other 
42 Walk/Ride Facing Traffic in Bike Lane 
43 Walk/Ride Facing Traffic No Bike Lane 
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Idaho Vehicle Collision Report Page 6 
Narrative/ Additional Information/ Additional Passengers: Case No. l07000031 
001 I, Corporal James Brouwer of the Idaho State Police, investigated a traffic 
002 crash on January 7, 2007. This was located two :miles north of Cottonwood on 
003 U.S. Highway 95. The road surface was concrete with a layer of ice and slush on 
004 top. There were severe cross winds blowing from the west heading east across 
005 the road. The time was 1243 hours. 
006 Four vehicles and 5 persons were involved in this incident. The first was a 
007 maroon Ford Focus driven by Mallory Larsen with Danielle Poe as her passenger. 
008 The second was a green Buick Skylark driven by Joe Byrd. The third was a White 
009 Volvo tractor-trailer combination driven by William Teurlings. The fourth was a 
010 white Honda S 2000 driven by Peter Molton. 
011 Mallory Larsen was driving south traveling 65 miles per hour when she crested 
012 a hill and saw a slush covered portion of highway ahead of her. She said she 
013 slowed to about 45 miles per hour as she entered this area. There were also 
014 severe cross winds blowing at that location and her vehicle's tires lost 
015 traction on the slippery surface. Her car slid left of center and sideswiped a 
016 northbound car driven by Mr. Byrd. This impact caused a chain reaction 
017 resulting in a loss of control for Byrd who in turn sideswiped a southbound car 
018 driven by Mr. Molton. Larsen's vehicle continued sliding south in the 
019 northbound lane heading directly toward a northbound tractor-trailer 
020 combination driven by Mr. Teurling. Teurling took evasive action to the right 
021 to avoid a head-on crash but the left front of the Ford still struck the left 
022 front of the tractor. 
023 I arrived at 1246 hours and quickly spoke with all involved parties. I updated 
124 the St. Mary's ambulance on the injuries and I helped the ambulance crew when 
025 they arrived. All but Mr. Molton were taken to St. Mary's Hospital for 
026 treatment. Two employees of the Idaho Transportation Department arrived and 
027 took over traffic control of the scene. Idaho State Police (ISP) Sgt. Brad Doty 
028 arrived and photographed the scene. ISP Trooper Ed Koopman measured and 
029 recorded the vehicle placement at the scene. ISP Trooper Josh Larsen 
030 interviewed all the persons involved at St. Mary's Hospital and obtained a 
031 written statement from each. 
032 C&B Towing removed the Honda as a preference AAA call and the Buick Skylark as 
033 a non-preference call. Forest Towing removed the tractor-trailer as a 
034 preference call. Dale's Towing removed the Ford Focus as a non-preference call. 
035 I inventoried each vehicle prior to the tow trucks removing them. 
036 I inspected the tread depth on the tires of the Ford Focus. I found 2132nd 
037 tread on the left front, 3/32nd tread on the right rear, 4132nd tread on the 
038 right front, and 9132nd on the left rear. My training and experience in crash 
039 investigation indicated that tread depths that low are not safe for snow 
040 covered roads. The driver of a vehicle with tires worn that far would be 
041 placing others at risk on the highway. This risk was compounded by the severe 
042 cross winds that were blowing that day. I went to the hospital and cited 
043 Mallory Larsen for inattentive driving. 
Additional Commercial Vehicle Data For Unit 3: 
044 Swift Transportation* 9400 NW 10th St* Oklahoma City, OK 73127 
Note: -U indicates Unknow:n 
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· IDAHO STATE POLICE 
DRIVER STATEMENT 
Case Number __:...-tJ_· o_·~_! __ ----=----
Are you injured? 1}§.D If ye~, where? ebv.>·b I. 1-lba; ci6ns 4c; h /p. 
Date an!;JTime of crash __ u;:;;..\..._A....,:Y....._l_7,.___,.t-~=-6_l_)7_,_ ____________ __,-..-------..........:.-
What road were you on? H L(.)Lj ~ }- What lane were you in? __ .,.s~. ~Ou.:.,·..;f-.,..· h....i..--.----~-"'-
What was your direction of travel~ . So U-tb How fast were you traveling? -~ (126 > fowecii{s---
What is the posted speed limit? (e S:---: How far were you behind the car in front of you? IJ6o «. - :· 
Were you going straight, turning, or stopping? 5fr1.,,../c1: l-v_t--- _ Was It daylight or dark? {&'4 4 )/ .. 9 (-1 t. 
· Where were you sitting or standing at the time of the crash? . dx. \ U.U · · · {J 
Where were you looking just prior_to the eras~?. __ s...;.+.;..~  _t.;..._, %*."""h_-6_--....&,,;al,.,jM....a.1f'. .  M..i'~-'-------------·;_, 
When did you realize the crash was going to happen? '1~'\..Q;,, (,0 £:btte d JP ·. '51 t Jg 
J.Ve you taken any drugs, medication, or alcohol in the last 12 hours? ........ ' ·-,..-.i....;_ ___________ _ 
If yes, what? _______________ Before crash? _____ After Crash?_· ___ _ 
Were you having any mechanical problems with your vehicle? Vl l>. If yes, what? _________ _ 
· Where did ypu b~gin your ttip? ...,tiJ{,,,,,,lf--¼;;.;;;.:11_· s.....i..H .. )_0_· ........ --------,------,-----------
Wha1 ~?S y9ur des~ination? R · · -e__ , 
Hqw many hours had you been drtv!ng or traveii~· ? '/ ,ho 11.A;'\ j . Whiit was t~th_er li~e? .. l~1td~ 
What were the road conditions like? )S:00, O _ xrLJJL> LJcl '\2.o aC!_ VJ ,rt, . . . 
>t1D ,:i= Were there other vehicles or pedestrian§ on toe roa~ at t~e time-of the crash? I' ~ , _. How many? --~-~ __ _ 
Where were the other vehicles? ..:J)-'-"'D'-'-Y-'·\::i=-'-,--'lo---·' =.:L::..JOI-L----=---,----'-----~--------=---
.Did a~ything obstruct your vi~io~? I\,) O If yes, describe obstruction{s) _____________ _ 
Did you brake?· \ ,tfP How hard? 1 Nat' lduH Q Did you accelerate? n · 7) How hard?.----~ 
Did you make steering input? . ,, l) If yes, describe ~ow , f?-; 6<J"'-~ Qwcyi ·£:r,'\'\ ..:br~~ c 
Make of the vehicle you were in? (of cl, Mo_del of the vehicle you Were in? J=nQ)..,-VCJ 
Yearofvehicle:2O02= Colorofvehicle l7:ecJ ·· LicenseNumber&State? &;.«I z-gy 
Is this ve~icle currently insured~)!':: If nQ, When did the insurance expire? 
Name of insurance company?..1l::::ti.~~"""i....1~~~------.;..;··;.._
1
, Policy number?~~---------__:. 
Insurance expiration date? J - 0"7 · Agent's Name, ' . Phone # 
,re you weartng a seatbelt? if'" · . · TYP• of seatb~1t ('!"'!•. one) _-; ou der~? Only--S-ho_u_ld-er_O_n_ly'---
ls your vehicle equipped with air-0ags? Ljfa° .. Did your air bags e · o . ....,ifr-,,:-,\,{-""h"'-------~ 




l the complete names and all persons in the veh1cle, arid all other requested information: 
Driver MAI~ € lo.r~o,"'- Sex F . Date of Birth f'~hildseat-__ 
Fron~,Middle ________ -,---_,Sex __ Date of Birth ______ Seatbelt/Childsea~---
F~om Passenger [hn.&ih Da.e. Sex f ·.Date of Birth _____ ....._...,. 
Rear Behind Driver ________ .Sex __ Date of Birth _____ _ 
Rear Middle Sex [?~t~ ~f Birth ____ ....,....,..,... $~?.t,qel~Cf-}il_tj$e~t __ _ 
Rear Passenger Sex __ Date of Birth ______ Seatbelt/Childseat-__ 
3rd behind driver Sex __ Date of Birth ______ Seatbelt/Ch!ldseat __ _ 
3rd Middle Sex __ Pate of Birth ______ Seatbelt/Childseat. __ _ 
. 3rd Passenger Sex __ Date of Birth ______ SeatbelVChildsea.__ __ 
Other --~--------------Sex __ Date of Birth., _ _;..._ ____ Seatbelt/Childsea . ,_ __ 
"his · a:tement is true and correct, and I acknowledge that penalty under law 
llows for my rosecutia for fUing a false· report to the police. 
ign:d. · 1 Date /-- 7-0'7 
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Collision Statement Unit #--1-/ __ _ 
IDAHO STATE POLICE 
PASSENGER STATEMENT 
Case Number __,_Q<-,;c;'-l-"--}( ____ _ 
Name __ D~(A_..:.:.,..._~;__,,_,-'-)"-'/c.=--_.:_K_;.C----"-fc..C....o_c ___________ Birth Date
Address
City State Tc-.1 -
Home Phon Work Phone _____________ _ 
Date/Time of Crash /- 7- d].. Location of Crash: d,_,..,'1 "IS -~------------ -'-'--7-f-----------
Describe the vehicle you were in: Year: Make:, __ __,_fi_c_._, ... _J___ Model :Co c, vJ 
Color: £,, J License#:. ___________ License State ______ _ 
Where were you sitting or standing at the time of the crash: _ _,_f_r_c;_."--_<+___,/2'--""---5_S_· _, ___________ _ 
How many hours had you been traveling_ .... /--'-)-'-) _r_. ______________________ _ 
Where did you begin your trip __ 4=-...,-;·=..s.'-~--_., _______________________ _ 
What was your destination __ --=:.f3::__,;,_Ls_r ________________________ _ 
What road were you on: '?15 What was the speed limit: G-5 What lane were you in _.S_E_· __ _ 
How fast was the vehicle going: C, c..-J J. What were the road conditions __ c_)'--c_r_._r__,_/_, -=,.s"'-'/"-~;;;_-s;::__h.~7'-------
What were the weather c.onditions _V--:-f_""_·_,_ _______________________ _ 
What were the lighting conditions 
What was the driver doing, describe:,_.;;....5_f-'-__ c- "_· r_.,_·:'..,_· _______________________ _ 
Were there other vehicles around you: / c:.s How heavy was traffic:_J_~_o_,_i_c.~_J._c.. ___________ _ 
What was the distance between you and the vehicle in front of you ~D=---c,_...__~_1_c._-"""6_e_r _________ _ 
Did you have a seat belt on: y c 5 Lap or~and Shoul~----- Did an airbag go off for you --f c __s 
Did you receive any injuries from the crash: Yv Please describe the injuries:_A. c./4- 3..53 Ar.,_; 
I 
When did you realize a crash was going to happen, describe: ..... )c~.f_e-,_r +_e_,/_--=S'-'-/2-'-l_,~:/4'-'-.r_=-=··..,_·-1-r ---------~ 




Please des~ri_b~ the evpnts leading up the crash, the eras~ itself,_ and what~h~ppened after the crash haJ occurred 
-/1 .:..J ,,..... /4-,,..,.,._ !f'c, . ..__ h/J- /4 'J.... J.. r ,f",:_.,,__r -<!'~__/ o, Cc-< 
Please do a sketch of the crash scene: 
This statement is true and correct, and I acknowledge that penalty under law 
auows for my pr~\secution )~ng a false report to the police. . 




· IDAHO STATE POLICE 
DRIVER STATEMENT 
- (}o/1. 1· Case Number __ ---'-;-'--__ ..:....__ 
Name ::SO"'--· E', ~g·~ · 
Address -;}-1 h .t; J = ·t;;;f-: 
Home Phon~ 9f3 ~ ~ ffo I . . . 
Date of Birt
C;~ .. a-_f0J-i9-"t' vi! l~ . ~ State=r:cl _· ·. Zip  '~.:r <) 
Work Phone _________ ·Other. Phone 
Pr.iver license State. _________ Driver License Number_·· _______ SSN ___________ _ 
What is your occupation? Name of Employer_,_'---~---------,,-------
Are you injured? YQ S: If yes, where? L ~~+- ~-t:::t-:C J.Q!( 
7 
Date and Time of crash ·')cl., 
1 
3 t> f· M J---7- 0 / · 
What road were you on? q~~ What lane were you in? -+N-· r_o_tR._....-f. . .. A___,, _____ ...;._ __ 
" 
What was youf direction of travel? __ _.;_ ___ -,--______ How fast were you traveling? -i-.\ .... .C.._.-"""_4._··-... _ __,...,.,........ ' ·<.i, 
What is the posted speed limit? · .. Ho\)' far were you behind the car in front of you?---.---.--:--
Were you going straight; turning, or stopping? SIM> G-¼t Was it daylight or dark?-~--...: __ ;..;../ ""'""-.: __ __.:.,''-' . 
·where ~ere you sitting or standing at the time of the crash? ..... · ---~---·_R_ri,...v_eft _ __ ·=--·---:-------------
Where were you looking just prior_ to the eras~?. -?d.=1-'--'-u.J...;.._c~-l½-;,..:;;.;..:-...;;~;;;.J;;;: . .r.."'£::;;;;lA-1;;;.;.,,.,;;0£t'-" _..::sz;;;;:;._;;· :.:;-?.;;.:_~=~~-'!:k:.L._::c::::l.:::,:-:::c:.:::~~~~:!::::=----·(_. 
' 11 '\-ien did you realize the crash was going to happen? -·-·= ....... ...--~-----___;--...,...,,r-::-------
. .... Ne you taken any drugs, medication, or alcohol in the last 12 hours? ......,.. _ _,71-C:;.;::..i ___________ _ 
If yes, what? _______________ Before crash?-.L-1-:-:"o;___ ___ After Crash?_· ___ _ 
Were you having any mechanical problems with your vehicle? ____ If yes, what? _________ _ 
· Where did ypu b~gin your tfip? ....,.._· ~G,..~_e_A-:-'t-l ...G.._<!;..._11_,',.,.
1
_J~_Q_..;;:;;_ ____ -.-----.,----------
Wha1 V{!lS y9ur des~ination? --~---:;;..·..;....;;~b;:;._m.--e'=-·-VI'\._-;;..-_· ___ ___,_ __________ .__ ____ _ 
H~w n:iany hours had you been driving or trave)ing? ...,.·· ______ What was the:weather like? 21 A:t!LY . ""-'-"--'--=-17'------
What were the road conditions like? _-51=-__ b.,__M____.·c ... - .... ,c.,__",:.~J u_· ..... Sa .... ·· ~h."1-, __________________ _ 
. . . 
Were there other v~hicles or pedestrian~ on toe road at t~e time-of the crash1/ e..s ·· ... 
Where were the other vehicles? s~ t.L ·, h. -
Did a~ything obstruct your vi~io~? HO If yes, describe obstruction(s) _____________ _ 
. r " Did you brake? fJ ( ...1 How hard? ______ Did you accelerate? y--e,s 
. I . / 
Did you make steering input? 'I:' t,J If yes, describe how ..... --------------'-----
How many? _____ _ 
How hard? Jlrr t)enr }m_d · r . 
~ak~ of the vehicle you .were in? _,~...;.1,.::;.c _: C.:.:;.,..-:k,_·· _____ · Model of the vehicle you Were in? 5 KI/ L4A K 
G-1,e.. €.. ii. d · License Number & State? · T · Year of vehicle J q C-Z 7 j Color of vehicle 
Is this vehicle currently insured? . ---4L- e....s · . If nq, when did the insurance expire? 
Name of insurance company? · ~,;.+;Tt2_ ~h- Rf!\ .. ;1 -Policy number? ==--===============: 
'"'"'Jrance expiration date? · \. · Age.nt's Nam~( /:;): '\ IE tJ W,' l / /:; ·· , Phone# _____ .....:...__ 
,, . ,e you wearing a:seatbelt?· \;t _.i,Type o~_seatbelt (c~~l,e_one) ~ Lap Only Shoulder Only 
Is your vehicle equipped with air·ba{s'T'6 _· ep Did your hif-b~ ·-·" _· _-_...rt/_v;;.._ ____ _ 
l"' .· . 
COMPLETE ;.r"HE BACK' OF THJS PAGE 




. .ist the complete names and all persons in the vehicle, arid all other requested inf,ormation: 
Driver Sex Date of Birth . S~atbel:tf(;hildsea 
FrontMiddle Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childsea~ 
Front Passenger Sex ·. Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childsea 
Rear Behind Driver Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childsea 
RearMiddl~ Sex Date of Birth $1??.t.b_el!J'.C!Jil.9$0!:\t .... 
R~ar P;3.ssenger Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Chlldseat 
3rd behind driver Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childseat 
3rd Middle Sex Oate of Birth Seatbelt/Childseat 
. 3rd Passenger _Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childs ea 
Other Sex Date of Birth. Seatbelt/Childsea 
,. , u' 
I' 
/hat could you have done to avoid this crash?.......;.. _____________________ _ 
i 
his . :-*atement is true and correct, and I acknowledge that penalty under law 




IOAHO STATE POLICE 
Tk.AFFIC CRASH STATEn,IENT 
6051 
X DRIVER __ PASSENGER - Where were you seated in the vehicle? ________ _ 
Were you wearing a .~_eatbelt? ___ _ CELLULAR TELEPHONE# 'S'S--c; · 3 i""2.., - ~ ~ lJ l 
NAME: tJ;· )}1 t\vv- P fY\ Jc_ v/ );,,J s HOME TELEPHONE#-~-----
ADDRESS; b-z, 3,, /U ?)/ r L 8i r ;, ':J.- A 0 e • £te_S,Y\O, L0 ~. 9 ~ 7 c 'L 
If so,·what?BEFORE THE CRASH···· · AFFERTHEcRAS~r ·•· · :.,/> ... 
\1\lhafifyhtJtoccupatibn?·' ~rr;·c':lc··""''•cl; ,··,··',' >· ,· •<•·;!': '.;1Y\'Pr~~Jel,ErP9?P.~~;: :·,····· ' ,.-,; ,,:,,,,,.,;/t<i;,,_:,,::.,:.,,,·' 
.• ~~~~tft:~~!~~ui~:::~;#~;~+~;.z,~.i'i;':;~,G,,~~~;tJ;i~~,,c, "'' ):t;;;t;;~~·;:i: 
What roadWereyouon? 9"S- ' Dir~cHonof Travel?' ;,;dr;cl-•( <·' ,, ',, 
Were you··goihg (circle one) ~ turning left turning right · st6pping• stopped>in-traffic/:, 
How fast were you traveling? 3S- What is the Speed Limit? ---'~="....;S--~· ______ _ 
Where were you looking just prior to the crash? _(A.+fi-+/J_r_o_, ,,___. c..._l_r--"~i.--· __ c_<'\._r ________ _ 
When did you realize the crash was ffoingto happen? c:,.J/.,,__~ ,5..l,:.. A.rl-- .;/1._,. orf-l-.., c.:-,._J 





s with you at the tin,~ of thE.l, crqsh?-=-~-0,-;;_. ··--,---~-____,..,___,._....;....---'-.,...· _ ... ·=: ,_;:,;;-,\..,.,.0 ·;'""";_:...:..I"'-f...:..:.;, •.:;;;,~-di,;..:., _· 
· · ;~~;~~se.8n~1~r2ri$;·'..i)l<,)1 .. . .··. _ .. · ... · .· ... · ._ . · ..




Describe in your own words what happened or what you saw. 
(}rJL 
( e.- c.. .. 
I 
5;ch 
hi"!\ ti· o/ 
Ct:-...r ' " 
/ t',f' ,>,..... 
er:<- s .... (.,., a cc-..,;-
l«=.vtf- j,,,.J c.~J. I"-' 
/,a,..j- .I-c>. /l'>.L 
L 
Signed: ..,.._/t ........... s_.,_,./2;'""'"/4_/_~ii-t:,_· _ __."!-~_r_. __..L"'"". ~'-"--,_" 5"-<_.,.,... _________ Date: /-- ?: - o·;i. 
r . 
Drc.iwing of Crash Sc~he: ~ 
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Name· . . f .&W Nt . ' 0{\&J,tL~-n Date of Birth 
Address ·· i!J I t:J0:J~ -£¥'. Ci~ __ ,Ep-::ir-f1~. _ . ~ State W ft· Zip ~ 'c(' g <]_ ~ _ . , . 
Home .Phone _'fil'):)>.&4'1..·ll 9.10 Work Phone ___ _., ·Other.Phone s,oq · 3&b. 840.3 
Dr:iver license State W 0-- Driver License Number .MO CTO PMS, I ~ hsN 
What is your occupation? ~,tJ;z,~ . Name of Employer ~ \\J) Jt·. . _,...., __ .......,_,_---'---,,----.--------
' 
Are you injured? .... i>i½"'--".-· · ________ If yes, where? B-n-,-A~-<J_p7 ~- u.rrw.f 
Date and Time of crash i /O, /P 7 ( p IYJ · 
What road were you on? Lf .S -J..::Lu ~ 0 1 ~- What lane were you in? ~ 
What was you~ direction of travel? :~~,,-;;:e~. How fast were you traveling? _i ~ 
What is the posted speed limit? k ~ · How far ~ere you behind the car in front of you? l fy~_ . ;_::: 
Were you going straight; turning, or stopping? Y~~ Was it daylight or dark? _!J~-~"'--,~· __ ........,:;.r. 
Where were you silting or standing at the time of the ~? . _ ~ 0 · . · 
Where were you looking just prior to the crash?. ·--~ ............... &&P.-... -~~~------r---------....,....-
When did you realize the crash w~s going to happen? (};,,- .1/\  i~,)-&yk . \fl . .e ... L:f) ~ ffi:;:4? 
J.Ve you taken any drugs, medication, or alcohol in the last 12 hours? -·:.1.:) "'---·-------------
If yes, what? _______________ Before crash? _____ After Crash?_· ___ _ 
. Were you having any mechanlGal prob;µ!ith your vehicle? · 1::,Jq If yes, what'/ 
Where did ypu b~gin your tfip? ....,0,--· -~+--""&.....--.....-. ---------=------,----------, 
Whl!l-! ~9-s y9ur desJination? ___ ___.~~~..,....----~------------'------
H~w n:iany hours had you been driving or traveling? · 1 -~ 
Were there other vehicles or pedestrian§ on tr.re road at the time~f the ~rash? Y <Q.,,1 , .. 
Where were the other vehicles? _ ~ · - . · · 
·Did a~ything obstruct your visio~? ".J,o If yes, describe obstruction{s) --.,.------------
Did you brakei \'Zo How hard? ______ Did you accelerate? \\JO How hard? ------
Did you make steering input? \J 0~ If yes, describe ~ow : ~v'¼'~ ctt,1 ~:»\-ft· 
~ake of the vehicle you were in? l10~ · Model of the vehicle you Were in? S 2 0 0 D 
Yea~ of vehicle Q{Do....z:::;- Color of vehicle ~ License Number & State? (p I ~ \')(~ WiA 
Is this vehicle currently insured?. Y/J_,,4 If nq, when did the insurance expire? -------~ 
Name of insurance company? f .QA\i'\.,,l,O ,· ii Policy number? C:A OG 9. Q Q ~1 :1 
Insurance expiration date? ii - '.)_°' -bi · Agent's Name, · . Phone# 
.•re you wearing a-:seatbelt? -J ()p · _Type of seatbelt (c!rcl,e_one) ~JJ lap Only-~--------------'-.-_ :/ 
Is your vehicle equipped with air·l;:iags? y@ .. Did your air bags deploy? _..,LY_;e=-,?j ______ _ 





'st the complete names and all persons in the veh1cle, arid all other requested information: 
Driver~  l'{L,,{t-'Q Sex M · Date of Birth ~lldseat,_ __ 
Front,.Middle ________ ___, __ Sex __ Date of Birth ______ Seatbelt/Childsea~,__ __ 
Front Passenger Sex ·. Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childsea 
Rear Behind Driver Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Chlldseat 
Rear Middle Sex Date of Birth $<?~~qel~C~il.9$8!:!t 
R1:1ar Passenger Sex Date of Birth Seatbett/Childseat 
3rd behind driver Sex Date of Birth Seatbett/Childseat 
3rd Middle Sex Oate of Birth Seatbelt/Childs eat 
. 3rd Passenger _Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childsea 
Other Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childsea 
Describe in y~ur own words what happened: 
CK) 
fhat could you have done to avoid this crash?-----"-' -=-\-J..;.·_·~-·--=-·· "-"'""~1------------------
his ,_ " ,tement is true and correct, and I acknowledge that -penalty under law 
low~ tor my prosecution for fUing a false· report to the police. 
Orr-/) ~ ~ "-.(\ ,,. ... Jjf}-:._ / / 7 / a ·7 
Jned _· _\_ f<'.t::::-_· ·\£i-.{ _ _•_) _· · .;..._~ 1_ i~_----'--'-. · ---=---· ___ Date_, _____ _ 
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· IDAHO STATE POLICE 
DRIVER STATEMENT 
cc1{ 
Case Number ______ ....;.__ 
2:~~ ~$, •. l ( J/. R , . " . Poe- Date of Birth I 
Address·;·~ 2:J~:sJ' C~ 1 ~1 '"'"',.... , C;ty 6v~ se · ·. State~:_.·. Zip ~-y'c;:sr: 
Home _Phonl <:.:0 :@ ::s.s-J S 1 JgNork Phone _________ . Other. Phone 
Driver Ucense State ~ · Driver License Number ·· SSN 
What is your occupation? ~- -L Name of Employer_, ;}4...b-.;: ·.·cf & , -_...,L, 
Are you injured? j,..,,.lc'_'--":..S--_-__ /4 E, ,k 1 · 8,~ '-- k / vF23 •. c:. 
Date and Time of crash ...:1'.:...=·-::c.::::;-;f;:.:...._ ____________________ .:..__~_:__ 
What road were you on? ___________ What lane were you in? ....,..0;;;;--~r_J _______ ....;.. ___ 
What was you~ direction of travel? . ··_;;j-. · 1 re l... How fast were you traveling? ;;._r ______ __,,.. __ 
What is the posted speed limit? How far were you behind the car in front of you? ____ ...;._ __ 
Were you going straight, turning, or stopping? Was it daylight or dark? _______ _ 
Where were you sitting or standing at the time of the crash?;..;,·_,._ _______________ :._ __ __ 
Where were you looking just prior to the crash?. --- ---------------------------
When did you realize the crash was going to happen? ----.--------___:---,,-,-------
ave you taken any drugs, medication, or alcohol in the last 12 hours? ....... _______________ _ 
If yes, what? ________________ Before crash? ______ After Crash?_· ____ _ 
Were you having any mechanical problems with your vehicle? ____ If yes, what? __________ _ 
· Where did ypu bE!gin y_our trip?~---........ · 1_:::,_· _;_ .......,. ___________ --,------,---------
Wh~t ~?S y9ur des~ination? _.:;;l., ...... e . __ .,_,. __ . _-_,· .:::i __ ·_~I,<---=-",_··--------~--.-.. _________ _,_ _____ _ 
Hqw IT!any hours had you been driving or traveling?_·· ______ What was the ;Weath_er like? ______ _ 
What were the road conditions like?-------"--------'-----------------
. ' 
Were there other vehicles or pedestrian~ on tr.re road at t~e time-of the crash? __ ==-,;; ___ How many? _____ _ 
Wher_e were the other vehicles? .. ---------------'------'---------.:...--
Did anything obstruct your vision?~, --------__ If yes, describe obstruction(s) _____________ _ 
Did you brake?· )' c ..S How hard? {..:- J/7 Did you~celerate? ./f--Je, How hard?------
Did you make steering input? _ ['-'- 5 If yes, describe how .,__...:1..;;o;;.__-Y_L_"--_.:..r.;..:;=..,.'i-}__..;.J _____ ---: ___ _ 
Make of the vehicle you were in? _________ Model of the vehicle you Were in? -,--------
Year of vehicle _____ Color of vehicle-------'---- License Number & State? _______ _ 
Is this vehicle currently insured?---~----~- If nQ, when did the insurance expire? -------~ 
Name of insurance company? Policy number?~~---,-.------__;. 
Insurance expiration date? __ ..,..... ___ .Agent's Namei,,._ ------:::::;;;::::---...;..' Phone#-------'---
_· re you wearing a'seatbelt? Type of seatbelt (c!rcl,e_one) Lap Only Shoulder Only 
Is your vehicle equipped with air-bags? f c.5 .. Did your air bag --"'-~-0_" _____ _ 




st the complete names and all persons in the vehicle, arid all other requested inf_ormation: 
Driver Sex Date of Birth . SE!atbett/Childsea 
FrontMiddle Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childsea.t 
Front Passenger Sex ·. Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childsea 
Rear Behind Driver Sex Date of Birth SeatbelVChlldseat 
Rear Middl'3 Sex Date of Birth ~!)H~_tR~l~C~ilp$e~t . . .. . . ~ ... 
Rear Passenger Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childseat 
3rd behind driver Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childseat 
3rd Middle Sex Oate of Birth Seatbelt/Childseat 
. 3rd Passenger _Sex Date of Birth Seatbelt/Childsea 
Other Sex Date of Birth. Seatbelt/Childs ea 
Describe in y~ur own words what happened:. 
t· 
Nhat could you have done to avoid this crash?--'-----------------------
.i 
·hit ~atement is true and correct, and I acknowledge that penalty under law 
11lows for my prosecution for filing a false· report to the police. 






Type of Incident [ ] Other 
[lam 
Date ! /o7 /{)] Time I ~ .lO pv) [ J pm ----------
Na me fehr- ~Q\f? 






Telephone # Home 509 ,5"lt-1· 6( 110 Work _ __.--··· 
cefZR ;, 300·31.+03 
-------
Describe what you saw, heard or know of this incident: 
--o < I 
.£.w ~ TiAYoi: ,,,¾;~ 1:~ .1/7/07. 
Signature Sf?Azzc ~ \\'} ~) 
ISP 130· 7·01 Page ___ of ____ Pages 
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Ti-...i: F,..,,..,... g'"',,.e,."'1,,c 
0 I - A - O ·:Z.. 4 '2 2. .. :;' - CJ 1 
.,._..,_;;)l,. ;-<i '7-'1- 07 ICE 
IDAHO STATE POLICE 
TOWED VEHICLE INVENTORY/N 
Date i- 7- zao 7 Time Iv 3 4 --~~---
Case No. Lo 7 o"-1vo 31 L ~ion: lt S j./...,,_'l 9 S- M ,'it ,eo'I.. -J-- 2- S-~ 
RbuciOn for Towing: Driver Arrest D Abandoned D Traffic Hazard D Accident El Private Property D 
Extraordinary Circumstances D (Specify): _____________________________ _ 
Registered Owner: .M q I{ o,. )' L 'i r -l'O,., Address: J -Z 8 7 7 ff.,i.,..-,i-/:-o r./ ,dv-e.. 0,-c:,,;::..,•,,,_ o :.I, 
Driver: s"' r>" .i. Address: 8 s .s-v-r 
Lien Holder: N',, .vcE" Address: ---''-'---""------------
Vehicle: Color .JI,'! ,o1.reo"2,,1 Year zooz. Make Fo,,..._f Fou1,;: Body 41 .I ocv ,r..,.J<t., 
State&License# :;;;,-( .. l,o 0C. :2..18$8 V.I.N. iF.AFP '5'tP '12.W JO'f782.. 
Odometer Reading: Vehicle Locked? D Yes D No ------------
Body Dam age: e.,.+,ri! p,...,...,,1- h"'-tt w.C L .. .-- dl!'Sr·"'<Jy~,_,/ 
' 
J ,'. . 
. ~~.·· 
<~~Contents: Yes No 
Radio ~ D 
Tape Deck/CD IZl- D 
Spare Tire D D 
Glove Box Locked D D 
Other (See attached) D D 
~ :~ 
Vehicle/contents taken 
to: Gr-"'"' · e ...-,'fl,e 
--,-e;(P'-hy~si-ca~l -ocii-~.,.:=ioc..::n)-'-~------------------------------
by: 0 ,A { ~s To ~ . ..,,,.. , · ..... § 
~(T~ow~in""'g""'c-=-om'-p-an-y-na-m=e-o'--'r oc.,th-e,-a-,-ilt.,,_ifo-,ri~ze...,.d -pe-,s-on...,.) _______ _ 
Phone: ------------
I ( fy that the items above were released to my custody by: Cpl ~ ~ ____ 
(Officeri?Name) --~- -· /" / - ,..,-/......,, 
X <"--------~ ~--···-
(Signature of towing company employee or other authorized person receiving vehicle and contents) 
Items retained by Officer? ~ None D Yes, describe ALL: 
COMPLETE NOTICE BELOW FOR ABANDONED VEHICLES ONLY 
NOTICE 
There are no "HOL,.DS" on this 
vehicle. 
The described vehicle has been towed and is subject to sale in compliance with Title 49, Chapter 18, Idaho Code. 
YOU MAY, AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE SALE OR PERMANENT DISPOSAL, RECLAIM YOUR VEHICLE BY PAYING 
THE POSSESSORY LIEN AGAINST THE VEHICLE WHICH CONSISTS OF THE AMOUNT OF THE TOWING AND 
STORAGE. 
../·~~;:, 
[ l You are entitled to a post-storage hearing to determine the validity of the towing and storage charge's. In order to 
receive a post-storage hearing, owners or their agents must request the hearing in writing within ian (10) days of 
the date offhis notice to the agency authorizing the tow. Any such hearing will be conducted withiff4_8 hours of 
request, excluding weekends and holidays. There is a possessory lien against this vehicle in the amount of 
$ ______ (towing) and storage which will accrue at the rate of$ ______ for each day the vehicle is 
stored. 
[ l The value of the vehicle has been appraised at LESS than $200. You have the right to a hearing in court if the 
"Declaration of Opposition" (form enclosed is signed and returned to Idaho State Police, __________ _ 
______________________ __,within ten (10) days of the date this notice was mailed. If 
a "Declaration of Opposition" is not received within this time, the possessory lien holder may dispose of the vehicle. 
[] , value of this vehicle has been appraised at MORE than $200. Storage may be charged for a maximum number of 
::.,xty (60) days. If your vehicle is not claimed prior to _______ (60 days from date above), it will be sold. 
Vehicle released to Date --------------
Contents released to Date 
Copy Distribution: WHITE - Regional Office, YELLOW- ITD Titles Section, PINK- Registered Owner/Lienholder-,-G-O_L_D_E_N-RO_D __ -W-re-c-ke_r_O_p_e_ra-to_r __ _ 
EH 06-05-01 rev. 7/04 
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S t--+-e F= .. ,..,.. :::::r..._s,_v ....... .;..e,, F' IDAHO STATE POLICE 
Pt:t:c, Lo3 7 '-1&,·7 - D • I-TOWED VEHICLE INVENTORY/N, CE 
Or;,,- 1 '(.l(, ~CJ Arr,· '7 '.:0·7 Date I - 7 - 2-c, 0·7 Time J 'i 'Lo 
·tion: Us; >i--y , s- ,.1vi )J~('.:;t,J-, 
fk_.;on for Towing: Driver Arrest D 
zs-7 
Abandoned D Traffic Hazard D 
Case No. 1... o ? 0000 '3 t 
Accident:@. Private Property D 
Extraordinary Circumstances D (Specify): _____________________________ _ 
Registered Owner: Jc.: t. 8) _,,.. d Address: 21./--'l--'6""-----=e=--...:.l-=-k=-----=J=-=·1--_ __,,G:..:'•_···-:.:.1.:.:"J-"'·-"'e"""..,,,::_,:_• ·'-'11-=-·"'--= ..... =-:"=-"· '-=<<>f.:.:A,..,,;;;,___ 
Driver: Jc; .e. )). 1,,,.. J Address: 
Lien Ho Ider: .::f'...=""=..:+CJ/1.2. "'~f:e1..r .!I.~ _ _,3!#.:.+/__c:f=-""e'-'·i,_,e"-'--'--=-"'f._· --=e~"-"'--"' -="'-'-' ·-'-1- Address: :._P--'a=-·' ----''1_9~7 __ "---=-e.:......-::__:_' -". <.::..1-_ti=-·_,_, _ .::z;cJ~'----=e_,_, .;;_ ..... , 
4,,,__./0rt 
Vehicle: Color G.~e,u1 Year ii', 7 
State & License# IJ.,.~"' ::Z .?9 8"' 8 
Make 8"',-G.k Sky/.,.,-1(. Body t:/d;,,. re...1.,,. 
V. I. N. I G ~ NJ 1:,- 2. .A/4 l \I C 1/ ,j- j- O 1 9 
Odometer Reading: ------------,-- Vehicle Locked? D Yes ~ No 
Body Damage: J _...,.,,,.,. .. ..,. .s: it it,. -..,:..,, +.:.,,.(_ l'L 4) .. - ./ d!sf-r.., yer:/ 
Contents: 2- ,. ... ., ,... ~ /:.. 3 ! 1-1ss- es Yes No 
Radio D D 
Tape Deck/CD D D 
Spare Tire D D 
Glove Box Locked D D 
Other (See attached) D D 
Vehicle/contents taken 
to: /I 0 a /V"' ,~;..1, JJ s·rJ-,,.e. ,r,.,;. 
(Physical location) 
by: Phone: 
~(T-ow-in_g_c_om-p-an_y_n-am_e_o_r o...,th_e_r a-ut""'ho-,,i,-ze..,.d -pe-,s-o..,.n) _______ _ ------------
I , 'fy that the items above were released to my custody by: Cl'; r ~-c: 
(Officer'! Name) 
X 
Items retained by Officer? ·ijil; None D Yes, describe ALL: 
A:r,,. b,,.5.i: nc,f- d'erloye.-/ 
COMPLETE NOTICE BELOW FOR ABANDONED VEHICLES ONLY 
NOTICE 
The described vehicle has been towed and is subject to sale in compliance with Title 49, Chapter 18, Idaho Code. 
YOU MAY, AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE SALE OR PERMANENT DISPOSAL, RECLAIM YOUR VEHICLE BY PAYING 
THE POSSESSORY LIEN AGAINST THE VEHICLE WHICH CONSISTS OF THE AMOUNT OF THE TOWING AND 
STORAGE. 
[ 1 You are entitled to a post-storage hearing to determine the validity of the towing and storage charges. In order to 
receive a post-storage hearing, owners or their agents must request the hearing in writing within ten (10) days of 
the date of this notice to the agency authorizing the tow. Any such hearing will be conducted within 48 hours of 
request, excluding weekends and holidays. There is a possessory lien against this vehicle in the amount of 
$ ______ (towing) and storage which will accrue at the rate of$ ______ for each day the vehicle is 
stored. 
[ ] The value of the vehicle has been appraised at LESS than $200. You have the right to a hearing in court if the 
"Declaration of Opposition" (form enclosed is signed and returned to Idaho State Police, __________ _ 
______________________ _,within ten (10) days of the date this notice was mailed. If 
a "Declaration of Opposition" is not received within this time, the possessory lien holder may dispose of the vehicle. 
[ ] · 9 value of this vehicle has been appraised at MORE than $200. Storage may be charged for a maximum number of 
_,/4ty (60) days. If your vehicle is not claimed prior to _______ (60 days from date above), it will be sold. 
Vehicle released to Date -------------
Contents released to Date -~-cc-=---,-,-.,---------Copy Distribution: WHITE - Regional Office, YELLOW - ITD Titles Section, PINK - Registered Owner/Lienholder, GOLDENROD - Wrecker Operator 
EH 06-05-01 rev. 7/04 
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IDAHO STATE POLICE 
TOWED VEHICLE INVENTORY/N( :E 
Date J- 7- 2.00 7 Time_____.:1--=":...o_._o ___ _ 
L 'ion: U ~- H· .........-1 9::,- m{iep,;,~I-
R& .... .;on for Towing: Driver Arrest D 
2.J-7 
Abandoned D 
Case No. l o"7 0000 JJ 
Traffic Hazard D Accident l\.tl' Private Property D 
Extraordinary Circumstances D (Specify): _____________________________ _ 
Registered Owner: --=-S.--=....,..'-''-.. '---/.',-'-----_,.._.,.._<11:....."'-"s"",e-"-<1_.r-"-f-_.,._L--'.----', o:::....;_J,,'------ Address: 
9 L/ Ot.1 .VW itHi,. s·J. 
<:J/i/._ J,,p-, C:{'}:v Ok 1 :JI '2. 7 
' Driver: !..:w'-'---; 1_1.=---· ~.:...:""::..:_-'__e:,:ec..cc:....:.._;_,...:...l ..:.../~"-:'l:j+C------ Address: 6219 N 8.-;,x F..-es .. v CA ?37:l.z. 
Lien Ho Ider: -=S-"",Pc:..:~::J..-, £.-::.!k::.!::A..1__:;::.:........,_, ·_::, .... ~.,.'.L!.,l..!"'-'' ~,::__-'=-C-'-n'-------- Address: PoBox, .?.~Zo/3 l'/252,~ .... ·x A2 es--o . n 
Vehicle: Color wh;J-e. Year zoo6 Make V{)lvo Body" __.... _ .~_v't. _ '7"'._,,._"'-_.:_,.,,_,_;;;~·,_~ ------------=-
St ate & License # -=o=-· ,!_k~------=2.=-..:c,J'---L.:........:::J:...ce<,;,"-. .,,,_J____ V. I. N. '-/ v 4./ N c '9 ,- 6 9 7 N '1 3' 6 a 3 'f 
Odometer Reading: Vehicle Locked? D Yes llcl No 
Body Damage: 
Contents: C{ '"'I ·"I I , ., '".., -J ,,.p., I b:J l":~ r; ;/-,4/' ;1t./" -/Li ,c (..,,;-It.,,. .j Yes No 
J3,,.Un ~-J,,,./1·"] L!J; 
r-,\ ·, ·-
hJ,.j t:..·~ . .;~t,-(!)./ .i'\. ',.__./ d.,J.C ~j Radio ~ D 
Tape Deck/CD !fl- D 
Spare Tire D D 
Glove Box Locked D D 
Other (See attached} D D 
Vehicle/contents taken 
to: __ L_e_i-\.,,,:....:._1:....:·s~J--'-c::....:..i.•i ______________________________ _ 
(Physical location) 
by: For- esrJ- 'T\? w,' "- Phone: 
<Towing company name or other thorized person) ------------




Items retained by Officer? D None D Yes, describe ALL: 
COMPLETE NOTICE BELOW FOR ABANDONED VEHICLES ONLY 
NOTICE 
The described vehicle has been towed and is subject to sale in compliance with Title 49, Chapter 18, Idaho Code. 
YOU MAY, AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE SALE OR PERMANENT DISPOSAL, RECLAIM YOUR VEHICLE BY PAYING 
THE POSSESSORY LIEN AGAINST THE VEHICLE WHICH CONSISTS OF THE AMOUNT OF THE TOWING AND 
STORAGE. 
[ ] You are entitled to a post-storage hearing to determine the validity of the towing and storage charges. In order to 
receive a post-storage hearing, owners or their agents must request the hearing in writing within ten (10) days of 
the date of this notice to the agency authorizing the tow. Any such hearing will be conducted within 48 hours of 
request, excluding weekends and holidays. There is a possessory lien against this vehicle in the amount of 
$ ______ (towing) and storage which will accrue at the rate of$ ______ for each day the vehicle is 
stored. 
[] The value of the vehicle has been appraised at LESS than $200. You have the right to a hearing in court if the 
"Declaration of Opposition" (form enclosed is signed and returned to Idaho State Police, __________ _ 
_______________________ __,within ten (10) days of the date this notice was mailed. If 
a "Declaration of Opposition" is not received within this time, the possessory lien holder may dispose of the vehicle. 
[ j e value of this vehicle has been appraised at MORE than $200. Storage may be charged for a maximum number of 
~,xty (60) days. If your vehicle is not claimed prior to _______ (60 days from date above), it will be sold. 
Vehicle released to Date --------------
Contents released to Date --------------Copy Distribution: WHITE - Regional Office, YELLOW - ITD Titles Section, PINK- Registered Owner/Lienholder, GOLDENROD - Wrecker Operator 
EH 06-05-01 rev. 7/04 
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IDAHO STATE POLICE 
TOWED VEHICLE INVENTORY/N .CE 
Date J- 7- Z,;;;,c '7 Time ) c,oo -------
"ltion: US '9 S" ./'\'tJlcc ,..O·· 2. !.>-7 
~-- .. son for Towing: • Driver Arrest D 
Extraordinary Circumstances D (Specify): 
Abandoned D 
Case No. l.. o ·;, o oo O Ji 
Traffic Hazard D Accident i;g.- Private Property o 
Registered Owner: Pe+,,._,,.. /A"' l+c;,, Address: l2., L.,ahev,/e,_, 0- lL,,,..J:,,1 ... k ;,.,,.,..A: 
Driver: Pd--.,.- M.tJl-lo,, Address: 
LienHolder: C,1i--y A ... ;,-,u f:','.--o.ti,ci"s.( Address: 
Vehicle: Color 1,vJ, ."fe. ---'-"-'-=------ Year Z..oos Make H o,..,I., S .Z<Joo c.ei Body 2-,J'.,.,. c,:n,c e V.I.N. J H MA-P 2. l ¥ ?S S C!Of; 8 9 _5' ___ _;:;;__;'-1------'""--St ate & License# vvA (; J 2. , x w 
g,,,.,.,,, Odometer Reading: --------;,--------
Body Damage: t '-el,; s .: ,j e C ''I .... .,,/ I'\ .f.ro ,.., 
Vehicle Locked? o Yes 1:!1-No 
-:,,-..,4,.b 
Contents: Yes No 
Radio ~ 
Tape Deck/CD IB-
Spare Tire ~ 
Glove Box Locked D 
Other (See attached) D 
g J''o'-,...-ee.1--
Phone:{±0 £:) 9.f-3- 2-]BS 
Vehicle/contents taken 
to: G>"~"' q c..,,,·11e llvo ,;v., l·~h 
_,,,,(P.,..hy-si~ca.,..l ~oc~Wc-+o"""n)"-"'--'------------------
by: c&g 'tv ,.,_,,.;.,.,.,, 
~(T-ow-i-ng_c..,,om""'p-an_y_n-am-"e-o-r o-th_e.,...h!,-ut.,..ho-,~,ze~d-pe-rs-o~n) _______ _ 
ify that the items above were released to my custody by: 
(Officer's i<iame) 
X 
Items retained by Officer? )'I None D Yes, describe ALL: 
A; .,.. 1:, ." _1 ,. ,1. er I~ y e..e 
COMPLETE NOTICE BELOW FOR ABANDONED VEHICLES ONLY 
NOTICE 
The described vehicle has been towed and is subject to sale in compliance with Title 49, Chapter 18, Idaho Code. 
YOU MAY, AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE SALE OR PERMANENT DISPOSAL, RECLAIM YOUR VEHICLE BY PAYING 
THE POSSESSORY LIEN AGAINST THE VEHICLE WHICH CONSISTS OF THE AMOUNT OF THE TOWING AND 
STORAGE. 
[ l You are entitled to a post-storage hearing to determine the validity of the towing and storage charges. In order to 
receive a post-storage he~ring, owners or their agents must request the hearing in writing within ten (10) days of 
the date of this notice to the agency authorizing the tow. Any such hearing will be conducted within 48 hours of 
request, excluding weekends and holidays. There is a possessory lien against this vehicle in the amount of 
$ ______ (towing) and storage which will accrue at the rate of$ ______ for each day the vehicle is 
stored. 






"Declaration of Opposition" (form enclosed is signed and returned to Idaho State Police, __________ _ 
_______________________ _,within ten (10) days of the date this notice was mailed. If 
a "Declaration of Opposition" is not received within this time, the possessory lien holder may dispose of the vehicle. 
[ l · . e value of this vehicle has been appraised at MORE than $200. Storage may be charged for a maximum number of 
_,;(ty (60) days. If your vehicle is not claimed prior to _______ (60 days from date above), it will be sold. 
Vehicle released to Date --------------
Contents released to Date 
Copy Distribution: WHITE - Regional Office, YELLOW - ITD Titles Section, PINK- Registered Owner/Lienholder-,-G-O_L_D_E_N_R_O_D ___ W_r-ec_k_e_r O-p-e-ra-t-or __ _ 








416 ELK STREET 
GRANGEVILLE ID 83530 
STICKER: 0710 030795 
DESCRIP: 
RC: 25020061018102358 




0 TRAN: RN BU 25/0 
. IDAHO GRANGEVILLE HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
THESE LICENSE PLATES BELONG TO YOU - REMOVE THEM WHEN YOU SELL THE VEHICLE 
!TD-3870 (Rev. 11-0 
Idaho Transportalion Dep· 
Division of Motor Vehicles 
PO Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
u[]={]O~ 0~ 
[r!] @ 1r ~ ~ D [L [L 
28.25 
I;We certify under penalty of law that this vehick 
is and will be continuously insured as prescnbed 
by Jaw (see reverse side) . 
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12/30/2006 14:24 FAX 6239077534 SWIFT 14)002 
ACORD™ CERTIFICATE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE I DATE (MM/DD/YYYY) 12/15/06 
PRODUCER l-501-374-9300 THIS CERTIFICATE IS ISSUED AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION 
AON Truck Group ONLY AND CONFERS NO RIGHTS UPON THE CERTIFICATE 
HOLDER. THIS CERTIFICATE DOES NOT AMEND, EXTEND OR 
PO Box 3870 ALTER THE COVERAGE AFFORDED BY THE POLICIES BELOW. 
Little Rock, AR 72203 
INSURERS AFFORDING COVERAGE NAIC# 
INSURED INSURERA: Self Inai.ired 
SWift Transportation Co., Inc, and Its Subaidiariea 
INSURER 6: 
P.O. Box 29243 INSURERC: 
Phoepi:it, AZ 85038-9243 INSURERD: 
INSURERE: 
COVERAGES 
THE POLICIES OF INSURANCE LISTED BELOW HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE INSURED NAMED ABOVE FOR THE POLICY PERIOD INDICATED. NOTWITHSTANDING 
ANY REQUIREMENT, TERM OR CONDITION OF ANY CONTRACT OR OTHER DOCUMENT WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THIS CERTIFICATE MAY BE ISSUED OR 
MAY PERTAIN, THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THE POLICIES DESCRIBED HEREIN IS SUBJECT TO ALL THI'; TERMS, EXCLUSIONS AND CONDITIONS OF SUCH 
POLICIES. AGGREGATE LIMITS SHOWN MAY HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY PAID CLAIMS. 
INSR ~~·~ POLICY HUMBER Pii!-+~':.1:r.~1;g;wr= POLICY EXPIRATION LIMITS LTR TYP~ ----·-,m ··-- OAT,; IMMIDnNYl 
GENERAL LIABILITY EACH OCCURRENCE , $ -
PREj~Tc~9E~~~,;;~nce\ - COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY $ 
- D CLAIMS MADE D OCCUR MED EXP (Any one person) $ 
PERSONAL & ADV INJURY $ -
GENERAL AGGREGATE ,-- $ 
GEN'L AGGREGATE LIMIT APPLIES PER: PRODUCTS· COMP/OP AGG $ n nPRO- nLOC POLICY JEr.T 
A AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY Swift is a Qualified 12/26/90 01/01/06 COMBINED SINGLE LIMIT >-- $1,000,000 
X ANY AUTO Self-Insured by the (Ea accidenl) ,---
- ALL OWNED AUTOS Federal Motor Carrier BODILY INJURY $ SCHEDULED AUTOS Safety Administration (Per person) -- HIRED AUTOS BODILY INJURY $ 
NON-OWNED AUTOS (Per accident) 
~ 
- PROPERTY DAMAGE 
(Per accldenl) $ 
GARAGE LIABILITY AUTO ONLY· EA ACCIDENT $ Fl ANYAUTO OTHER THAN EAACC $ 
AUTO ONLY: AGG $ 
EXCESS/UMBRELLA LIABILITY EACH OCCURRENCE $ 
OoccuR D CLAIMS MADE AGGREGATE $ 
$ R DEDUCTIBLE $ 
RETENTION $ $ 
WORKERS COMPENSATION AND 
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY 
I ro~rniii¥s I 10;~-
ANY PROPRIETOR/PARTNER/EXECUlWE INCL E.L. EACH ACCIDENT $ 
OFF!CERJMEM6ER EXCLUDED? EXCL E.L, DISEi\SE • EA EMPLOYEE $ 
If yes, describe under 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS below E.L. DISEASE· POLICY LIMIT $ 
OTHER 
DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS/ LOCATIONS/ VEHICLES/ EXCLUSIONS ADDED BY ENDORSEMENT /SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
Swift Tran.aportation - MC#1368l8/DOT #54283 
E~cese Auto Coverage - Policy #N07QA00120- $1,000,000 Limit of Liability -
In.surance Carrier• Lloyda of London 
In the event of a claim, please contact the Swift Transportation Claim Dept at (800) 467-2793. 
CERTIFICATE HOLDER 
Evidence of Coverage 
• 2200 s. 75th Ave 
!Phoenix, AZ 65043 




SHOULD ANY OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PO!.ICIES BE CANCELLED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION 
DATE THEREOF, THE ISSUING INSURER Will. ENDEAVOR TO MAIL _!Q__ DAYS WRITTEN 
NOTICE TO THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER NAMED TO THE LEFT, BUT FAil.URE TO o'o SO ~JiALL 
IMPOSE NO OBLIGATION OR LIABII.ITY OF AIIY KIND UPON THE INSURER, ITS AGENTS OR 
REPRESENTATIVES, 
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE 
©ACORD CORPORATION 1988 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Fl LED 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 















MALLORY E. LARSON -1-
Case No: CV09-0025 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MALLORY E. LARSON 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) S.S, 
County of Clearwa.te:r ) 
MALLORY ll LARSON, being fi.rst duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:· 
I. lam nn m1ult citizen of the United States of America, over t:h'.': age of 
twenty-one (21 ), competent to testify as a witness. and make this nffidavir on personal 
.knowledge. 
2. I ~1.t1•rently live at l.2878 Vi$tn Avenue, Orofino. Idaho . .I have lhed ir, 
Orofino, Idaho and have been a resident of Clearwater County since November of 2007. 
3, The Summons and Complaint .in thi.s case were served by a process 
server at my residence at 12878 Vista Avenue, 01:ofi.noJ Idaho. 
l swea:r under .the penntties of pei:jury that the above statements are true to the 
best of my knowledge, 
DATED: Octobor _J__, 2009. 
\. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I hereby certify that on the ___5f October 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
X U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
X TELECOPY (FAX) 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MALLORY E. LARSON 
~~4~~- ~.J;:~ 




Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 














Case No: CV09-0025 
DEFENDANT'SREPLYTOPLAINTIFF'S 
PARTIAL OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE 
OFVENUETOCLEARWATERCOUNTY 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 6, 2009, plaintiff filed his Complaint in this case in Nez Perce 
County. On July 24, 2009, defendant filed a Motion for Change of Venue to Clearwater 
County, the county where defendant Mallory Larson currently resides and where she resided 
at the time the Complaint in this case was filed . On October 6, 2009, plaintiff filed a Partial 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF ' S 
PARTIAL OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 




Objection to Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue to Clearwater County. Plaintiff stated 
that his objection was partial "in that Defendant's Motion is correct that the venue of this 
Action should be located in Idaho County, Idaho, or Clearwater County, Idaho." (Plaintiffs 





The relevant portion of Idaho Code § 5-404 states that: 
In all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which 
the defendants, or some of them, reside, at the commencement 
of the action; or if none of the defendants reside in the state, or 
if residing in this state, the county in which they reside is 
unknown to the plaintiff, the same may be tried in any county 
which the plaintiff may designate in his complaint. ... 
In his Complaint, plaintiff alleged that "Defendant Mallory E. Larson was [sic] 
the time of collision a resident of Clearwater County, Idaho." (Complaint, 1/6/2009, ,r II). 
Ms. Larson admitted in her Answer to the Complaint that she is a resident of Clearwater 
County, Idaho. (See Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 7/24/2009). In her 
affidavit filed in this matter, Ms. Larson affirmed that she has been a resident of Clearwater 
County since November of 2007. It is therefore undisputed that Ms. Larson is currently and 
was at the time plaintiff filed his Complaint, a resident of Clearwater County, Idaho. Under 
J.C. § 5-404, this case must be tried in Clearwater County, absent plaintiff proving that an 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PARTIAL OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 




alternative provision of the statute should apply. 
In his Partial Objection, plaintiff does not assert that he was unaware of Ms. 
Larson's county of residence when he filed the lawsuit. 1 On the contrary, Ms. Larson was 
properly served by plaintiffs process server at her residence in Clearwater County as shown 
in the Affidavit of Service filed by plaintiff on July 30, 2009. Instead, plaintiff first argues 
that venue should be located in Idaho County for the convenience of the witnesses. (See 
Plaintiffs Partial Objection, p. 2). However, plaintiffs acknowledges that one witness 
resides in Boise, Idaho, another in Burbank, Washington, and plaintiff lives in Fresno, 
California. Only one witness lived in Grangeville, Idaho at the time of the accident. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(e)(l)(C), one potential witness possibly still living in Idaho County 
does not equal "satisfactory proof. .. [t]hat the convenience of witnesses and the ends of 
justice would be promoted by the change" of venue to Idaho County. See id. 
Plaintiff also cites Hayes v. Kingston, 140 Idaho 551, 96 P.3d 652 (2004), for 
the proposition that venue is "proper in the County 'the cause of action arose in.'" (Plaintiffs 
Partial Objection, p. 2.) However, Hayes involved claims by shareholders of securities fraud 
1 Although Idaho does not have any case law discussing the burden ofproofrequired to establish one of the alternatives 
ofl.C. § 5-404, Texas courts have dealt with this issue under a similar statute. In Pan American Sign Company v. J.B. 
Hotel Company et. al., 403 S.W.2d 548 (1966), the court held that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show 
by preponderance of evidence that defendant's residence was unknown to plaintiff at the time suit was filed. See 
id. The court stated that "[i]t is a well established rule that a person's right to be sued in the county of his residence is a 
valuable right, of which he should not be deprived unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the case 
comes under some 'exception' to the rule." Id. at 551. Although plaintiff stated in his Complaint that he was unaware of 
plaintiffs county ofresidence, the fact that he also alleged that defendant resided in Clearwater County at the time of the 
accident and had plaintiff served in Clearwater County is contrary to the bare allegation contained in his Complaint. 
Plaintiff would have to show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's residence was unknown to him at the 
time suit was filed. Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence on this issue and as such has failed to meet his burden. 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PARTIAL OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 




against a corporation and its officers. See id. The last provision of LC. §5-404 states that 
" .. .in all actions against any corporation organized under the laws of the state ofldaho, suit 
or action shall be commenced and tried in the county of this state where the defendant has its 
principal place of business or in the county in which the cause of action arose." Id. In Hayes, 
the Supreme Court ofldaho held that, based on the plain language ofl.C. §5-404, the cause 
of action against the corporation should be tried in the county where the cause of action 
arose. See Hayes, 140 Idaho at 554, 96 P.3d at 655. 
The defendant in this case is not a corporation. It is not disputed that 
defendant's place of residence at the time the action was filed was Clearwater County. 
There has been no evidence presented to establish that an alternate provision ofl.C. § 5-404 




Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that her Motion for 
Change of Venue to Clearwater County be granted. 
DATED this 8th day of October 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
B9ts~ATEE~ NU~S~Hc~ ' 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PARTIAL OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE TO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CLEAR WATER COUNTY -4-
 
93
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th of October 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 




X TELECOPY (FAX) 
c::::"¾.,, -~ ~~,.. --r:(_ LI . .., ___._o_~ 
SonyaleeR'~ Nutsch 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PARTIAL OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 














William P Teurlings vs. Mallory E Larson 
Hearing type: Change of Venue 
Hearing date: 10/13/2009 
Time: 8:58 am 
Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Ned Cannon 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Mr. Cannon and Ms. Nutsch present. 
Court addresses Counsel. 
Ms. Nutsch presents argument on Defendant's Motion to Change Venue. 
Mr. Cannon addresses the Court on Defendant's Motion to Change Venue. 
Ms. Nutsch presents rebuttal argument. 




Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNlCHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1=- I i_ .:· D 
2009 NOU Y Prl 12 51 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
















Case No: CV09-00025 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I, Sonyalee R. Nutsch, attorney for defendant, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 33(a)(5), 
and 34(d) certify that on the 4th day of November, 2009, DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION were 
served on counsel for plaintiff, Ned A. Cannon. 
DATED this 4th day of November 2009. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~~tNU~~iI~ ' 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of November 2009, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
U.S . MAIL 
X HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -2-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
















CASE NO. CV 2009-0025 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR CHANGE OF VENUE 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue to 
Clearwater County. The Court heard oral argument on October 13, 2009. The Plaintiff, William 
P. Teurlings, was represented by Ned Cannon, Attorney at Law. The Defendant, Mallory Larsen, 
was represented by Sonyalee Nutsch, of the firm Clements, Brown & McNichols. The Court, 
having heard argument and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
William Teurlings filed this lawsuit after he was involved in a motor vehicle collision 
which occurred in Idaho County on January 7, 2007. The Complaint was filed in Nez Perce 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 




County on January 6, 2009. On July 24, 2009, the Defendant filed a motion for change of venue, 
seeking to move the case to Clearwater County, the county where the Defendant resides. On 
October 6, 2009, the Plaintiff filed a partial objection to the Defendant's motion for change of 
venue, arguing that venue should be moved to Idaho County, the county where the collision 
occurred. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Determination of venue is within the discretion of the court only in cases where 
conflicting issues of fact must be resolved, such as the actual residence of a defendant, 
convenience of witnesses, or impartial trial. Hayes v. Kingston, 140 Idaho 551, 554, 96 P.3d 652, 
655 (2004). Otherwise, where there are no conflicting issues of fact, 1 a trial court lacks discretion 
and must grant or deny a motion to change venue in accordance with relevant statutes. See Id 
part: 
ANALYSIS 
I.R.C.P. 40(e) sets forth the requirements for change of venue. The rule states in pertinent 
[T]he judge or magistrate must, on motion pursuant to Rule 12(b ), change the 
venue of a trial when it appears by affidavit or other satisfactory proof: 
(A) that the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county, which 
motion must be made no later than fourteen (14) days after the party files a 
responsive pleading, or . 
(B) That there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had therein, or 
(C) That the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted 
by the change. 
1 If it can be ascertained where the Defendants reside, and the Court finds that the action was filed in a county where 
no Defendants reside then it must, upon the timely filing of the Defendants' motion, remove the case to where at least 
one of the Defendants reside. See Pintlar Corp. v. Bunker Ltd Partnerships, 117 Idaho 152, 156, 786 P.2d 543, 547 
(1990) 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 




LR.C.P. 40(e)(l) (emphasis added). This rule is couched in mandatory language requiring a trial 
court to grant a change of venue motion for any of the three reasons stated above. Corder v. 
Idaho Farmway, Inc., 133 Idaho 353,358, 986 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Ct. App. 1999). 
In accordance with LC. § 5-404, the Defendant asserts that venue is proper only in 
Clearwater County, Idaho, where the named Defendant resides. LC.§ 5-404 provides in part: 
In all other cases2 the action must be tried in the county in which the defendants, 
or some of them, reside, at the commencement of the action . . . and provided, 
further, that in all actions against any corporation organized under the laws of the 
state of Idaho, suit or action shall be commenced and tried in any county of this 
state where the defendant has its principal place of business or in the county in 
which the cause of action arose. 
The requirements of the venue statute are also mandatory, and the statute recognizes the general 
principal that the Defendant has a right to a trial in her county of residence. Hayes v. Kingston, 
140 Idaho 551, 554, 96 P.3d 652, 655 (2004). It follows that if a complaint is filed in a county 
where no Defendant resides then venue is improper in that county in accordahce with LC. § 5-
404. See Id. 
In the case at hand, the Defendant is currently a resident of Clearwater County. Further, 
the Defendant was a resident of Clearwater County at the time of the collision. Affidavit of 
Mallory E. Larson, filed October 8, 2009. Thus, in accordance to LR.C.P. 40(e)(l)(A) and LC.§ 
5-404, the Court must remove the case to Clearwater County, Idaho, where venue is proper 
according to relevant statutes. 
The Plaintiff filed a partial objection to the Defendant's motion for change of venue, 
2 I.C. § 5-404 is titled Other actions - Venue determined by residence - Exceptions. I.C. § 5-404 is used when 
determining venue for cases which do not fall within the confines of the other venue statutes which include: I.C. § 5-
401 ("Actions relating to real property"), I.C. § 5-402 ("Actions for penalties and against officers"), and I.C. § 5-403 
("Actions against Counties"). The case at bar is not an action related to real property, for penalties, against officers 
or against counties. Thus, venue in this case is appropriately determined by I.C. § 5-404. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 




arguing that for the convenience of the witnesses, venue is proper in Idaho County, the situs of 
the collision. The Plaintiff relies on Hayes v. Kingston, 140 Idaho 551, 96 P.3d 652 (2004) in 
support of his argument that venue should be moved to Idaho County. Hayes is distinguishable 
from the case at hand, however, because the defendant in Hayes was a corporation, thus, pursuant 
to LC. § 5-404, the cause of action should be tried in the county where the cause of action arose. 
Id. at 554, 96 P.3d at 655. The Defendant in the case at hand is an individual, not a corporation, 
therefore LC. § 5-404 requires the case be transferred to the county of the Defendant's residence, 
Clearwater County. 
Further, should the Plaintiff pursue the argument that venue is proper in Idaho County 
due to the convenience of the witnesses, such a determination is best left to the court presiding 
over the case in the proper county, Clearwater County. See Spaulding v. Hoops, 49 Idaho 289, 
287 P.2d 947 (1930)( where a case is originally filed in the improper county, it must first be 
removed to the county where venue is proper before the Court can consider changing venue for 
the convenience of the witnesses). When a case is originally filed in an improper county it must 
be moved to where venue is proper before the convenience of the witnesses may be considered. 
Although it may later be found that Idaho County is the best venue due to the convenience of the 
witnesses, it must first be removed to where venue is proper. This ruling is in keeping with the 
general principal that the Defendant has a right to have the case be heard in her county of 
residence. Thus it is appropriate to allow the court where venue is proper to make the 
determination to remove it to another venue for the convenience of witnesses. In accordance with 
LR.C.P 40(e)(l) and LC. § 5-404, this case must be moved to Clearwater County, Idaho, where 
the named Defendant resides. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 





For the reasons stated above, the Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue to Clearwater 
County is granted pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(3), 40(e) and LC. § 5-404. 
ORDER 
The Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue to Clearwater County is hereby 
GRANTED. This case is hereby REMOVED to Clearwater County. IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this L/~ay of November 2009. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR CHANGE OF VENUE was: 
__ faxed this __ day of November, 2009, or 
-1- hand delivered via court basket this5~day of November, 2009, or 
_J_ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 5'~ 
November, 2009, to: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 










_ ________ ) 
Case No. CV f)l-4-ZiJ 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
It is ORDERED that Judge Bradbury, whose chambers are located in Grangeville, 
Idaho, is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this _j_ day of November 2009. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE was mailed to: 
Ned Cannon 
508 8th St 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
PO Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
The Hon John Bradbury 
Grangeville, ID 83530 
~~ 
on this £ day of N°i:02009. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF, l HE t}V{fi-~~ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER~ ,,u J 
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) ______________ ) 
ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION 
The undersigned presiding Judge having good cause to disqualify himself from this 
case, does hereby deem himself disqualified from further proceedings herein, under rule 
40(d)(4), I.R.C.P., and requests the Administrative Judge to appoint another Judge to hear 
this case. 
ORDER OF DISQUALIFICATION - 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Ahe foregoing Order of 
D_!s~ alification was hand-delivered, faxed or mailed on the Ii U q day of t £.rr') 0 
1 to: 
Jeff M Brudie 
Administrative District Judge 
Faxed: 208-799-3058 
5tr\i~\tt- fl likth 
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NOV. 19. 2009 10 :06AM ~!STR ICT COURT NO. 953 6- P. 112 
TO:C LE ARWA T E COUN TY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
vVILLIAM P .. TERULINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CV 09-420 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
It is ORDERED that Judge Stegner, whose chambers are located in Moscow, Idaho, 
is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this tj_ day of November 2009. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1 
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NOV. 19. 2009 10 :06AM ~!STRICT COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, b:ue, complete 
and correct copy of the fol'egoing 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE was mailed to: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Ned Cannon 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2 
NO. 9536 P. 2/ 2 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
PLAINTIFF' S I.R.C .P. RULE 40(d)(l) 
DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE 
Comes now the Plaintiff, by and through his attorney of record, Ned A. Cannon, of the 
law firm Smith & Cannon PLLC, and, under and pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 40( d)(l ), hereby moves for the Disqualification of Judge John Stegner from presiding over 
this action. 
DATED this 23 rd day of November, 2009. 
PLAINTIFF'S I.R.C.P. RULE 40(d)(l) 
DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
ed A. Cannon, attorney for Plaintiff 
 
110
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiff's IR. C.P. Rule 40(d)(l) Disqualification Without Cause on the following 
parties via the method(s) indicated below: 
The Honorable John Stegner 
Latah County District Court 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
321 13 th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston. ID 83501 
Via: 
(X) U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 23 rd day of November, 2009, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
PLAINTIFF'S I.R.C.P. RULE 40(d)(l) 
DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE 2 
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NOV, 25, 2009 3:54PM DJ~ T~JCT COURT 
TO:CLEARWATER ~OUNTY NO. 9 7 8 2 P. 1/2 
l~)b ;~, 
S\~ Cl,:,< C,sl. G::ur. 
____ C_k ..... _· 1.v~~~r c_~un·.·"J.J_'.:t•o 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No, CV09-00420 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
It is ORDERED that Judge Kerrick, whose chambers are located in Lewiston, Idaho, 
is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this 1.S'ctay of November 2009. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 1 
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NOV.25. 2009 3:54PM DJST~JCT COUR T 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE was mailed to: 
Ned Cannon 
508 8th St 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
PO Box1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
The Hon Carl Kerrick 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
on this / ~ day of~~-
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2 
NO. 9782 P. 2/ 2 
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, t.· ·< i'!a.ilt-0~~ 
·. J~~- - -
3t fD: f~o'clock_ 0......_M 
~ i i ™ & Clerk 
By S\!--o Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 1)'i:1ni~t-S;NCOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ...._._ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No. CV-09-00420 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
Plaintiff having filed a Motion for Disqualification of the undersigned District 
Judge pursuant to Rule 40(d)(l) , I.R.C.P. , 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for Disqualification is granted .. 
The undersigned requests that the Administrative Judge of the Second Judicial 
District appoint another district judge to preside in this matter. 
DATED this 2. 'f ~y of November, 2009. 
r 'l~ 
Jo~ R. Stegner 
District Judge 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
was transmitted by facsimile to: 
THE HONORABLE JEFF BRUDIE 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 
PO BOX 896 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
799-3058 
NED CANNON 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
746-8421 
SONYALEE NUTSCH 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
746-0753 
on this.ZA..y of November, 2009. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION - 2 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
C, \• ~I _ 
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Ul 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN A1'TD FOR TI-TE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served true and correct 
copies of Plaintiffs Answers to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Defendant Mallory E. Larson through her counsel via the method 
indicated below: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Email (pdf attachment) 
Signed this 29th day of April, 2010, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Notice of Service on the following parties via the method(s) indicated below: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 29th day ui' April , 201 u, at Lewiston, ldabCt. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 2 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
~ LE q '.- ) I . ·- .,. ' ,-.-
., V I I 
r -
~ - r ... , . . , 
LI . '': '• I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 















Case No: CV09-420 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
STAY UNDER THE MILITIA 
CIVIL RELIEF ACT 
Defendant, by and through her attorney of record, Sonyalee R. Nutsch of 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., pursuant to The Militia Civil Relief Act, Idaho Code § 
46-409, hereby moves that all proceedings in the above matter be stayed due to the fact that 
defendant is a member of the Idaho National Guard and has been called up to active duty. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
STAY UNDER THE MILITIA 
CML RELIEF ACT -1-
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This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Stay under the Militia Civil Relief Act, the Affidavit of Mallory R. Martinez (fka 
Larson) and the Affidavit of Sonyalee R. Nutsch filed herewith. 
DATED this 6th day of August 2010. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~m~~~ ~ NUiscif° ~ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-8421 - facsimile 




DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
STAY UNDER THE MILITIA 
CIVIL RELIEF ACT -2-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
C'L~R:, - DI..., · : 1· 0'~ l , . 
l .. \ . 
\,.1 I\ .. ' i I -·, '~ 'l 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No: CV09-420 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
STAY UNDER THE MILITIA 
CIVIL RELIEF ACT 
FACTS 
Defendant Mallory Martinez (fka Larson), is a member of the Idaho National 
Guard and has been for the last seven years. (See Affidavit of Mallory E. Martinez, 6/2/2010, 
,i 2). Ms. Martinez was recently called up to active duty. She is currently finishing up a four 
month training session in Portland, Oregon and will then be transferred to Iraq for one year. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY 
UNDER THE MILITIA CIVIL RELIEF ACT -1-
 
120
(See MartinezAff., ii 6). On July 29, 2010, defense counsel was provided with a copy ofMs. 
Martinez's Orders directly from Ms. Martinez's Section Sergeant, SSG Tony Rice. (See 
Affidavit of Sony alee R. Nutsch, 8/6/2010, ii 3 ). Although the Orders have been redacted for 
security reasons, the unredacted portion clearly states that Ms. Martinez has been called up 
for active duty for a period "[n]ot to exceed 400 days". (Nutsch Aff., Exh. A). 
Due to the nature of this case, the defendant's communication with counsel and 
participation in her defense is critical to counsel's ability to adequately defend this matter. 
Defendant's attendance will be required at trial. (See Nutsch Aff., ii4). 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to the Militia Civil Relief Act: 
Whenever any active member of the national guard in time of 
war, armed conflict, or emergency proclaimed by a governor or 
by the president of the United States, shall be called or ordered 
by a governor to state active duty for a period of thirty (30) 
consecutive days or more, or to duty other than for training 
pursuant to title 32 U.S.C., the provision as then in effect of the 
soldiers' and sailors' civil relief act, 50 App. U.S.C. section 501 
et. seq. .. ... shall apply. 
I.C. §46-409 (2). Pursuant to § 522 of the current Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act: 
(b) Stay of proceedings 
( 1) Authority for stay 
At any stage before final judgment in a civil action or 
proceeding in which a servicemember described in subsection 
(a) is a party, the court may on its own motion and shall, upon 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY 
UNDER THE MILITIA CIVIL RELIEF ACT -2-
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application by the servicemember, stay the action for a period of 
not less than 90 days, if the conditions in paragraph (2) are met. 
(2) Conditions for stay 
An application for a stay under paragraph (1) shall include the 
following: 
(A) A letter or other communication setting forth 
facts stating the manner in which current military duty 
requirements materially affect the servicemember's 
ability to appear and stating a date when the 
servicemember will be available to appear. 
(B) A letter or other communication from the 
servicemember's commanding officer stating that the 
servicemember's current military duty prevents 
appearance and that military leave is not authorized for 
the servicemember at the time of the letter. 
50 App. U.S.C.A. § 522(b ). 
In her Affidavit, defendant explained that she will be leaving for Iraq in 
September of 2010 and has been told she will be gone for one year. (Martinez Aff., 1 6). 
The Orders received from her commanding officer confirm the information provided by 
defendant. (See Nutsch Aff., Exh. A). The fact that the defendant is being called up to Iraq 
will prevent her appearance and participation in her defense in this case. 
The defendant therefore has met the conditions required to stay this case 
pursuant to I.C. §46-409 and 50 App. U.S.C.A. §522 and hereby requests that the Court stay 
all proceedings of any kind being held in this matter until further Order of the Court. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY 





Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that her Motion to Stay 
be granted and all proceedings in this matter be stayed until further Order of the Court. 
DATED this 6th day of August 2010. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
B~ R~ts~~, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
UNDER THE MILITIA CIVIL RELIEF ACT -4-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 





MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY 
UNDER THE MILITIA CIVIL RELIEF ACT -5-
 
124
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLErvIENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
3 21 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB#6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
201 ro I " ~ r : . 1 r r. • - J .__ , I , .J 
- " · -: :· . t_vcq -l/;;b 
--·- (!J) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND TIJDICIAL DISTRICT 




MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 











Case No: CV09-420 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SONY ALEE R. NlJTSCH 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
SONY ALEE R. NUTS CH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, over the age of 
twenty-one (21 ), competent to testify as a witness, and make this affidavit on personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am one of the attorneys representing the defendant in this matter. 
3. On July 29, 2010, Mallory Martinez's (fka Larson) Section Sergeant, 
SSG Tony Rice, delivered to me a copy of Ms. Martinez's Orders. The Orders have been 
redacted for security reasons. A fair and accurate copy of the redacted Orders are attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. Ms. Martinez was a witness to plaintiffs conduct, behavior and actions 
shortly after the accident at issue in this case and had conversations with him afterward. I 
will be unable to adequately defend this claim without her presence and participation. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SONY ALEE R. NUTSCH 
~~--I. ~\;-;ob SOAL R. NUTSCH ' 
Notary PubliG i1,1 a~d for the State of _ ___ _ 
residing at f\¼J I~ , therein. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th of August 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 





c::ssv." 'ri" • -L " );; .) 4 ,, ~ 
Sonyalee . Nutsch 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SONY ALEE R. NUTSCH -3-
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STATE OF IDAHO 
MILITARY DIVISION 
4040 WEST GUARD STREET 
BOISE, ID 83705-8048 
ORDERS 166-161 15 June 2010 
MARTINEZ MALLORY E 
(TQ2T0-330) 2707 16TH AVE 
SPC HHC 145TH SPT BN 
LEWISTION ID 83501 
You are ordered to active duty as a member of your Reserve Component Unit for 
the period indicated unless sooner released or unless extended. Proceed from 
your current location in sufficient time to report by the date specified. 
You enter active duty upon reporting to unit home station. 
REPORT TO HOME STATION: 17 September 
REPORT TO MOB STATION: 20 September 
Period of active duty: Not to exceed 
Purpose: In support of Operation 
Mobilization Category Code: G 
Additional instructions: 
2010, LEWISTON Gl 
2010, CP Shelby 
400 days 
(a) You are ordered to active duty with the consent of the Governor of Idaho. 
The mobilization period may be shortened or extended under the provisions 
of DOD directive 1235.10 or supplemental guidance. The soldier will be 
excluded from the active Army end-strength per Title 10 USC, section 138, 
and will not be placed on the active duty list (sections 641(1) (D) and) Tj 
(b) You are ordered to active duty for a period of less than 30 days for mobil-
ization processing that includes medical and dental screening and/or care. 
ET 
If you are not determined to be medically qualified for deployment (whether) T 
released from active duty, transferred to your prior status, and returned 
to your home address. 
(c) You will be subject to a subsequent order to active duty upon resolution of 
the disqualifying medical condition. If you are found to be medically 
qualified for deployment, then you are further ordered to active duty for a 
period not to exceed the period of active duty specified, unless sooner 
released by proper authority. This period of active duty shall exclude the 
medical/dental screening period but shall be calculated to that period. 
(d) Soldier to remain under command of First United States Army until deployed. 
Complete DD Form 2795 (Pre-Deployment) within 30 days prior to deployment 
(e) This is not a permanent change of station (PCS). Soldiers are deployed in a 
TCS status. Movement of household goods and dependents is not authorized. 
Non-temporary storage of household goods (HHG) is authorized. Storage of 
one Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) is authorized. Transportation of 
personal weapons is not authorized. 
(f) All Government meals are provided and directed. (Soldiers will receive the) T 
Government quarters are provided. 
(g) Attached to USAREUR for Courts-Martial jurisdiction and the administration 
of Military Justice with further attachment to local on site commanders. 
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ORDERS 166-161 HQ ID , OTAG, 15 June 2010 
Additional instructions (cont): 
(h) Early reporting is not authorized. Movement by privately owned vehicle is 
not authorized. Rental car is not authorized. 
(i) 








Unit will mobilize at home station as a unit. Unit members will travel as a 
group. 
Bring your complete military clothing 
Excess baggage for official equipment 
baggage is not to exceed 120 pounds. 
authorized. 
bag and appropriate personal items. 
authorized. Excess accompanied 
Unaccompanied baggage shipment is not 
Family members may be eligible for TRICARE (military health care) benefits. 
For details call 1-888-DoD-CARE (1-888-363-2273) or go to web address 
www.tricare.osd.mil/reserve/ or email TRICARE_help@amedd.army.mil. 
Eligible for TAMP 30 on REFRAD. 
Call 1-800-336-4590 (National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard) Tj 
about your employment or re-employment rights. 
Sure Pay is mandatory. Soldier must bring the appropriate documentation to 
authorize sure pay. Imminent Duty Pay authorized; BAH payable based on the 
soldier's Home of Residence. Family Separation Allowance II (FSA-II) 
authorized for all soldiers with dependents. Enlisted soldiers authorized 
Hardship Duty Pay. Basic Allowance for Subsistance (BAS) authorized for 
all enlisted soldiers. 
SM will contact local unit for actual initial reporting location. 
Soldiers affected by this order will be provided information on Army One 
Source, a free service available anytime. Consultants are available to 
assist Soldiers and family members by calling 1-800-464-8107 or by calling 
collect outside the United States 1-484-530-5889. Internet access is avail-
able to email a consultant at www.armyonesource.com. User ID is Army. The 
password is Onesource. 
Meals and lodging will be provided at no cost to the Soldier. Claims for 
reimbursement require a statement of non-availability control number. 
For unresolved pay issues, contact the ARNG Pay Ombudsman at toll-free 
1-877-ARNGPAY or by email at ARNG-MILPAY@ARNG-FSC.NGB.ARMY.MIL 
FOR ARMY USE 
Auth: TITLE 10 USC, SECTION 12302/HQDA MSG 231710ZAprl0/DAMO-ODM/: ORD 
TYP/MOBORD/HQDA NO. 1695-10 
Acct clas: 
Enl pay/alw: 219/0/1 2010.0000 01-1100 P2X2A00 ll**/12** VIRQ F9203 5570 Sl2120 
Enl tvl/pd: 2102020.0000 Bl BlTC 135197 21Tl/T2 VIRQ F4210 AZVN2E 12161 
Enl pay/alw: 210/1/2 2010.0000 01-1100 P2X2A00 ll**/12** VIRQ F9203 5570 Sl2120 




PMOS/AOS/ASI/LIC: 92Gl, YY , YY 
HOR: PO BOX 2474 
DOR: 28-APR-09 
PEBD: 0l-APR-03 
Security Clearance: N 
Comp: ARNGUS 
Format: 165 
, OROFINO ID83544 
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ORDERS 166-161 HQ ID ,, OTAG, 15 June 2010 
FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL 
DISTRIBUTION: 
SPECIAL 
"INPUT BY DCSPER" 
\\\\\\IIII//////// 
\ HQ, IDARNG // 
\ OFFICIAL // 
\\\\\\Ill/II/II/II 
ANTHONY A. WICKHAM 
COL, GS, IDARNG 
DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF J-1 PERSONNEL 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
C,\r.~.1 C ~1 : f -l 
CI ~ I ' () •r , 
l- L \ \ - 1 d I I \ , L T (, 1_1 ) 
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·-' !""" - ) 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
C 1.s::: I I ty6Cj--4 do 
--- {!.f;:; 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













Case No: CV09-420 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ 
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~ • d 
oa-02-10;13:13 ;C~BRMC, COM 1503274003B ;20B7460753 
STATE OF OREOON ) 
) ss. 
County of M.itlUPNek ) 
MALLORY R, MARTINEZ fonnerly k.nown flli MALLORY B. LARSON. 
being first duly sworn on oath, deposes und says: 
l. I a.w an adult CJili~en of the Unhcd Stutei; c,f America, over the age of 
twenty-one (21), competent to testify as o witness, make this affidavit on personal knowledge-
and am the defendant in this matter. 
2. 1 am a .ml:lmbcr ot· the Idaho National Qua.rd, 145th HHC Suppon 
.l:lattaliont bi:adquartered in Lewiston, Idaho. l have been a member of the ldaho Nation11l 
Ouard for seven (7) yi;:nn and have achieved thco runkofB-4 - specialU&t. 
3. As a member of the Idliho National Guard, I am required to attend 
n1onthly inslnlction d.rilb1 unless I have bQcn called up for active duty. Ea.ch drill generally 
lasts four (4) day:.. 
4. On January 7, 2007, l was on duty with the ld.aho National Guard and 
was attending one of our reguharly scheduled inKtruction drills in L~wiston, Idaho. 01\ 
J11nuary 7, 2007. my i.,hnin of command consisted ofmy Section sergeant SSG Tony Rice~ 
First Serseant Frost and Captain James Deverteuil. Per my superior•,, verbal orders. I wa.1 to 
provide transportation of a fellow guardsman from tho drill to Boise,, Idaho. 
S. At the time of the accident on January 7, 2007. I was on duty with the 
Idaho National Ouanl und was acting under my superior'~ orders by transporting a fellow 
guardsman to Boise, Idaho. 
AFFIDA V1T OF 
MAJ .LO.RYE. MAR'nNEZ --2· 
# 3( 4 
OCOOP-L.;JCOS o:a I no :JhlU7 >1~u..i 1c:~1 010~ co unc 
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""' • ,J 
ce-02-10;13: 13 ;CLBRMC, COM 15032740038 ;2087450753 # 41 4 
6. I have recently been called up to active: duty. J am presently in Portland, 
Oregon for four (4) months of training. After I comi:,lctc my training in Portl11nd, I will be 
transferred to Iraq for one ( 1) year. 
AF'FIDA V J1" OF 
MAT.LORY E. MA.R'l'lNHZ .3. 
OCOO~.JCOS 1c:~1 OtO~ CO unc 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August 20 I 0, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 






MALLORY E. MARTINEZ -4-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No: CV09-420 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: Plaintiff, WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, and to your attorney of record, NED 
A.CANNON: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned will call up for hearing, 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY UNDER THE MILITIA CIVIL RELIEF ACT 
before The Honorable Carl B. Kerrick at the Nez Perce County Courthouse on Tuesday, 
the 24th day of August, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
NOTICE OF HEARING -1-
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DATED this 6th day of August 2010. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
B~~~rlc-w ;L..,  
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-8421 - facsimile 
X U.S.MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
c · · = i .. __ C,,V;)a:)9-vzo 
, ~n 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case N0.: CV 09-420 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT PROVISIONS OF 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ AND 
SONYALEE R. NUTSCH, AND 
OBJECTION TO ABSOLUTE STAY 
Under and pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e), supporting affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show 
affirmatively that affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein . Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof, referred to in an affidavit shali be attached therew or served 
therewith. 
It is submitted that in Mallory E. Martinez's Affidavit, Provision Number 1 is based upon 
hearsay regarding Ms. Martinez's " ... superior's verbal orders .... " In Provision Number 5, Ms. 
Martinez. generally references her superior's orders. which ar~ hea~sav as utilized in such 
PLArNT!FF' 'S MOTION TO STRlKF 
AFFIDAVIT PROViSIONS OF 
MALLORY E. MARTfNEZ 
AND SONYALEE R. NUTSCH, AND 
OBJECTION TO ABSOLUTE ST A Y 
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provision. There is no foundation to support a statement as to how or why Ms. Martinez was 
acting in a certain manner and/or under certain speculative orders. Additionally, the two 
foregoing provisions are irrelevant to the proceeding at hand, regarding a motion for relief, under 
the Militia Civil Relief Act, Idaho Code §46-409. 
Provision 4 of Sonyalee R. Nutsch's affidavit is conclusory and without foundation 
regarding Ms. Martinez purportedly being a witness to Plaintiffs " ... conduct, behavior and 
actions shonly after the accident .... " Such provisions of both affidavits should be struck. 
In Sonyalee R. Nutsch's affidavit, references are made to particular orders that are 
attached and redacted. It is moved that such purported orders be struck in that they are neither 
signed nor conformed, and although references are made to certain redacted p01iions of Exhibit 
A, this reader is unable to identify where and to what degree said purported order has been 
redacted. 
Defendant's motion seeks relief beyond that encompassed by Idaho Code §46-409 in that 
Defendant moves to stay '"all proceedings in the above matter". 
Because Plaintiff continues to seek medical care and treatment, and because certain 
discovery will continue to be supplemented and provided by and between the parties, it is moved 
that any stay that the court considers herein, be referenced such that these pro~~eedings may 
continue in all manner other than as will prejudice Defendant's rights herein, as an active 
member of the United States military. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT PROVISIONS OF 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ 
AND SONY ALEE R. NUTSCH, AND 
OBJECTION TO ABSOLUTE STAY 2 
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DATED this 1 i 11 day of August, 2010. 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Afjidavit Provisions of Mallory E. !vfartinez and Sonyalee R. 
Nut.'ich on the Defendant via the method(s) indicated below: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile - (208) 746-0753 
( ) Email (pdf attachment) 
Signed this 1 ih day of August, 2010, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
1 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT PROVISIONS OF 
MALLORY E. MARTfNEZ 
AND SONY ALEE R. NUTSCH, AND 
OBJECTION TO ABSOLUTE STAY 3 
 
139
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
COURT MINUTES 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Presiding Judge 
CARL B. KERRICK 
Reporter 
NANCY TOWLER 
Date AUGUST 24, 2010 
Time: 10: 18 A.M. 
) 
) 




) NED CANNON 
) For, Plaintiff 
) 
) SONY ALEE NUTSCH 
) For, Defendant 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR ST A Y 
BE IT KNOWN, THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO-WIT: 
COURTROOM #1 
101816 Ned Cam1on present. Sonyalee Nutsch present. 
101836 Court questions Mr. Cannon re: no response filed with the Court. 
101845 Mr. Cannon responds. He filed a Motion to Strike Affidavit Provisions of 
Mallory E. Martinez and Sonyalee R. Nutsch, and Objection to Absolute Stay in 
Clearwater County. 
The Court does not have this document. Mr. Cannon has the bailiff make a copy of his 
for the Court. 
102136 Ms. Nutsch presents argument re: motion to stay and indicates she has no 
objection to provision 4 of the defendant's affidavit being stricken. 
102645 Mr. Cannon presents argument re: motion to stay and asks the Court to strike 
provisions 4 and 5 of the defendant's affidavit and provision 4 of Ms. Nutsch's affidavit. 
103210 Ms. Nutsch indicates she also does not object to provision 5 of the defendant's 
affidavit being stricken. She does object to any part of her own affidavit being stricken. 
Ms. Nutsch proceeds with rebuttal argument. 
103344 Court addresses counsel. 
1 Page of 2 Pages 
COURT MINUTES AUGUST 24, 2010 
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CV-09-420 TEURLINGS VS. LARSON 
10350 I Mr. Cannon addresses Court. 
I 03536 Court requests Ms. Nutsch prepare an order. 
103554 Court does not strike any portion of Ms. Nutsch' s affidavit. 





2 Page of 2 Pages 0 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No: CV09-420 
ORDER 
Upon filing and reading DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY UNDER THE 
MILITIA CIVIL RELIEF ACT and supporting Affidavits and Plaintiffs response thereto, the 
Court hearing oral argument and having fully considered the matter; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR STAY UNDER THE MILITIA CIVIL RELIEF ACT is 










CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ;JS f:::- day of AuCoL, S f-2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
ORDER 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1510 
32113th St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No: CV09-420 
STIPULATION TO LIFT STAY 
Defendant, by and through her attorney of record, Sonyalee R. Nutsch of 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. , and plaintiff, by and through his attorney of record, 
Ned Cannon of Smith & Cannon PLLC, hereby stipulate that the stay of this case previously 
ordered by this Court on August 25 , 2010, pursuant to The Militia Civil Relief Act, Idaho 
Code § 46-409, be lifted. 
STIPULATION TO LIFT STAY -1-
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This Stipulation is based on the fact that the defendant has returned home from 
active duty with the Idaho National Guard . 
DATED this M~ day of c§.;~,..;J.;o;;;A,.u,~- 2011. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
B~~~iJc~ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DATEDfuis~ t~  2011. 
SMITH & CANNON PLL 
By: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STIPULATION TO LIFT ST A Y -2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ ay of~.....,~ 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following : 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 





STIPULATION TO LIFT ST A Y -3-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLE1\1ENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND TTJDICIAL DISTRICT 















Case No: CV09-420 
ORDER 
Upon filing and reading the STIPULATION TO LIFT STAY of the parties and 
good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the stay 
previously entered by Order of the Court on August 25, 20 I 0, is hereby lifted and the parties 
may proceed in this action. 
ORDER 
DATED: )/Jl-aay of &/2tec 2011. 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ) )-t- day of 1lfv)Uq o11, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
ORDER 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1510 
32113 th St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
l 
l C;:) , () /'. I I ( , , 
\ ,...I ,.., ,.,. v ' . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served an original and a 
true and correct copy of Plaintiff's First Set of Supplemental Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Defendant on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method 
indicated below: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
Via: 
(vi') U.S . Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 




DATED this 21 st day of February, 2012. 
Ned A. Cannon 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Notice of Service on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method(s) indicated 
below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
(v"') U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 21 st day of February 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 2 
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' . I I 
-,'.: '1~ ·:-: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 















Case No: CV09-420 
NOTICE OF TAKING 
DEPOSITION UPON 
ORAL EXAMINATION 
TO: Plaintiff~ WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, and to your attorney of record, NED 
CANNON: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will take the deposition, on oral 
examination, of TONY A. RICE before a notary public in and for the State of Idaho, on 
the 26th day of April 2012, at 9:00 a.m., at the offices of Clements, Brown & McNichols, 
P .A. , 321 13th Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501 (208)743-6538. 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
UPON ORAL EXAMINATION - 1-




This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2012. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~ ~ O H \-{,_ ('>,;t,,.~ 
SONYij:EE it NUTSCH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of March 2012, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
U.S.MAIL 
X HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
nv~ .Rl\Tl:GHT l\,1AIL . 
1ELECOPY (FAX) 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
UPON ORAL EXAMINATION -2-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
r1~VOEI~ ~~;,  r 
\ 
{\' - ! . - ., • • r' 
~ - - I ,:;,::-i 'r fl 
\...- - •• i..J, • '---
, .. ,-~,,." r : . ' .... __ l 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No: CV09-420 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I, Sonyalee R. Nutsch, attorney for defendant, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 33(a)(5), 
and 34( d) certify that on the 20th day of April, 2012, DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION were served on counsel for plaintiff, Ned A. Cannon. 
DATED this 20th day of April 2010. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~tEt NU~ Hbh 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of April 20 I 0, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following : 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
U.S. MAIL 
X HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -2-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plain ti ft: 
vs. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 











Case No: CV09-420 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
RE: TONY A. RICE 
Brad Mittendorf, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of eighteen ( 18) years, 
and not a party to the above-entitled action. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
RE: TONY RICE -1-
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2. On the 
;'Z 
· day of ,1.0r, L 
I 
, 2012, I personally served a 
SUBPOENA and an AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE OF PERSONNEL RECORDS 
AND MEDICAL/HEALTH RELATED INFORMATION signed by Mallory E. Martinez, 
fka Larson upon TONY A. RICE, at approximately a.m.1§) at 
____ ;z_.:l~0-• ..... :!~<-1<:;~r:~d~/--/)_r_. __ , City of Lewiston, County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho. 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this / gT.-day of HDf t \ 
i 
2012. 
\J~ ~p~~;;c~ JJd (j~~·~e State Of!da 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
RE: TONY RICE 
Residing at Lewiston, therein. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of April 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83 50 I 





AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
RE: TONY RICE -3-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB#6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No: CV09-420 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant, by and through her attorney of record, Sonyalee R. Nutsch of Clements, 
Brown & McNichols, P.A., pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b), moves for 
Summary Judgment as to plaintiffs claims against her. 
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice and the Affidavit of Mallory Martinez 
fka Larson filed herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 




DATED this 26th day of April 2012. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P .A . 
~~ Ld ~ •J~ so EE R. NU SCH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 





~82,.,. ... J?.__ . t,. ~ 
Sonyalee R. utsch 




Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
















Case No: CV09-420 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 7, 2007, Mallory Martinez fka Larson ("Ms. Martinez") was on 
duty with the Idaho Army National Guard when she was involved in an automobile accident 
with William Teurlings ("plaintiff'). On January 6, 2009, plaintiff filed his Complaint in this 
matter alleging one claim of negligence against Ms. Martinez. Because National Guard 
members are exempted from liability for state law claims arising out of their activities when 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 




they are in training or acting under duty, Ms. Martinez has filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment asking the Court to dismiss plaintiffs Complaint against her in its entirety. This 
Memorandum is submitted in support of Ms. Martinez' Motion. 
II. 
FACTS 
Ms. Martinez is a member of the Idaho Army National Guard, 145th HHC 
Support Battalion, headquartered in Lewiston, Idaho. She has been a member of the National 
Guard for eight (8) years and has currently achieved the rank of Sergeant - E-5. (See 
Affidavit of Mallory E. Martinez, 12/30/11, p. 2). As a member of the National Guard, 
unless she has been called to active duty, Ms. Martinez is required to attend monthly 
instruction drills. Attendance at the drills is mandated by federal law. (See id.; see also 
Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, 4/26/12, ii 4 and 32 U.S.C.A § 502 et. seq.). January 7, 2007, 
was the final day of one of the 145th 's regularly scheduled instruction drills in Lewiston, 
Idaho and Ms. Martinez was in attendance. (See Rice Aff., ii 4). On January 7, 2007, Ms. 
Martinez' chain of command consisted of her Section Sergeant Tony Rice, First Sergeant 
Frost and Captain James Deverteuil. (See Martinez Aff., ii4). 
Each guardsman is on duty from 12:00 a.m. the first date of the drill until 11 :59 
p.m. the final day of the drill. (See Rice Aff., ii 5). In January of 2007, Ms. Martinez was on 
duty with the National Guard from 12:00 a.m. on January 6, 2007 until 11 :59 p.m. on January 
7, 2007. See id. In January of 2007, Ms. Martinez lived in Boise, Idaho. In addition, another 
guardsman who was also a member of the 145th lived in the Boise as well. Ms. Martinez was 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 




instructed by her superior officer SSG Rice to provide transportation for her fellow 
guardsman to and from the drill in Lewiston that was completed on January 7, 2007. (See 
Rice Aff., ,r 6; see also Martinez Aff., ,r 5) At the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez was 
complying with that Order. (See Martinez Aff., ,r,r 5-6). 
After the accident, Ms. Martinez reported it to SSG Rice and a Line of Duty 
Investigation was completed by the Army National Guard. Ms. Martinez participated in the 
investigation and the determination was made that she was on duty at the time of the 
accident. (See Martinez Aff., ,r 8, Exh A; see also Rice Aff., ,r 7, Exh. A). As a result, her 
medical bills were paid by the Army National Guard. See id. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-904: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the 
course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: ... 4. 
Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard when 
engaged in training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, 
505 or 709, title 32, United States Code. 
Idaho Code § 6-904 was last amended in 1988 and was therefore in force, as stated above, on 
January 7, 2007. See id. 
32 U.S.C.A § 502 states in pertinent part that: 
(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the 
Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, each 
company, battery, squadron, and detachment of the National 
Guard, unless excused by the Secretary concerned, shall 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 




(1) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor 
target practice, at least 48 times each year; and 
(2) participate in training at encampments, maneuvers, 
outdoor target practice, or other exercises, at least 15 days 
each year. 
There are no Idaho cases interpreting Idaho Code § 6-904( 4) in its present 
form. In Baca et. al. v. State of Idaho, The Idaho Army Reserve National Guard et. al., 119 
Idaho 782, 810 P.2d 720 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the previous version of 
Idaho Code§ 6-904(4), codified in 1987 and designated as Idaho Code§ 6-904(5). 
The court stated: 
In 1987, Senate Bill 1161, which became Chapter 361, amended 
Section 6-904(5) of the Tort Claims Act, the same subsection 
amended in 197 4 to eliminate the Guard's immunity when acting 
under a call of the Governor. SB 1161 closed a loophole in 
Section 6-904( 5) by ensuring that the State of Idaho would not 
be liable for actions of the Guard in instances where the federal 
government had assumed full responsibility. 
Id. at 793, 810 P .2d at 731. The court quoted Adjutant General Darrell V. Manning who 
addressed the House Transportation and Defense Committee prior to the passage of the 
amendments. General Manning stated, "[i]t is the primary purpose of this bill to recognize 
the federal government's acceptance of responsibility for claims against the Idaho National 
Guard when on active duty or training under certain federal authorizations." Id. 
In Baca, two Idaho Army National Guard members were driving fire fighters 
back to camp when they were involved in an automotive accident most likely caused by 
fatigue. Id. at 784,810 P.2d at 722. The court found the exemption in Idaho Code§ 6-904(4) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 




did not apply because the Guard members were not engaged in training or duty pursuant to 
any of the federal regulations identified in Idaho Code § 6-904( 4) but rather had been called 
to action by the Governor of the State ofldaho who declared a state of emergency because of 
the Anderson creek fire. See id. at 793-794, 810 P.2d at 731-732. Under those 
circumstances, the state ofldaho is responsible for the actions of the Guard members acting 
within the course and scope of their duty under state authority. See id. 
On January 7, 2007, when the accident in this case occurred, Ms. Martinez was 
a member of the Army National Guard, on duty pursuant to 32 U.S.C.A. §502 and complying 
with a direct order from her superior officer to transport a fellow guardsman to Boise, Idaho. 
(See Martinez Aff., pp.2-3, Exh A; see also Rice Aff., pp. 2-3, Exh. A). The fact that Ms. 
Martinez was acting "in the line of duty" at the time of the accident was confirmed by the 
investigation completed by the National Guard Bureau. See id. Because Ms. Martinez was 
injured "in the line of duty," her medical bills incurred as a result of the accident were paid 
by the Army National Guard. See id. 
As stated previously, the rationale behind Idaho Code § 6-904( 4) is to exempt 
Idaho National Guard members from liability when they are participating in the drills, 
trainings and exercises mandated by the federal government. The appropriate forum for the 
resolution of claims arising under those circumstances is federal court with federal claims. 
The only claim plaintiff alleged in his Complaint in this matter is a state law claim for 
negligence for which Ms. Martinez cannot be held liable for pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 








Because, in accordance with Idaho Code § 6-904(4), Idaho National Guard 
members cannot be held liable for state law claims arising out of their activities when they 
are in training or acting under duty pursuant to certain federal statutes including 32 U.S.C.A. 
§502, plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed. 
DATED this 26th day of April 2012. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~~I (~ 1\~<b 
SOBER. NUTSCH 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB#6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND nJDICIAL DISTRICT 




MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 










Case No: CV09-0025 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SSG TONY RICE 
SSG TONY RICE, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, over the age of 
twenty-one (21), competent to testify as a witness, make this affidavit on personal 




2. I am the Section Sergeant of the Idaho National Guard, 145th HHC 
Support Battalion, headquartered in Lewiston, Idaho. 
3. I am one of the commanding officers of Mallory Martinez, fka Mallory 
Larson. 
4. Members of the Idaho National Guard, pursuant to 32 U.S.C.A § 502 et. 
seq., and other implementing statutory provisions, are required to attend monthly instruction 
drills unless they have been called up for active duty. We assemble and drill at least 48 times 
per year. 
5. January 7, 2007, was the final day of one of the 145th's regularly 
scheduled instruction drills in Lewiston, Idaho and SPC Mallory Larson was in attendance. 
SPC Larson was on duty from 12:00 a.m. on January 6, 2007 to 11 :59 p.m. on January 7, 
2007. 
6. I was aware that SPC Larson lived in Boise, Idaho and another 
guardsman who was also a member of the 145th lived in that area as well. I instructed SPC 
Larson to provide transportation for her fellow guardsman to and from the drill that was 
completed on January 7, 2007. I understood that she had complied with my order. 
7. SPC Larson notified me of the accident after it occurred. A Line of 
Duty Report oflnvestigation was completed. The result of the investigation determined that 
SPC Larson was on duty at the time of the accident and her medical bills were paid as a result 
of that determination. A fair and accurate copy of the Report of Investigation which is 
AFFIDAVIT OF SSG TONY RICE -2-
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maintained as regular course in the personnel file of SPC Larson of which I am personally 
familiar, is attached as Exhibit A. To protect the privacy of all those involved in the 
investigation, their social security numbers have been redacted. 
/lo,~ / SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _X, 
~ 2012. 
day of 
Notary Public in and for the State oif diM 
residing at ~,~ , therein. 
My Commission Expires: 9- /5'-cJ.() 1:] 
AFFIDAVIT OF SSG TONY RICE -3-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 









Page 1 of 2 
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 
1. REPORT DATE /YYMMDDJ 
LINE OF DUTY AND MISCONDUCT STATUS 20070309 
2. INVESTIGATION OF /XaneJ 
IIILUIESS 
3. STATUS (X•.,,ppbble) 
IX7 INJURY n DISE,\SI i7o!ATH 7 a. REGULAR OR EA0 
~ ... I .. - '" £" n11 ------- ,.,.., an ·--
National Guard Bureau Attn: NGB-ARP-DA 111 S. George Mason Dr., Arlington, VA .lEl (1) MORE.THAN 30 DAYS 
222040-1382 (2J 30 DAYS OR Ll!SS 
5. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Lall. First, Mk!d,_ lnllfal) I a. ss~ 7. GRADE a. INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING (Type/ 
LARSON, MALLORY ELIZABETH 
. EJ 
8. ORGANIZATION AND STATION .. 
0145CSBN SPT HHC d. SHORT TOUR OF ACTIVE DUTY 
9. OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE SAME INCIDENT FOR TRAINING 
NAME (I...,, Fin( Mlddle lnllfll) SSH GRADI! JAy'j~~ e. DURATION(AppMHONI.Ylo3.,:. 1111dd.) .. b. .. 
vu NO - DATE HOUR 
POE, OANIELLI! RENAi E3 )( (YYMMODJ 
(11START 
(21 FINISH I 




I (21 DATI! (YYMMDD) I (3) PLACI! 
20070107 U.S. HWY 95 N of Cottonwood Idaho County Idaho 
(41 HOW SUSTAINED 
Loss of control of vehicle traveling 45 MPH in 65 \.fPH zone, due to slush and ice. Side swiped oppos 
b. MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS 
Chest pains from air bag deployment, burning pain on skin R pelvic area. Abrasion to nose and Iliac 
.. PRESENT FOR F=f BSENT: (X} . I (Oo nol comp/n ~AS INTl!NTIONAL MISCONDUCT OR ~ INDIVIDUAL 
DUTY? (X) WITH AUTHORITY t0.<1, MIii/. in OLECT THE PROXIMATE CAU81!7 (X} MENTAU Y SOUND? (X} 
xl YES n NO WITHOUT AUTHORITY doth t:an.) YES f>cl NO )( YES l7 NO 
II• REMARKS 
PFC Mallory Larsen (driver) and PV2 Danielle (Passenger) were released early from drill at Lewiston due to hazardous weather. 
At 12:43 Larsen crested a hill on HWY 95, N. Cottonwood, where she encountered slush overlying ice, and severe winds. 
While slowing to 45 MPH in a 6SMPH zone, she was unable to maintain control of her vehicle, crossed the center line and side 
11. FINDINGS /XOM. Donotcomplel91t1de111t1cuu.J . 
x7 IN UNI! Of DUTY r7 NOT N UNI! OF DUTY• NOT DUE TO OWN MISCONDUCT r7 NOT IN UNI! Of DUTY• DUE TO OWN MISCONDUCT 
12. INVESTIGATING OFFICER 
a. TYPl!D NAMI /I.all, Finl. Mlddl9 In/Ila) b. GRADli I .. BRANCH Of SERVICE Id. SIN_ 
DARNEY, DA YID MICHAEL ARAN 03 AR ···-· 
I, ORGANIZATION AND STATION r. BIGNATURI! 
0145CSCOAST «Signed>> 
DARNEY DAVID MICHAEL ARAN 
13, ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY 14. ACTION av REVIEWING AUTHORITY 
1. HEADQUARTERI I b, DATE (YY/1/MODJ o. HEADQUARTERI I b. DATI! (YYMl./0D) 
0 I 45CSBN SPT 20070725 HQ STARC ID ARNO 20071011 
c. (X on.. lndlcala l9ft0nl 1111d sub1Ululff finding, an back.) a. (X OM. ,,,_,.._.Ind aulnlitutal llndlng1 on back.) 
x7 APPROVED n DISAPPROVED rn APPROVED l7 DISAPPROVED 
d. TYPl!D NAMI! (u,, Finl.,,,_ ln/HII) d. TYPl!D NAMI! (u1t, Finl, MlddM ln/1111) 
JOHNSON, DANTEL T FAST, HEl'li'IUT< MARK 
o. GRADI! I '· BRANCH Of SERVICE I II• SSN o, GRADE! , ,. BRANCH Of SERVICE! I 11. s_sN ·-04 AR 05 AR 
h, SIONATURI! h. SIGNA TURI! 
«Signed» «Signed» 
JOHNSON DANIEL T FAST HENRIK MARK 
15. FINAL APPROVAL (For IIC/lqn of otnc. lndlclllff In Item 4.) 
Chief, National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC 20310-2500 «Signed>> 
JN LINE OF DUTY FOR MILD CERVICAL STRAIN AND CHEST WALL SHELLEY Tt:!RRY 
CONTUSION 
By Authority of the Secretory of the Anny 
CRAIG R. EKMAN 
12 February 2008 
DD FORM 261, OCT 95 (EG) PREVIOUS EDITION WILL BE USED. DH,Vl"ld uu,g P1tform Pro, WHS,OIOR, Oc1 95 
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16, NAME OF INDIVIDUAL /Last Fnr, Mlddr. /nil/el) l 17. s_sN 
LARSON, MALLORY ELIZABETH 
19. APPOINTING AUTHORITY· REASONS AND SUBSTITUTED FINDINGS 
NIA 
20. REVIEWING AUTHORITY • REASONS ANO suesmUTED FINDINGS 
21. APPROVING AUTHORITY· REASONS AND SUBSTITUTED FINDINGS 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 










Case No: CV09-420 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MALLORYE.MARTINEZ 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ formerly known as MALLORY E. LARSON, being 
first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, over the age of 
twenty-one (21 ), competent to testify as a witness, make this affidavit on personal knowledge 
and am the defendant in this matter. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ -1-
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2. I am a member of the Idaho National Guard, 145 th HHC Support Battalion, 
headquartered in Lewiston, Idaho. I have been a member of the Idaho National Guard for eight 
(8) years and have achieved the rank ofE-5 - specialist. 
3. As a member of the Idaho National Guard, unless I have been called to 
active duty, I am required to attend monthly instruction drills. 
4. On January 7, 2007, I was on duty with the Idaho National Guard and was 
attending one of our regularly scheduled instruction drills in Lewiston, Idaho. On January 7, 
2007, my chain of command consisted of my Section Sergeant SSG Tony Rice, First Sergeant 
Frost and Captain James Deverteuil. 
5. Per SSG Rice's verbal orders, on January 7, 2007, I was to provide 
transportation of a fellow guardsman from the drill to Boise, Idaho. 
6. At the time of the accident on January 7, 2007, I was on duty with the 
Idaho National Guard and was acting under my superior's orders by transporting a fellow 
guardsman to Boise, Idaho. 
7. After the accident, I reported it to SSG Rice and an investigation was 
completed to determine ifl was on duty. I cooperated in that investigation and received a copy 
of the report once it was completed. A fair and accurate copy of the report I received is 
attached as Exhibit A. The social security numbers have been redacted to protect everyone's 
pnvacy. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ -2-
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8. After the investigation was completed, the medical bills I incurred for 
the treannent I received as a result of the accident on January 7, 2007 were paid by the Army 
National Guard. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWO 
,'-' ,.~ ...... ,,, 
,,,•' pOLLJe,1',, .... , ,....)· ........ -t -'I! 
~ V .•• ··'•• ·~ .. • jl.., 'Ct, ! l ~oT A~ r ii. : \ . = : ....... \,.: .:: .. . . .. : -
\ ,. ~UB\.\C, I . J: 
'ft .. ' . • .: .. n.... -· o· .. .. .,-~ • .~ .~ !!I 
"" ";, ··~······ t-"'\ .. '":"'.· "',,, ,.,Jo~ \'O .. , .... 
'•· . .Y, ...... . r•·~····"''' . 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 










Page 1 of 2 
REDACTED 
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 
LINE OF DUTY AND MISCONDUCT STATUS 
1. REPORT DATE (YYMMDD) 
20070309 
2. INVESTIGATION OF (Xone/ 3. STATUS (Xasappllcable) 
><1 INJURY n DISEASE n IL~Ess n DEATH n .. REGULAR OR EAD 
4. TO (Major Anny or Air Forcw Ccmmander) b. CALLED OR ORDERED TO AD fOR 
l\ational Guard Bureau Attn: NOB-ARP-DA 11 I S. George Mason Dr., Arlington, VAi "lffl"""d---,1 (1) MORE.THAN 30 DAYS 
l--,2::.2:,2:,:0='4.;0,_;·1:.:J:.:8,::,2,.,.,.,,;.,--------,-----r~=,,..-- ---...,..,:--:::-::-::-==:----r (2) 30 DAYS OR LESS 
5. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Las~ First, Mk/di& In/Mal) I &. ss~ . 7. GER)ADE •. INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING (Type) 
LARSON, MALLORY ELIZABETH 
8. ORGANIZATION AND STATION 
0145CSBN SPT HHC 
9. OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE SAME INCIDENT 
d. SHORT TOUR OF ACTIVE DUTY 
FOR TRAINING 
NAME (last, Fir,t, Mldd/o /niff1I) .. SSN b. GRADE c • .;'Ar'ig~ =:1 I, DURATION (AppHes ONLY It> 3.c. and d.) 
YES NO • DATE HOUR 
1,.:P:.::O:.:E.::..:D::AN=IE::L:::LE::..:.:RE::1'1::.A::.l ________ .j-______ -l_..:E:.:3_+--+--=x.:........p. __ IYY_M_M_o_o_~--------1 
(1)START 
(2) FINISH / 
10. BASIS FOR FINDINGS (Aadotonnln1dby/nves6gatton) 
I 
(t) HOUR I (2) DATE (YYMMDD) I (3) PLACE 
a. CIRCUMSTANCES 1243 20070 I 07 U.S. HWY 95 N of Cottonwood Idaho County Idaho 
(4) HOW SUSTAINED . 
Loss of control of vehicle traveling 45 MPH in 65 \fPH zone, due to slush and ice. Side swiped oppos 
b, MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS 
Chest pains from air bag deployment, burning pain on skin R pelvic area. Abrasion to nose and Iliac 
c. PRESENT FOR Fl' IF ABSENT: (X) . I (Do not comp/ala µf' INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT OR ~-WAS INDIVIDUAL 
DUTY? (X) WITH AUTHORITY 10.a. •nd /. In GLECT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE? (X) MENTAU. Y SOUND? (X) 
rx7 YES I\ NO WITliOUT AUTHORrTY d•alll casas.) YES fxl NO X YES i7 NO 
g. REMARKS 
PFC Mallory Larsen (driver) and PV2 Danielle (Passenger) were released early from drill at Lewiston due to hazardous weather. 
At 12:43 Larsen crested a hill on HWY 95, N. Cottonwood, where she encountered slush overlying ice, and severe winds. 
While slowing to 45 MPH in a 65MPH zone, she was unable to maintain control of her vehicle, crossed the center line and side 
11. FINDINGS /Xona. Donolcomplolein dHlhcasu) 
x7 IN LINE OF DUTY I\ NOT IN LINE OF DUTY · NOT DUE TO ~WN MISCONDUCT r7 NOT IN LINE OF DUTY· DUE TO OWN MISCONDUCT 
12. 'INVESTIGATING OFFICER 
1. TYPED NAME (Last. Fir,t Mlddl• ln/Nal) 
DARNEY, DA VTD MICHAEL ARAN 
o, ORGANIZATION AND STATION 
0145CSCO AST 
13. ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY 
1. HEADQUARTERS 
0145CSBN SPT lb. DATE (YYMMDDJ 20070725 
c. (X ona. /nd/ca/8 m•son, and sub,Ulu/1d findings on back.) 
x"J APPROVED I\ DISAPPROVED 
d. TYPED NAMI! (La•t. First Mlddl• ln/1111) 
JOHNSON, DANIEL T 
o. GRADE 
04 1




JOHNSON DANIEL T 
I g. SSN 
15. FINAL APPROVAL (For 1cMon al of/lea indlcalad in /tom 4.) 
Chief, National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC 20310-2500 
b. GRADE 
03 
I c. ';~NCH OF SERVICE I d. ~SN. 
I, SIGNATURE 
<<Signed>> 
DARNEY DAVID MICHAEL ARAN 
14. ACTION BY REVIEWING AUTHORITY 
a. HEADQUARTERS 
HQ ST ARC ID ARNO I b. DATE (YYMMDD) 20071011 
c. (X ona. Ind/ala roasons and subs61ulad Rndlng, on back.) 
iX7 APPROVED II DISAPPROVED 
d. TYPED NAME (/..asl, Fir,/, Mlddla In/Na/) 
FAST, HE!l,'JUK MARK 
o. GRADE 
05 1




FAST HENRIK MARK 
J 11- s_sN ,. 




By Authority of the Secretary of the Anny 
CRAIG R. EKMAN 
12 February 2008 
DD FORM 261, OCT 95 (EG) PREVIOUS EDITION WILL BE USED. Oe,igr,ed uslr!Q Perform Pro, WHS/OIOR, Oct 95 




16, NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last. First, Middle lnilial) 117. SSN 
LARSON, MALLORY ELIZABETH 
19. APPOINTING AUTHORITY· REASONS AND SUBSTITUTED FINDINGS 
NIA 
20. REVIEWING AUTHORITY· REASONS AND SUBSTITUTED FINDINGS 
21, APPROVING AUTHORITY• REASONS AND SUBSTITUTED FINDINGS 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No: CV09-420 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: Plaintiff, WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, and to your attorney of record, NED 
A.CANNON: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned will call up for hearing, 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT before The Honorable Carl 
B. Kerrick at the Nez Perce County Courthouse on Tuesday, the lih day of June, 2012, at 
9:00 a.m. , or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 




DATED this 26th day of April 2012. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~ER.NtTlcii~ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 746-8421 - facsimile 
X U.S.MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
~ ~~- 0~ ':---. 
Sonyalee R~utsch 
NOTICE OF HEARING -2-
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB#6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
J 
FILE 
MAY 1 1 2012 
Clerk Dist. Court 
Clearwater Coun , Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No: CV09-420 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I, Sonyalee R. Nutsch, attorney for defendant, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 34( <l) 
certify that on the 10th day of May, 2012, DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOClHv1ENTS TO PLAINTIFF were served on counsel for _plaintiff 
Ned A. Cannon. 
DATED this 10th day ofNovember 2012. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE ·· 1-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 8th Street · 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
U.S. MAIL 
X HAND DELIVERED (via Valley Messenger) 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -2-
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477 
Andrea J. Rosholt, ISB No. 8895 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 




Attorneys for Applicant 
Swift Transportation Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2009-0420 
MOTION TO INTERVENE 
COMES NOW Swift Transportation Company ("Applicant"), by and through 
their counsel of record, MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED, and 
pursuant to Rule 24, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves to intervene in the above-
captioned case. Applicant is entitled to intervene because (1) Applicant is an employer engaged 
in interstate commerce who has compensated Teurlings related to the motor vehicle accident at 
MOTION TO INTERVENE - 1 Client:2433830 .1 
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issue in this litigation; and (2) Applicant is entitled to subrogation pursuant to Idaho's worker's 
compensation laws, codified at Title 72, Chapter 2 of the Idaho Code. 
This Motion is supported by a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene 
and Affidavit of Mark A. Peterson filed contemporaneously herewith. Further, in accordance 
with the requirements of Rule 24(c). 
DATED this 25th day of May, 2012. 
MOTION TO INTERVENE - 2 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By~ OftheFi 
Attorneys for Applicant 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of May, 2012, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO INTERVENE to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS BROWN & MCNICHOLS, PA 
321 13th St. 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501-1510 
Facsimile (208) 743-9295 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ned A. Cannon 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile (208) 746-8421 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MOTION TO INTERVENE - 3 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 





Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477 
Andrea J. Rosholt, ISB No. 8895 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 




Attorneys for Applicant 
Swift Transportation Company 
~-::------ ~ 1 F1· .~o , . -tr\-;• 
--'-'/11 ! i"IO ( , ·~ ,-1\.[!.';'. 
--WlJ.LJ..:_ f_~-:' 1 - --1 
[ MAY ? q _2iJ_~_j?t{ / 
I.- - '"t. ·~-:.:rt C ~! .. ,..., .... '")t' l. I . 
. _ .. , • '. ._ :i __ / 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND mDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2009-0420 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO INTERVENE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This memorandum is submitted in support of Swift Transportation Company's 
("Swift" or "Applicant") motion to intervene. Applicant applies for intervention as a matter of 
right under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure§ 24(a)(2) or, in the alternative, apply for permissive 




intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b )(2). Applicant has a significant interest in the outcome of this 
litigation. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff William P. Teurlings ("Teurlings") was injured in a January 1, 2007 
motor vehicle accident between Teurlings and Mallory E. Larson. At the time of the accident, 
Teurlings was employed and acting within the scope of his employment with Applicant. 
Teurlings tendered a worker's compensation claim to Applicant in connection with the accident. 
On April 23, 2008, Applicant, pursuant to a Compromise and Release, agreed to pay Teurlings a 
Fifty-Five Thousand Dollar ($55,000.00) award. The award was made pursuant to California's 
worker's compensation laws. 
Subsequently Teurlings filed a civil complaint on January 6, 2009, in Nez Perce 
County, Case No. 2009-0000025, seeking damages for injuries sustained in the January 1, 2007, 
motor vehicle accident against Mallory E. Larson ("Larson" or "Defendant"). Upon motion, the 
court transferred venue to Clearwater County, Case No. CV-2009-0420, where the case is 
pending. 
On July 20, 2010, counsel on behalf of Applicant sent a letter by certified mail to 
both Sonyalee Nutsch and Ned Cannon, Teurlings and Larsons' respective counsel, asserting its 
rights to subrogation in the pending proceeding. See Affidavit of Mark C. Peterson ("Peterson 
Aff."), Exhibit A. 
On June 13, 2011, Mr. Peterson sent a letter by certified mail to both Teurlings 
and Larson's respective counsel, asking them to provide him with the status of the litigation. 
Peterson Aff., Exhibit B. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - 2 Client:2433829.3 
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On June 20, 2011, Ms Nutsch responded to Mr. Peterson's letter indicating that 
her client was a member of the Idaho National Guard which was called up to active duty, and 
that as a result, the case had been stayed until she returned home in September of 2011. Peterson 
Aff., Exhibit C. 
On September 27, 2011, Mr. Peterson sent a follow-up letter to Ms. Nutsch asking 
her to advise him of whether her client returned or when that should occur. Peterson Aff., 
Exhibit D. 
On September 29, 2011, Ms. Nutsch responded to Mr. Peterson's letter advising 
that her client returned from active duty and that the parties had signed a stipulation to lift the 
stay that would be filed with the Court. Ms. Nutsch indicated that once the Court entered the 
Order lifting the stay, they would proceed with the case. Peterson Aff., Exhibit E. 
On January 9, 2012, Mr. Peterson wrote a letter to Ms. Nutsch thanking her for 
advising him that the stay had been lifted based upon the return of her client from the military 
service. Mr. Peterson indicated that his clients continue to assert their subrogation rights under 
the claim noted in his July 20, 2010, letter and that his clients are willing to participate in 
settlement discussions concerning the resolution of the case. Peterson Aff., Exhibit F. 
As there was no response to Mr. Peterson's January 9, 2012, Mr. Peterson sent 
another letter to both Ms. Nutsch and Mr. Cannon on March 7, 2012, indicating that his clients 
continued to assert their interest in the current tort litigation, and to please let him know whether 
there had been any effort to try and resolve the matter short of trial. He explained that his clients 
would like to be included in any mediation or other efforts to settle the case. Peterson Aff., 
Exhibit G. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE - 3 Client:2433829.3 
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As outlined above, counsel for Applicant followed up with several letters 
reiterating Applicants' right to subrogation and seeking information concerning the status of the 
proceeding, including whether any settlement negotiations had taken place. Several months have 
gone by, and Mr. Peterson has yet to receive a response to his letters of January and March, 
2012. 
According to the Court's repository, Defendant moved for summary judgment on 
April 27, 2012. A hearing on Summary Judgment is currently set for June 6, 2012. In order to 
protect its right to subrogation, Applicant has presented this court with a motion to intervene. 
I. ST AND ARD FOR INTERVENTION 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to intervene as a matter of right 
or to intervene with permission. See IDAHO R. Crv. P. 24. Intervention as a matter of right is 
pennitted upon the filing of a timely application under the following circumstances: 
(1) when a statute of the state ofldaho confers an unconditional 
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction which is subject of the action 
and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede applicant's ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
IDAHO R. CIV. P. 24(a). Alternatively, permissive intervention is warranted when "a statute 
confers a conditional right to intervene" or "an applicant's claim or defense and the main action 
have a question oflaw or fact in common." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 24(b). As demonstrated below, 
Applicant satisfies either standard and should be allowed to intervene in this action. 
Intervention as a matter of right is considered a mixed question of law and fact 
involving the discretion of the trial judge. Rodriguez v. Oakley Valley Stone, Inc. , 120 Idaho 
370, 377 (1991). However, both Rule 24 and statutes providing for intervention are to be 
liberally construed. Herzog v. City of Pocatello, 82 Idaho 505, 509 (1960). Further, pertinent 





factual allegations in a motion to intervene should be assumed to be true. Id. It is proper to 
allow intervention where an applicant shows merely that he "may" be bound by the judgment or 
representation as to him "may" be inadequate. Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 302 (1974). A 
motion for intervention is considered timely when it is filed before trial. Anderson v. Ferguson, 
56 Idaho 554 (1936); see also Duff, 96 Idaho at 301-302. Finally, Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure§ 24(c) requires that a motion to intervene" ... shall state the grounds therefor and 
shall be accompanied by pleadings setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is 
sought." IDAHO R. Crv. P. 24(c). 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Applicant Is Entitled To Intervene As A Matter of Right. 
Applicant is entitled to Intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure§ 24(a) under either subsection (1) or (2). 
First, Applicant is entitled to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to 
Rule 24(a)(l). The worker's compensation statutes contemplate an employer as a party to the 
litigation or settlement of any claim against a third-party tortfeasor. Pursuant to Idaho's 
worker's compensation laws, codified at Title 72, Chapter 2 of the Idaho Code, an employer who 
has paid compensation to an employee "shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee, to 
recover against such third party to the extent of the employer's compensation liability." Idaho 
Code§ 72-223 (3). Idaho Code§ 72-202 provides that "this law shall affect the liability of 
employers engaged in interstate commerce." 
Under Idaho law, the employer is entitled to institute an action against a third-
party on behalf of an employee either jointly with the employee or on its own accord if the 
employee refuses to participate. See Idaho Code§ 72-223. 
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Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) confers on an employer the right to join an action 
between its employee and a third-party tortfeasor to recover damages. In return for this right, the 
statue awards a proportionate share of the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the employee in 
obtaining such recovery. Idaho Code§ 72-223(4). The right to proportionate recovery is 
abrogated where an employee alleges or asserts a position in the third-party claim adverse to the 
employer. Idaho Code§ 72-223(4)(1)(b). 
Applying the foregoing statutory authority, Applicant respectfully requests that 
this Court grant its motion to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 24(a)(l). Applicant is an employer engaged in interstate commerce. Applicant has 
paid compensation to its employee Teurlings related to the motor vehicle accident at issue in this 
litigation. As such, Applicant is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of Teurlings. 
Secondly, Applicant is entitled to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to 
Rule 24(a)(2). Rule 24(a)(2) further permits that an applicant can intervene, as a matter of right 
"when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is subject of 
the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest 
is adequately represented by existing parties." See IDAHO R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2). 
In the present case, Applicant is claiming a statutory subrogation right to any 
recovery by Teurlings. Although Applicant has asserted its right to subrogation and has 
requested information regarding the status of the proceeding, the parties have been non-
responsive. A summary judgment motion is pending. The disposition of the action, may, as a 
practical matter, impair or impede Applicant's ability to protect its interest. Additionally, based 
on the actions - or inactions - of the parties, Applicant's interest is not adequately represented by 
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the existing parties. As such, Applicant respectfully requests that this Court grant its motion to 
intervene pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 24( a)(2). 
B. Applicant Is Entitled To Permissive Intervention 
In the alternative to Intervention as a matter of right, Applicant is entitled to 
permissive intervention. Permissive intervention is warranted when "a statute confers a 
conditional right to intervene" or "an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a 
question of law or fact in common." IDAHO R. Crv. P. 24(b ). As provided, Idaho Code § 72-
223(3) confers on Applicant, the right to join an action between its employee and a third-party 
tortfeasor to recover damages . Additionally, Applicant's claim directly goes to the element of 
damages in the present action. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223(3), Applicant has all the claims 
or defenses in the main action as the Plaintiff against Defendant. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Applicant respectfully requests that the Court grant its 
Motion to Intervene and order that Swift shall forthwith be a party to the instant lawsuit. 
DATED this 25th day of May, 2012. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
F ELDS, CHARTERED 
By _ _ __________ _ 
Andrea J. Rosholt- Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Applicant 
Swift Transportation Company 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
MARK C. PETERSON, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am an attorney employed by MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED, counsel ofrecord for Swift Transportation Company ("Applicant"). As 
such, I am personally familiar with the facts and circumstances contained herein. 
2. At the time of the motor vehicle accident that is the subject of this 
litigation, the Plaintiff in this action, William P. Teurlings ("Teurlings"), was employed by 
Applicant. Teurlings filed a workers compensation claim with Applicant. Applicant, by and 
through its surety, paid Teurlings' workers compensation benefits. As a result, Applicant is 
statutorily entitled to be subrogated to any recovery received by Teurlings. 
3. On July 20, 2010, I sent a letter by certified mail to both Sonyalee Nutsch 
and Ned Cannon, Teurlings and Larsons' respective counsel, asserting its rights to subrogation in 
the pending proceeding. A true and correct copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. On June 13, 2011, I sent a letter by certified mail to both Teurlings and 
Larson's respective counsel, asking them to provide him with the status of the litigation. A true 
and correct copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
5. On June 20, 2011, Ms Nutsch responded to my letter indicating that her 
client was a member of the Idaho National Guard and was called up to active duty, and that as a 
result, the case had been stayed until she returned home in September of 2011. A true and 
correct copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
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6. On September 27, 2011, I sent a follow-up letter to Ms. Nutsch asking her 
to advise me of whether her client had returned or when that would occur. A true and correct 
copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
7. On September 29, 2011, Ms. Nutsch responded to my letter advising that 
her client returned from active duty, and that the parties had signed a stipulation to lift the stay 
that would be filed with the Court. Ms. Nutsch indicated that once the Court entered the Order 
lifting the stay, they would proceed with the case. A true and correct copy of said letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
8. On January 9, 2012, I wrote a letter to Ms. Nutsch thanking her for 
advising me that the stay had been lifted based upon the return of her client from the military 
service. I indicated that my clients continue to assert its subrogation rights under the claim noted 
in the July 20, 2010, letter and that my clients are willing to participate in settlement discussions 
concerning the resolution of the case. A true and correct copy of said letter is attached hereto as 
Exhibit F. 
9. As there was no response to my January 9, 2012, I sent another letter to 
both Ms. Nutsch and Mr. Cannon on March 7, 2012, indicating that my clients continued to 
assert their interest in the current tort litigation, and to please let me know whether there had 
been any effort to try and resolve the matter short of trial. I explained that my clients would like 
to be included in any mediation or other efforts to settle the case. A true and correct copy of said 
letter is attached hereto as Exhibit G. 
10. As outlined above, I followed up with several letters reiterating 
Applicants' right to subrogation and seeking information concerning the status of the proceeding, 
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including whether any settlement negotiations had taken place. Several months have gone by, 
and I have yet to receive a response to my letters of January and March, 2012. 
11 . Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment and a summary judgment 
hearing is currently scheduled in this matter for June 12, 2012. 
12. In order to protect its interest, Swift, by and through its counsel has filed a 
Motion to Intervene and Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Intervene concurrently 
herewith. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
Marke.Peterson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24th day of May, 2012. 
Residing at - ~ ~~~-------
My Commission Expires _ _ 03_-_1_6_-2_0_1_5_ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of May, 2012, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARK C. PETERSON IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO INTERVENE to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS BROWN & MCNICHOLS, PA 
321 13th St. 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501-1510 
Facsimile (208) 743-9295 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ned A. Cannon 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile (208) 7 46-8421 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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Twin Fa lls 
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD. 
Eugene C. Thomas 
John W . Barrett 
Richard C. Fields 
John S. Simko 
John C. Ward 
D.James Manning 
David B. Lincoln 
Gary T. Dance 
Larry C. Hunter 
Randall A. Peterman 
Mark S. Prusynski 
Stephen R. Thomas 
Glenna l\'f. Christensen 
Gerald T. Husch 
Scott L. Campbell 
Robert B. Bums 
Michael E. Thomas 
Patricia M. Olsson 
Christine E. Nicholas 
Bradley J Williams 
Lee Radford 
Michael 0 . Roe 
Nancy J. Garrett 
David S. Jensen 
James L. Martin 
C. Clayton Gill 
Michael \V/. McGreaham 
David P. Gardner 
Julian E. Gabiola 
Tara Martens 
Kimberly D. Evans Ross 
Mark C. Pecerson 
Tyler J. Anderson 
Jon A. Stenquist 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Jason G. :Murray 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Paul D. Mcfarlane 
Tyler J . Henderson 
C. Edward Cather Ill 
Andrew J. Waldera 
Dylan B. Lawrence 
Benjamin C. Ritchie 
Noah G . Hi llen 
Matthew J. McGee 
David J. Dance 
Mindy M. Willman 
Robert E. Bakes, of counsel 
Willis C. .Mo/Tare, 1907-1980 
Kirk R. Helvie, 1956-2003 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
PO Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
July 20, 2010 
via Certified Mail 
Ned A. Cannon 
US Bank Plaza Bu ilding 
1 01 S Capitol Blvd 10th Fl 
PO Box 829 
Boise Idaho 83701 0829 
208 345 2000 
800 422 2889 
208 385 5384 Fax 
www.moffatt.com 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 Eighth St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Re: Teurlings v. Larson, Nez Perce County Case No. CV09-00025 
MTBR&F File No. 23798.0008 
Dear Ms. Nutsch and Mr. Cannon: 
I represent Swift Transportation Company (Swift), the employer for William Teurlings 
(Teurlings), and Gallagher Bassett Services. The surety for Swift, has paid workers' 
compensation benefits to Teurlings for the injuries Teurlings sustained in a traffic accident 
while working as a Swift employee. These workers' compensation benefits were paid pursuant 
to California's workers' compensation law because Teurlings is a California employee. 
To the extent that Teurlings is entitled to an award of damages against Mallory Larson (Larson) 
for the injuries Teurlings sustained in the traffic accident, the surety has the right to recover 
from all damages awarded Teurlings as reimbursement for the compensation it has paid to 
Teurlings. Cal. Labor Code§§ 3852, 3856; Scalice v. Performance Cleaning Systems, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 711 (Ct. App. 1996). The surety intends to assert this right by filing a lien on the 
judgment as provided for by California law. Cal. Labor Code §§ 3856, 3862. 
Because the surety has paid worker's compensation benefits to Teurlings, Teurlings may not 
settle his case against Larson, a third-paity, without giving the employer/surety notice and an 
opportunity to recover the compensation it has paid to Teurlings. Cal. Labor Code§ 3860(a). 
A settlement will not be effective without my clients' consent. Coe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 136 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1977). If Teurlings and Larson are interested in settling 





Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Ned A. Cannon 
July 20, 2010 
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If you would like to discuss this matter further, please contact me at the above number. 
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PO Box 829 
Boise ID 83701-0829 
Physical Address 
US Bank Plaza 
101 S Capitol Blvd 10th Fl 
Boise ID 83702-7710 
208 345 2000 
800 422 2889 
208 385 5384 Fax 
www.moffatt.com 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
508 Eighth St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Re: Teurlings v. Larson, Nez Perce County Case No. CV09-00025 
MTBR&F File No . 23798.0008 
Dear Ms. Nutsch and Mr. Cannon: 
As you know, I represent Swift Transportation Company (Swift), the employer for William 
Teurlings (Teurlings), and Gallagher Bassett Services. Please provide me with the status of this 
litigation. 
If you would like to discuss this matter, please contact me at the above number. 
~G~ 
Mark C. Peterson 
/jy 
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CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
IAWYERS 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 7 43-6538 
Fax (208) 7 46-0753 
Mark C. Peterson 
Moffati Thomas 
P. 0. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
Dea,r J\:1r. Peterson: 
20 June 2011 
Re: Teurlings v. Larson 
Case No: CV09-00025 
,i.-; 'rt t, ooot 
RECEIVED 
JUN 2 2 2011 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD, 
Robert P. Brown 
Michael E. McNichols 
Cynthia L. Mosher* 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch* 
Eric K. Peterson* 
Bentley G. Stromberg 






Philip E. Peterson 
(1922-2003) 
I am in receipt of your letter dated June 1J;20H; w~ereinyou requested the status of the 
case of Teurlings V. Larson, Case No: cvo9.:0002s-. · My client, Mallory Larsoii, is a member 
of the Idaho National Guard which has been called up to active duty. As a result of that, the 
case has been stayed until she returns home. It is my understanding from my communication 
with my client th~t she should be home some time in September of 2011. 
Please contact me if you have any questions or concerns . 
. - ·· ···· . 
Sincerely, 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
SRN/cam 
cc: Ned Cannon 
Steve Johnson 
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Re: Teurlings v. Larson 
Nez Perce County Case No. CV09-00025 
MTBR&F File No. 23798 .0008 
Dear Ms. Nutsch: 





PO Box 829 
Boise ID 83701-0829 
Physical Address 
US Bank Plaza 
101 S Capitol Blvd 10th Fl 
Boise ID 83702-7710 
208 345 20D0 
800 422 2889 
208 385 5384 Fax 
www.moffatt.com 
It is my understanding that your client was set to return for military service during this time 
frame. Please advise whether your client has returned and, if not, when that should occur. 
Thank you for your cooperation regarding this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
~c~ 
Mark C. Peterson 
mcp@moffatt.com 
MCP/cs 
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29 September 2011 
Re: Teurlings v. Larson 
Case No: CV09-00025 
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Philip E. Peterson 
(1922-2003) 
Insresportse to your letter of September 27, 2011, please be advised that my client has 
returned from active duty with the Idaho National Guard. The parties have signed a 
Stipulation to lift the stay that will be filed with the Court. Once the Court enters the Order 
lifting the stay, we will proceed with this case. 
Please contact me if you have any questions or concerns. ·· 
Sincerely, 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~.~s.t=L SO AL R. TSCH 
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cc: · - Ned Cannon 
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Thank you for your letter advising that the stay has been lifted based upon the return of your 
client from military service. My clients continue to assert their subrogation rights under this 
claim as noted in my July 10, 2010, letter. Fmther, my clients are willing to participate in 
settlement discussions concerning the resolution of this case. 
Thank you for your cooperation as it relates to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Mark C. Peterson 
MCP/cs 
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As you know I represent Swift Transpo1tation Company, the employer for William Teurlings, 
· and Gallagher Bassett Services, as it relates to their subrogation interest. Swift and Gallagher 
Bassett continue to asse11 their interest in the current t01t litigation. Please let me know whether 
there has been any effort to try and resolve this matter short of trial. My clients would like to be 
included in any mediation or other efforts to settle the case. 
Thank you for your assistance regarding this matter_ 
Sincerely, 
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As you know I represent Swift Transportation Company, the employer for William Teurlings, 
and Gallagher Bassett Services, as it relates to their subrogation interest. Swift and Gallagher 
Bassett continue to assert their interest in the cmTent tort litigation. Please let me know whether 
there has been any effort to try and resolve this matter sho1t of trial. My clients would like to be 
included in any mediation or other efforts to settle the case. 
Thank you for your assistance regarding this matter. 
Sincerely, 
~~-~ 






Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477 
Andrea J. Rosholt, ISB No. 8895 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK& 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 




Attorneys for Applicant 
Swift Transportation Company 
r ~ , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLIN GS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2009-0420 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION 
TO INTERVENE 
TO: ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Swift Transportation Company's (hereinafter 
"Applicant"), Motion to Intervene will be called up for hearing on Tuesday, June 12, 2012, at 
9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick at 
the Nez Perce County Court. 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO INTERVENE - 1 Client:2439507.1 




PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that counsel for Applicant, Andrea J. 
Rosholt, will appear via telephonically, with the Court to initiate the call. 
DATED this 25th day of May, 2012. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By LQ-------_.,.. 
Andrea J. Rosholt - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Applicant Swift 
Transportation Company 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of May, 2012, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO INTERVENE to 
be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS BROWN & MCNICHOLS, PA 
321 13th St. 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501-1510 
Facsimile (208) 743-9295 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ned A. Cannon 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth St. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile (208) 7 46-8421 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 




NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Ms. Larson is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. She has failed to 
establish that she was "acting within the course and scope of [her] employment or duties" at the 
time of the accident pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-904(4). 
II. FACTS 
The automobile accident between Plaintiff and Mallory Larson occurred on January 7, 
2007 at 12:43 p.m. Ms. Larson was returning home after completing her drills with the Idaho 
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National Guard. The following facts indicate that Ms. Larson was not "acting within the course 
and scope of her employment or duties" at the time of the accident: 
• Ms. Larson was not reimbursed for her mileage for her travel to and from National Guard 
training. 
• Ms. Larson has submitted no evidence that the National Guard directed her route home 
from Lewiston to Boise. 
• Ms. Larson was driving her own vehicle home after completing her monthly training 
duty. 
• Ms. Larson has submitted no evidence that the National Guard provided her a car, 
approved of the car she was using, or performed any inspections of the car she was using 
on the day of the accident. 
• Ms. Larson's obligation with the National Guard included once-a-month training that 
began on January 5th and continued until her drills completed on January 7th. 
• Ms. Larson's monthly training duties did not give her full-time status; she maintained a 
civilian job as a food service worker for the Idaho Department of Corrections. 
• The National Guard did not control Ms. Larson's conduct at the time of the accident. She 
was free to take any route on her return trip home. 
• Ms. Larson has submitted no evidence that she was hired by the National Guard to drive 
or transport other guardsmen. 
• Ms. Larson has submitted no evidence that the National Guard provided her training on 
safe travel from Boise to Lewiston and home again. 
• At the time of the accident, Ms. Larson was not driving between assignments. She was 
returning home after completing training. 
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• Mr. Rice has submitted affidavits stating that Ms. Larson was on duty until 11 :59 p.m . on 
January 7th, but has made no mention of the hour when he regularly released guardsmen 
on scheduled training days. 
As will be argued more fully below, Idaho law does not support Ms. Larson's position that she 
was acting within the course and scope of her employment with the National Guard at the time of 
the accident. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "motions for summary judgment should be 
granted with caution." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541 , 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). 
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should only be granted when 
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). 
The trial court must liberally construe all facts- and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from those facts- in favor of the party opposing the motion. Ray v. Nampa School Dist. 
No. 131, 120 Idaho 11 7,122,814 P.2d 17, 19 (1991). If reasonable people could reach different 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. 
It is well settled in Idaho that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court 
is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to resolve controverted factual issues. If the pleadings, 
admissions, depositions and affidavits raise any question of credibility of witnesses or weight of 
the evidence, the motion for summary judgment should be denied. Altman v. Arndt, 109 Idaho 
218, 221 , 706 P.2d 107, 110 (Idaho Ct. App., 1985) (citations omitted). "When ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment, it is not within the trial court's province to assess the credibility 
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of an affiant or deponent when credibility can be tested in court before a trier of fact." Sohn v. 
Foley, 125 Idaho 168, 171, 868 P.2d 496,499 (Idaho Ct. App., 1994). 
Summary judgment may be granted in the non-movant's favor. It is established law in 
Idaho that "[s]ummary judgment may be rendered for any party, not just the moving party, and 
on any or all of the causes of action involved, under the rules of civil procedure. Flexibility in 
designing summary judgment orders is clearly the intent of the drafters of the civil rules." 
Brummett v. Ediger, 106 Idaho 724,726,682 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1984). 
Ill. DISCUSSION 
1. 32 U.S.C.A. § 502, the statute upon which Ms. Larson relies, does not 
include travel to and from National Guard training. 
Ms. Larson relies on two statutes in support of her summary judgment motion, Idaho 
Code§ 6-904(4) and 32 U.S.C. 502. Section 6-904 states that 
[a] governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and 
scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be 
liable for any claim which: 
Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard [sic] when engaged in 
training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, 505 or 709, title 32, United 
States Code. 
(Emphasis added). Section 502(a), the statute Ms. Larson relies upon, states, 
(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or the 
Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, each company, battery, squadron, 
and detachment of the National Guard, unless excused by the Secretary 
concerned, shall-
(1) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target practice, at 
least 48 times each year; and 
(2) participate in training at encampments, maneuvers, outdoor target 
practice, or other exercises, at least 15 days each year. 
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Ms. Larson's trip home from Lewiston to Boise was not "training or duty" as explained in 32 
U.S.C. § 502. 
Mr. Rice states in his affidavit that Ms. Larson was only dismissed and allowed to leave 
Lewiston after she had completed her drill. Affidavit of Tony Rice, 'ii 6. At the time of the 
accident, Ms. Larson had completed all activities listed under 32 U.S.C.A. 502(a). Ms. Larson 
has provided no authority in support of the position that either the Idaho legislature or the United 
States congress intended to exempt National Guard members from liability for accidents they 
may cause traveling to or from their training. 
2.. Mallory Larson was not "acting within the course and scope of [her] 
employment or duties" at the time of the accident. 
Idaho Code section 6-904 (4) provides that a "governmental entity and its employees 
while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal 
intent shall not be liable for any claim which ... [ a ]rises out of the activities of the Idaho national 
guard when engaged in training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, 505 or 709, title 32, 
United States Code." (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the applicability of these statutes turns on 
whether Ms. Larson was "acting within the course and scope" of her employment with the 
National Guard at the time of the accident. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has not had an occasion to interpret or discuss the applicability 
of I.C. § 6-904(4). The Court's discussions regarding the meaning of the phrase "course and 
scope of employment" have generally arisen in two contexts: (1) employer liability under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, (2) and worker's compensation cases. In defining the scope of 
employment in a tort case, the doctrine of respondeat superior is considered the appropriate 
standard to be applied. The concepts discussed in worker's compensation cases may be 
instructive, but are not controlling. The Arizona Court of Appeals discussed the relationship 
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between these two areas of law in Robarge v. Bechtel Power Corp., 640 P.2d 211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982): 
The line separating workmen's compensation cases from tort law cases is indistinct, for 
tort cases have cited workmen's compensation cases as precedential authority, in addition 
to using similar language when addressing situations common to both and, particularly, 
when the "going and coming" rule is at issue. Nevertheless, the rules adopted for 
workmen's compensation cases should not be mechanically applied in negligence cases. 
640 P .2d at 213 ( citations omitted). The Robarge court cited the policy reasons for this 
distinction as follows: 
While workmen's compensation law and respondeat superior doctrine both 
involve allocations of costs regarding industrial accidents, they differ in scope. 
Workmen's compensation benefits tum solely upon whether the employee was 
injured while performing an activity related to his job-and "relatedness" is usually 
a function of benefit to the employer. In contrast, respondeat superior subjects 
employers to liability for injuries suffered by an indefinite number of third 
persons. To limit this burden of liability, the narrower concept, "scope of 
employment," has long been tied to the employer's right to control the employee's 
activity at the time of his tortious conduct. 
640 P.2d at 213, quoting Luth v. Rogers and Bahler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761, 764 (Alaska 
1973). 
The doctrine of respondeat superior provides that an employer is responsible for the torts 
of its employee when the torts are committed within the scope of employment. Rausch v. 
Pocatello Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Idaho 80, 83-84, 14 P.3d 1074, 1077-78 (Ct. App. 2000), 
quoting Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,944, 854 P.2d 280,287 (Ct. 
App. 1993). In general, the employee's conduct "is within the scope of his employment if it is of 
the kind which he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of 
time and space, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." Podolan, 123 
Idaho at 944, 854 P.2d at 287 (citations omitted). 
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In Idaho, the test for whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment 
when he committed a tort is "the right to control reserved by the employer over the functions and 
duties of the agent." Id. at 945, 854 P.2d at 288 (citations omitted). Generally, the issue "is a 
factual question to be decided by the trier of fact. However, conduct that is clearly outside the 
scope of employment may properly be decided by the court as a matter of law." Id, citing Birkner 
v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989) and Manion v. Waybright, 59 Idaho 
643,656, 86 P.2d 181, 186 (1938). 
This doctrine was recently discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Finholt v. Cresto, 
143 Idaho 894, 155 P.3d 695 (2007). In Finholt, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile 
accident involving Jacob Albrethsen, who worked as a salesman for Fairway Lawns, a company 
owned by the defendant. Albrethsen worked a split-shift of mornings and early evenings, and 
Fairway required that Albrethsen provide his own vehicle, although the company reimbursed 
him for the cost of traveling to job sites. Id at 896, 155 P.3d 697. At the time of the accident, 
Albrethsen had completed his morning assignments and was on his way to meet his girlfriend for 
lunch. Id. 
The defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that Albrethsen was not acting 
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The plaintiff argued 
that Albrethsen's actions fell under a "special errand" or "traveling employee" exception. Id 143 
Idaho at 897, 155 P.3d at 698. The court noted that generally, "work performed to serve the 
employer falls within the course and scope of employment, whereas actions pursued for a purely 
personal purpose do not." Id., citing Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 
184,983 P.2d 834, 838 (1999). 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 7 
 
223
Pursuant to the "coming and going" rule articulated by Idaho courts, an employee is not 
acting within the course and scope of his employment while he is on his way to and from work. 1 
143 Idaho at 898, 155 P.3d at 699, citing Ridgway v. Combined Ins. Companies of America, 98 
Idaho 410,411,565 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1977). The "special errand" exception to this rule, which 
typically arises in worker's compensation cases, provides that an employee who leaves his 
normal place of work to perform some special service or errand at the direction of his employer 
is considered to be acting within the course and scope of his employment. 143 Idaho at 898, 155 
P.3d at 699 (citations omitted).2 The Finholt court concluded that the special errand exception 
did not apply to the facts of the case. 
Next, the court discussed the "traveling employee" exception to the coming and going 
rule, in which an employee is typically covered by worker's compensation when the "employee's 
work requires him to travel away from the employer's place of business or his normal place of 
work." 143 Idaho at 898, 155 P.3d at 699, quoting Cheung v. Wasatch Electric, 136 Idaho 895, 
897, 42 P.3d 688, 690 (2002). Noting that the traveling employee theory had not previously 
been applied "outside the worker's compensation context where it expands employer liability," 
the Court stated, "Regardless, we need not reach the question of whether to apply the traveling 
employee exception to tort claims, because the theory would not apply to the facts presented by 
this case." 143 Idaho at 898, 155 P.3d at 699. 
1 The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated that the "coming and going" rule from worker's compensation law may be 
applied in negligence actions brought against employers based on the theory ofrespondeat superior. Casey v. Sevy, 
129 Idaho, 13, 17,921 P.2d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 1996). 
2 A form of this exception was considered by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Casey v. Sevy, although it was not 
specifically designed as such. In Casey, the plaintiffs asserted that the incident fell under an exception to the coming 
and going rule, because the employee was traveling from his employer's premises "for a specified task as directed 
by his employer." 129 Idaho at 18,921 P.2d at 195. Without discussing whether the exception should be applied in 
tort cases, the court stated that it was ultimately unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' theories regarding why the coming 
and going rule was inapplicable to the case. Id. At 19,921 P.2d at 196. 
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Even if this Court were to apply worker's compensation theories into consideration, for 
the following reasons, the Defendant has failed to establish that she was acting within the course 
and scope of her employment with the National Guard at the time of the accident. First, Ms. 
Larson acknowledges that at the time of the accident, she had already been released from her 
training duties. On the weekend of the accident, Ms. Larson had been "participating in her 
monthly training commitment to the Idaho National Guard" in Lewiston, Idaho. However, at 
"approximately 12:00 noon on January 7, 2007, the guard members were released from training 
due to a snow storm forecast." Affidavit of Ned Cannon, Ex. A, "Defendant's Answer to 
Plaintiffs Interrog. No.8 ( emphasis added). Ms. Larson's destination at the time of the accident 
was her home in Nampa, Idaho. Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Interrog. No. 10. She was 
driving her own vehicle, which was registered to her grandparents, Clifford and Darlene Kleer. 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs Interrogs. and Reqs. for Production, Exhibit F, Tr. of 
Recorded Statement of Mallory Larson at page 3. 
It is clear that at the time of the accident, Ms. Larson had completed her work duties and 
was simply returning home. Under the "coming and going" rule, Ms. Larson was not acting 
within the course and scope of her employment while she was on her way home from work. 
Neither does the "traveling employee" exception apply. Again, this exception has been 
previously limited to worker's compensation cases. The Idaho Supreme Court clarified the 
"traveling employee" exception in Andrews v. Les Bois Masonry, Inc., 127 Idaho 65, 896, P.2d 
973 (1995), a worker's compensation case, as follows: "When an employee's work requires the 
employee to travel away from the employer's place of business or the employee's normal place of 
work, the employee will be held to be within the course and scope of employment continuously 
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during the trip, except when a distinct departure for personal business occurs." Id. at 67, 896 
P.2d at 975. 
In this case, Ms. Larson was not traveling away from her normal place of work to engage 
in more work for the National Guard at a different job site, nor was she transferring from one 
training station to another. She had concluded her work and was simply returning home; 
therefore, the traveling employee exception should not apply.3 
Further, although the traveling employee doctrine does not require that the employee 
receive travel expenses, "the payment of travel expenses, along with other evidence indicating 
the employer intended to compensate the employee for travel time, will justify expanding the 
course of employment to include going to and from work." Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 
110 Idaho 871,872,719 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1986), quoting Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 
105 Idaho 108, 666 P.2d 635 (1983) (Barker I); Andrews, 127 Idaho at 67, 896, P.2d at 975. Ms. 
Larson acknowledges that the National Guard does not reimburse her for travel expenses 
associated with attending weekend trainings: 
Q. All right, now when you're on guard duty uh, traveling back and forth, is, are the 
travel expenses paid by the National Guard or are they paid out of your own 
pocket? 
A. They're paid out of my own pocket. 
Q. Are you reimbursed by the Guard? 
A. No. 
Aff. of Ned Cannon, Tr. of Recorded Statement of Mallory Larson at p.2. Again, while the travel 
expenses issue is not decisive, the fact that Ms. Larson's expenses were not paid by the National 
3 
Ms. Larson has stated that the National Guard provides medical coverage for her while she is traveling to and from guard duty. 
(Tr. of Recorded Statement of Mallory Larson at 10-11.) This fact may be used to bolster an argument for application of the 
traveling employee exception, but, as discussed below, the basic test regarding the doctrine of respondeat superior is whether the 
employer had a right to control the employee's conduct. Although the National Guard may have provided medical coverage 
while Ms. Larson was traveling, it did not have any control over her manner of travel. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 
 
226
Guard is strongly suggestive that Ms. Larson's travel was not within the course of her 
employment with the National Guard. 
Neither does the "special errand" exception apply in this case because Ms. Larson was 
providing transportation for another employee, Danielle Poe: 
Q. Okay, let's see now uh, when you and her were getting ready to go to do Guard 
duty uh, did she, does she ask you if she can ride with you or do you a ... just 
volunteer to take her or how do you make that arrangement? 
A. Uh, it was, okay at that time I had been asked by my commander and my uh, 
section sargent [sic] to provide transportation for her. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then it just kind a ended up that we would prearrange our you know, when 
wet. .. when I'd pick her up and where I'd drop her off and all that so .. . 
A. So they requested that you give her transportation on this particular uh .. . 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, now have they requested that before? 
A. Uh, yes. 
Aff. of Ned Cannon, Tr. of Recorded Statement of Mallory Larson at p. 14. Ms. Larson argues 
that providing transportation for Ms. Poe for the weekend was part of Ms. Larson's job. 
However, it should be remembered that Ms. Larson was expected to travel to Boise for training 
anyway, and that she was not being reimbursed for her travel expenses. Also, it seems that Ms. 
Larson was not being reimbursed for travel expenses associated with providing a ride for Ms. 
Poe, as the two shared fuel expenses during the trip. See Tr. of Recorded Statement of Mallory 
Larson at 14. While Ms. Larson may have been asked to give Ms. Poe a ride for the sake of 
convenience, it does not appear that providing transportation was considered a part of Ms. 
Larson's job duties for the National Guard, either generally or on this occasion specifically. 
Apparently Ms. Poe was also required to travel to Lewiston for weekend training at her own 
expense, and Ms. Larson merely facilitated this trip. Both Ms. Larson and Ms. Poe benefited 
from this arrangement, as each spent less for fuel than if they had traveled separately. The fact 
that Ms. Larson provided a ride for Ms. Poe does not mean that Ms. Larson's act of returning 
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home to Nampa after being released from training duty in Lewiston amounted to a special errand 
for her employer. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions in cases involving 
automobile accidents in which national guardsmen were traveling in their own vehicles. In State 
v. Superior Court, 524 P.2d 951 (Ariz. 1974), the Arizona Supreme Court considered whether 
the state of Arizona could be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the 
negligent acts of an Arizona National Guardsman who was involved in an automobile accident 
while traveling to a weekend training session. The guardsman, who was driving his own vehicle, 
was killed in the accident, as were the occupants of the other vehicle. In determining whether the 
guardsman was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, the court 
concluded that no exception to the "going and coming" rule applied under the facts of the case: 
Going to work is certainly preparatory to working. But, such travel is not within 
the scope of the employment unless the employee is rendering a service growing 
out of or incidental to the employment. Driving his car to Phoenix was not part of 
Derrick's training. He was not required to run any errands for the Academy before 
his 6:30 a.m. arrival. While the Arizona National Guard granted travel 
reimbursements, we can find no authority that would give the Guard a legal right 
to control Derrick before the time that he was ordered to report for duty, such as 
during his travel from San Manuel to Phoenix or travel back home, again. 
524 P .2d at 954. The court also noted that whereas employer liability under the doctrine of 
repondeat superior generally depends upon the employer's right to control the employee's 
conduct, such control was lacking in this case: "The Guard had no right to dictate the manner of 
travel, the route to be taken, his speed, or that he use his car to go and come from school as 
compared to other modes of travel." Id. Further, the payment of a travel allowance, without 
more, did not subject the guardsman to the control of the Guard while he was traveling. Finally, 
although the respondents argued that the guardsman was on "'full time training duty' throughout 
the six-months period of attendance at the monthly school meetings in Phoenix," the court found 
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that the record did not support this contention. The guardsman had a full-time civilian job, and 
his orders only required him to report for full-time training duty for a period of two days each 
month: "Derrick's once-a-month sessions at the Arizona Academy certainly did not give him 
'full time' status in the Arizona National Guard for six months while at the same time he worked 
six days a week for Magma Copper Company." Id. at 955. 
The facts of the present case are similar to those in State v. Superior Court. Ms. Larson 
was driving her own vehicle home after completing her monthly training duty. The Guard had 
no right to dictate Ms. Larson's manner of travel, the route to be taken, her speed, or her mode of 
transportation. Ms. Larson was not even reimbursed for travel expenses, unlike the guardsman 
in State v. Superior Court. Finally, her monthly training duties did not give her full-time status, 
especially since she maintained a civilian job as a food service worker for the Idaho Department 
of Corrections. Aff. of Ned Cannon, Tr. of Recorded Statement of Mallory Larson at 1. As in 
State v. Superior Court, the employer control necessary for liability under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior is lacking here. See also Robarge, 640 P.2d at 214 (employee driving home 
at end of workday was not within the scope of employment because he was traveling in his own 
vehicle and without employer imposed obligations regarding route, manner of travel, or work-
related duties). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a similar factual situation in Hartzell v. 
United States, 786 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1986), in which the United States was held not liable for 
injuries resulting from an automobile accident involving an Air Force staff sergeant. At the time 
of the accident, the staff sergeant had just completed a temporary duty assignment at Camp 
Mercury in Nevada and was driving her own vehicle back to her permanent duty station at 
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Kirtland Air Force Base, near Albuquerque, New Mexico. She had also requested one additional 
day of leave so that she could do some sight-seeing on her way back to Kirtland. 
Applying Arizona law, the court stated that 
an employee is considered to be acting within the scope of employment if he meets either 
of two related tests. The first, adopted from section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency, states that the act of an employee is within the scope of employment only if: (1) 
it is typical of the kind of work the employee was hired to perform; (2) it occurs within 
the authorized time and space limits; and (3) it was intended at least in part to serve the 
master. The second holds an employer liable for the negligence of an employee if, at the 
time of the accident, the employee is: (1) subject to the employer's control or right to 
control; and (2) acting in furtherance of the employer's business. 
786 F.2d at 966 (citations omitted). The Court found that neither of these tests was satisfied 
under the factual circumstances of the case. As to the first test, the staff sergeant was an 
administrative specialist; driving her own vehicle for personal reasons was not an act typical of 
the work she was hired to perform. Also, because the accident occurred while she was on leave, 
it did not occur within the authorized time and space of her employment. Further, although the 
staff sergeant's travel from a temporary duty station back to her permanent duty station "was in 
some part intended to serve the Air Force, this factor alone is not sufficient to bring her within 
the scope of employment." Id. at 966-67. As to the control test, the Court noted that the Air 
Force did not have the right to control the staff sergeant's route and manner of travel, nor did it 
request that she perform any service related duties en route back to her base. Id. at 967. 
Additionally, the staff sergeant was on leave at the time of the accident; the Air Force's only 
interest in her during this period was that she report back to Kirtland on time. Id. See also 
Wuorinen v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d 521 (Wis. 1972) (state was not liable 
for injuries caused by national guardsman's negligent operation of his vehicle where guardsman 
was on 24-hour leave and the National Guard did not control his conduct at the time of the 
accident or the method or route of travel in his private vehicle). 
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In the present case, if this Court applied the test set forth in Hartzell, the result would be 
the same. As to the first test, driving her own vehicle was not typical of the kind of work Ms. 
Larson was hired to perform for the National Guard. Also, because Ms. Larson had completed 
her training duties for the weekend and was released to return home, the accident did not occur 
within the authorized time and space limits of her employment. Further, although it could be 
argued that providing transportation for Ms. Poe was intended at least in part to serve Ms. 
Larson's employer, this factor alone is not sufficient to bring Ms. Larson within the scope of 
employment. In Hartzell, the fact that the staff sergeant was traveling from one duty station to 
another was not sufficient. In this case, Ms. Larson was not even traveling from one duty 
assignment to another, or from one job site to another. She had been released from work and 
was simply returning home. 
As to the second test, the National Guard had no right to control Ms. Larson's actions 
after she was released from training duty. It has been noted that "the right to control has long 
been the touchstone in determining whether one was acting within the scope of his employment." 
Wuorinen, 201 N.W.2d at 526. In Wuorinen v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., another case 
involving an off-duty national guardsman who had an accident while driving his own vehicle, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that 
the "right of control" is material to determine whether Semenok was acting within the 
scope of his employment. We believe the answer is clear. One authorized to leave on pass 
to do what he wants on his own free time for a period of 24 hours is not acting within the 
scope of his military duty nor in pursuance thereof. The national guard was in no way 
controlling Semenok's free time, and the national guard did not control Semenok's 
conduct at these material times, nor the method or route of travel in his private vehicle. 
Id. Similarly, the National Guard did not control Ms. Larson's conduct at the time of the 
accident. She was free to take any route on her return trip home. She could sight-see if she 
wanted to, could stop for meals or to rest; she could make the trip in one day, or take several 
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days to return home if she chose. This complete freedom of action further emphasizes the 
conclusion that Ms. Larson was not acting within the course and scope of her employment at the 
time of the accident. 
It should be noted that the plaintiffs in Hartzell also argued for application of the "dual 
purpose" rule, which provides that "an employee is acting within the scope of his employment if 
he is going to or coming from the job site and service to the employer is at least a concurrent 
cause of his trip." 786 F .2d at 970 ( citations omitted). However, the Court noted that the dual 
purpose rule is a worker's compensation concept that had only been applied to the respondeat 
superior setting once by an Arizona court, and that Arizona courts since then had refused to 
extend the rule beyond the facts of that case. The court reiterated that in Arizona, the doctrine of 
respondeat superior is the standard against which a determination of scope of employment 
should be made in a tort case, and that concepts borrowed from worker's compensation law are 
not controlling in tort cases. Id. (citations omitted). See also Wuorinen, 201 N.W.2d 521 ("This 
is not a workmen's compensation case so neither the broader test of employment nor the dual 
purpose doctrine are controlling. Rather, the principles of the common-law doctrine of 
respondeat superior apply."). 
In this case, Ms. Larson has failed to establish that her return trip from training in 
Lewiston to her home was within the scope of her employment for purposes of Idaho Code § 6-
904(4). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, summary judgment is inappropriate. Ms. Larson is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw pursuant to Idaho Code§ 904(4). 
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Moreover, interpretation of Idaho Code § 904( 4) is a matter of first impression in the 
state of Idaho. Should it be necessary for the issue to go up to the Idaho Supreme Court on 
appeal, as a matter of judicial efficiency it would be better to do so with a complete record after a 
full and fair presentation of the evidence. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment on Mallory Larson through her 
counsel via the method(s) indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( /) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 29th day of May 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
~~ 
Ned A. Cannon 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
---- ------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Plaintiff moves to strike the following Paragraphs from the affidavit submitted by SSG 
Tony Rice: 11 5, 7, and Exhibit A. Plaintiff also moves to strike the following Paragraphs from 
the affidavit submitted by Mallory E. Martinez: 11 6, 7, and Exhibit A. 
This Motion is made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e ), and is based upon 
the records and files herein and the accompanying Memorandum in Support. 
Should the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, Plaintiff moves the Court to deny Ms. 
Larson's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(f). If the Exhibits are deemed 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
 
234
admissible by the Court, Plaintiff seeks additional time to depose both affiants and the author of 
the Report that is attached as Exhibit A to the affidavits of Mr. Rice and Ms. Larson. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Motion to Strike on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method(s) indicated 
below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
M Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 29th day of May 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
I. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. Portions of the Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice and the Affidavit of 
Mallory Larson should be stricken as inadmissible. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) states in pertinent part, "Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall ... set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence." The Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated, 
The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of 
or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be 
answered before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule 
to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE 1 
 
237
J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 314-15, 193 P.3d 858, 
861-62 (2008) (citations omitted). 
In this case, the Affidavit of Tony Rice and the Affidavit of Mallory Larson should be 
stricken for the following reasons: (1) Both affidavits contain inadmissible hearsay; and (2) both 
affidavits were submitted for the primary purpose of admitting the legal conclusions contained 
therein. 
a. The Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice and Mallory Larson contain 
inadmissible hearsay. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 801 ( c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted." Rule 802 states that "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided 
by these rules or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court ofldaho." 
In this case, the Affidavit of Tony Rice and the Affidavit of Mallory Larson both contain 
inadmissible hearsay. Both affidavits contain an Exhibit A, "Report of Investigation." Neither 
Mr. Rice nor Ms. Larson indicates who produced the report, but both heavily rely on the report in 
support of the position that Ms. Larson was on duty at the time of the accident. 
Plaintiff respectfully petitions the Court to strike Exhibit A and all conclusions drawn by 
Ms. Larson and Mr. Rice based on the Report. The document is a statement made by one other 
than either Mr. Rice or Ms. Larson; the document is submitted in support of summary judgment; 
the Report is submitted to attempt to prove the truth of the matter asserted-that Ms. Larson was 
on duty at the time of the accident. 
Ms. Larson has failed to state whether the declarant is available, and if the document's 
author is available, why the declarant has failed to submit his or her own affidavit. Plaintiff has 
not had an opportunity to question the document's author, and the Court has no guarantees as to 
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the document's trustworthiness. Accordingly, the "Report of Investigation" 1s inadmissible 
hearsay. 
b. The Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice and the Affidavit of Mallory Larson 
contain inadmissible legal conclusions. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "Legal conclusions are inadmissible 
because the jury would have no way of knowing whether the preparer of the report was 
cognizant of the requirements underlying the legal conclusion and, if not, whether the preparer 
might have a higher or lower standard than the law requires." Hines v. Brandon Steel Decks, Inc., 
886 F.2d 299, 303 (11th Cir., 1989). The Ninth Circuit has analyzed the Hines decision and has 
reached a similar conclusion. 
Pure legal conclusions are not admissible as factual findings. In the context of a 
summary judgment motion, a conclusion of law by a third-party investigator does 
not, by itself, create a genuine issue of material fact for the obvious reason that a 
legal conclusion is not a factual statement and for the reasons explained by the 
Eleventh Circuit. 
Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 777 (C.A.9, 2010). 
Larson Affidavit Paragraphs 6 and 7 state in pertinent part as follows: 
At the time of the accident on January 7, 2007, I was on duty with the Idaho 
National Guard and was acting under my superior's orders by transporting a 
fellow guardsman to Boise, Idaho. 
After the accident, I reported it to SSG Rices and an investigation was completed 
to determine if I was on duty. I cooperated in that investigation and received a 
copy of the report once it was completed. 
Whether Ms. Larson was "on duty" for purposes of Idaho Code § 6-904 is a matter of law. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. It is impermissible for Ms. Larson offer a legal 
opinion on the issue in her affidavit. 
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Mr. Rice draws similar conclusions to Ms. Larson. His affidavit at Paragraphs 5 and 7 
state in pertinent part, 
SPC Larson was on duty from 12:00 a.m. on January 6, 2007 to 11:59 p.m. on 
January 7, 2007. 
SPC Larson notified me of the accident after it occurred. A line of Duty Report of 
Investigation was completed. The result of the investigation determined that SPC 
Larson was on duty at the time of the accident and her medical bills were paid as 
a result of that determination. 
Again, whether Ms. Larson was "on duty" for purposes of Idaho Code § 6-904 is a matter of law. 
Mr. Rice has failed to provide any foundation to support his legal conclusions. 
2. If Exhibit A of the affidavits of Mr. Rice and Ms. Larson are deemed 
admissible, Plaintiff petitions the Court to deny summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56(t). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides, 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
In this case, Defendant has submitted a report attached to two separate affidavits without 
disclosing the report's author. If the Court deems the report admissible, Plaintiff petitions the 
Court to deny summary judgment at this time in order that Plaintiff may seek further discovery 
and depose affiants and the report's author. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff respectfully moves the Court to strike Exhibit A 
from both the Affidavit of Tony Rice and the Affidavit of Mallory Larson. The Exhibit is 
inadmissible hearsay, and neither affidavit provides the name of the document's author. Plaintiff 
also petitions the Court to strike all legal conclusions in Ms. Larson's and Mr. Rice's affidavits 
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as to the issue of whether Ms. Larson was "on duty" at the time of the accident for purposes of 
Idaho Code § 6-904. 
In the alternative, Plaintiff petitions the Court to deny summary judgment at this time 
pursuant to Rule 56(f) in order that Plaintiff may conduct further discovery. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike on Mallory Larson through her counsel 
via the method(s) indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ./) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 29th day of May 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
(::_' .' . ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAMP. TEURLINGS, 
Case No. : CV 09-00420 
Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF NED A. CANNON 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendants. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
I, Ned A. Cannon, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, and make this 
Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
I am the attorney for Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of excerpts from 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Requests for Production dated 
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November 3, 2009, including Answer No. 8, Answer No. I 0, and portions of Exhibit F. 
DATED: This 29
th 
day of May, 2012. ~
d~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 29th day of May, 2012. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Lewiston. 
My commission expires: June 11, 2014 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of this Affidavit of Ned A. Cannon on Defendant through her counsel via the 
method indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Email (pdf attachment) 
Signed this 29th day of May, 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 






Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB#6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Case No: CV09-00025 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
Defendant, through her attorney, Sonyalee R. Nutsch responds to Plaintiffs 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please identify yourself and identify each and every 
person with whom you consulted, upon whom you relied, or who otherwise constituted a 
source of infonnation for you in connection with the preparation of your answers to these 
interrogatories, listing with respect to each and every such person the number of each 
interrogatory and/ or discovery request to which he or she helped you to prepare answers 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION -1-
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INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please fully describe Defendant driver's activities for 
the twenty-four (24) hours immediately preceding the collision set forth in the Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
ANSWER: Defendant objects to Inte1Togatory No. 8 on the grounds that the 
interrogatory is overly broad and seeks infonnation that is not reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Reserving these objections, to the best of 
her recollection, Mallory Larson recalls that she was participating in her monthly training 
commitment to the Idaho National Guard on the weekend of the accident. Mallory 
Larson would have participated in training in Lewiston, Idaho, on January 7, 2007. On a 
typical training weekend, Mallory Larson would have driven to Orofino, Idaho, after 
guard training on Saturday, January 6, 2007, and spent the night with either her mom, 
Cristine Erbst, or her grandparents Clifford and Darlene Kleer. She would have gone to 
bed at approximately 9:00 p.m. and gotten up around 6:00 a.m. on January 7, 2007. She 
would have left Orofino in time to arrive in Lewiston at 8:00 a.m. for additional guard 
training. At approximately 12:00 noon on January 7, 2007, the guard members were 
released from training due to a snow storm forecast. Mallory Larson and Danielle Poe 
may have stopped for something to eat after finishing training and after eating would have 
started their trip to return to Nampa, Idaho. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please set forth the names, addresses and telephone 
numbers of all persons with whom Defendant driver had contact within the eight (8) 
hours immediately prior to the collision set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint. Please 
specifically describe her activities for such eight (8) hour period, along with her reasons 
for being in contact with each named person. Please identify the name, address, and 
phone number of Defendant's planned destination at the time of collision herein. 
ANSWER: Defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 10 on the grounds that the 
Interrogatory is overly broad, unduly burdensome, compound and seeks information that 
is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Reserving 
these objections, Mallory Larson would have gotten up on the morning of January 7, 
2007, at approximately 6:00 a.m. and would have left from either her mom's or 
grandparents' home in Orofino, Idaho, in sufficient time to arrive at the Idaho National 
Guard Headquarters located at 2707 16th Avenue, Lewiston, Idaho, for training by 8:00 
a.m. Mallory Larson does not recall all of the names of the guard members who attended 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES 
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training that weekend. Mallory Larson would have had communications with her 
commander, Cpt. Deverteuil, her first sergeant, First Sergeant Frost and, her section 
sergeant, Staff Sergeant Tony Rice. Mallory Larson would have also had communication 
with Danielle Poe, a fellow guard person. Mallory Larson's destination at the time of the 
accident was her home which at that time was located at 11692 West Trinity Avenue, 
Nampa, Idaho 83651. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 21: In Defendant's answer, she provides affirmative 
defenses Nos. 1-7. As to each affirmative defense Nos. 1-6, please identify each fact 
upon which such affirmative defense is based, and the name, address, and phone number 
of each witness who has or may have any information pertaining to each such fact. 
ANSWER: Defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 21 on the grounds that it seeks 
infonnation that is privileged as attorney work product and on the grounds that it calls for 
the disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of 
defense counsel. Reserving these objections, discovery is in its earliest stages and factual 
investigation is not complete. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5 Please produce every document, note, 
memorandum, or other written material, of any kind, which in any way references and/or 
pertains to your answer to Interrogatory No. 21. 
RESPONSE: See Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 21. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Do you agree to supplement your responses to these 
interrogatories in accordance with Rule 26(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
without new requests for supplementation of prior responses? 
ANSWER: Defendant agrees to supplement her responses in accordance with 
I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l) and (2) only. 
DATED this 3rd day ofNovember 2009. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Mallory Larson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That she is the Defendant in the above-entitled matter; that she has read the 
foregoing DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION and well knows the contents thereof; that the facts 
therein stated are true as she verily believes. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of November, 2009. 
As to Objections: 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES 
Notary Pu f c in and for the State of Idaho. 
Residing at Lewiston, Idaho, therein. 
My Commission Expires: 6 / .J LJ/ It) 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~£iiR.~TS~H~b 
Attorneys for Defendant 






Insured: Clifford Kleer 
Policy No. 01-024225-01 
Date of Loss: 1-7-07 
This is Steve Schlottman conducting a recorded personal uh, statement with Mallory Larson. 
This interview is taking place on July 6, 2007. It's approximately 12:20 p.m. Lewiston time. 
This interview is taken place from Lewiston, Idaho by telephone. This interview concerns an 
automobile accident that occurred on January 7, 2007 uh, on Highway 95. 
Q. Mallory, would you give me your full name please? 
A Uh, my full name is Mallory Elizabeth Larson. 
Q. Would you spell your last name for me please? 
A L-A-R-S-0-N. 
Q. Are you aware that this interview is taking place? 
A Yes. 
Q. And you consent to it being recorded? 
A Yes. 
Q. And what is your current address and phone number? 
A 1 ... 11692 West Trinity Avenue, in Nampa, Idaho 83651. Current phone number is 208-703-
4626. 
Q. Kay I'm just gonna shut off the tape for a minute and reverse and make sure I'm picking you 
up okay. 
A Okay. 
Q. (tape stopped) Okay and what is your date of birth? 
A Um, That's August 16, sorry. 
Q. Kay, that's fine and are you married, single or d ... were you married, single or divorced at the 
time of the accident? 
A Single. 
Q. And at the time of the accident, what was your occupation or business? 
A Um, I'm a food service officer but at that very time I was actually getting off National Guard 
drill. 
Q. Kay now you say food officer, food service officer. 
A Yes. 
Q. And who is that, who is your employer? 
A Uh, Idaho Department of Corrections. 
Q. Okay, Idaho Correction and that's out of Boise there or Nampa? 




Q. Oh okay, and at the time of the accident you were on guard duty you said? 
A Yes. 
Q. Kay I'm just gonna ask you a couple of questions about that while we're here. Um, were you 
returning home from Guard duty or returning to your uh, to the Guard ... 
A Returning home. 
Q. Returning home and how long had you been on Guard duty? 
A Uh, it had been that weekend since Friday night. 
Q. And where was the Guard duty location? 
A It was in Lewiston. 
Q. Lewiston. So it's Friday, from Friday to Sunday basically? 
A Yes. 
Q. All right, now when you 're on guard duty uh, traveling back and forth, is, are the travel 
expenses paid by the National Guard or are they paid out of your own pocket? 
A They're paid out ofmy own pocket. 
Q. Are you reimbursed by the Guard? 
A No. 
Q. Kay, now when you're on Guard Duty, are you paid wages while you're traveling to and 
from? 
A Um ... 
Q. Or are you just paid a flat fee for the weekend or how are you paid? 
A I'm paid a flat fee for the weekend. 
Q. Okay. 
A How it works. 
Q. So out of that you have to, your salary and your travel expenses and all that? 
A Yes. 
Q. Now are you paid before you go to Guard duty or after you return? 
A After I return. 
Q. Kay, and was that your, and the vehicle that you were, well let me get back to here, um, at 
the time of the accident, I'm gonna go back to the general statements outlined here again. At 
the time of the accident, what would you contider, consider your health to be like, excellent, 
poor, fair, good? 
A Excellent. 






Q. And could you give me a description of the vehicle that you were in at the time of the 
accident? 
A I was in a 2002 dark red Ford Focus. 
Q. Kay Ford Foc .. a Ford what? 
A A Ford Focus. 
Q. Okay. 
A Four door. 
Q. Four door? 
A Yeah. 
Q. Were you the driver at the time of the accident? 
A Yes. 
Q. Uh, could you give me a description of the other vehicles that were involved in the accident? 
A I know that it was a green Buick and a uh, Volvo Swift tractor trailer. 
Q. Kay. 
A And that's ... 
Q. Do you recall the names of the drivers of either one of those vehicles? 
A No I don't. 
Q. All right, and the vehicle that you were driving, are you the registered owner on that vehicle? 
A I wasn't at the time, no. 
Q. Okay who were the registered, or who was the registered owner? 
A My grandparents, Cliff and Darlene Kleer. 
Q. Kay, and you had permission to drive the vehicle? 
A Yes, technically it was mine. 
Q. Okay, uh, when you say technically were you making the payments on it and stuff like that? 
A Uh, no it's a complicated matter. No I wasn't but it was a gift if you could. 
Q. A gift from them? 
A Yes. 
Q. All right, do you recall the date, the approximate time and the location of the accident? 
A I know it was January 7 and it was sometime about 12:40ish. 
Q. Am. or p.m.? 




Q. Okay. Did, were your tires a little bit iffy as far as that kind of driving? 
A They probably were. I um, I drove it a lot so the tires were fairly new though but as much as 
I drive it, it's a big possibility. 
Q. All right, uh, let's see, you were dr ... do you know what your driver's license number is by 
any chance? 
A Um, I could go get it. 
Q. Oh well, I have it on the police report so that's all right. 
A Okay. 
Q. Oh I was gonna ask you, did Danielle, did she help pay for any of your travel expenses like 
gas or anything like that? 
A She gave me gas money. 
Q. Gas mo ... does she usually do that? 
A What's that? 
Q. Does she usually do, help with the gas when she goes with you? 
A Yes. 
Q. Okay, does she pay all the gas expenses or just part of it? 
A Part ofit. 
Q. Okay, what about meals and stuff. Do you eat meals and stay in rooms or do you just go 
straight through? 
A Um, well I mean occasional snack and stuff. 
Q. All right, does she buy that or do you just kind a buy your own? 
A Kind a buy our own. 
Q. Okay, let's see now uh, when you and her were getting ready to go to do Guard duty uh, did 
she, does she ask you if she can ride with you or do you a ... just volunteer to take her or how 
do you make that arrangement? 
A Uh. it was, okay at that time I had been asked by my commander and my uh, section sargent 
to provide transportation for her. 
Q. ,Okay. 
A. And then it just kind a ended up that we would prearrange our you know, when we t. .. when 
I'd pick her up and where I'd drop her off and all that so ... 
Q. So they requested that you give her transportation on this particular uh ... 
A Yes. 
Q. Okay, now have they requested that before? 
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WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
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Case No.: CV 09-420 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
AND TO : Sonyalee R. Nutsch, attorney of record. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiffs Motion to Strike will be heard at the Nez 
Perce County Courthouse before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick on Tuesday, June 12, 2012, at 
9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Notice of Hearing on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method(s) 
indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 29th day of May 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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Case No: CV09-420 
R£PL YIN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMNIAR Y JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 7, 2007, Mallory Martinez flea Larson ("Ms. Martinez") was on 
duty with the ldaho Anny National Guard when she was involved in an automobile accident 
with William Teurlings ("plaintiff'). On January 6, 2009, plaintlfftiled his Complaint in this 
matter alleging one claim of negligence against Ms. Martinez. On April 26, 2012, because 
National Guard members are exempted from liability for state law claims arising out of their 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
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activities when they are in training or acting under duty, Ms. Martinez filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment asking the Court to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint against her in its 
entirety. On May 29, 2012, plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment, asserting that despite the fact that the National Guard determined that 
Ms. Martinez was on duly at the time of the accident, she has still failed to establish that she 
was acting within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. This 




TIME OF 'l'HE ACCIDENTON JANUARY 7, 2007. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the 
course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: ... 4. 
Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard when 
engaged in training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, 
505 or 709, title 32, United States Code. 
Idaho Code § 6 .. 904 was last amended in 1988 and was therefore in force, as stated above, on 
January 7, 2007. See id. 
32 U.S.C.A § 502 states in pertinent part that: 
(a) Under regulntions to be prescribed by the Secretary of the 
Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, each 
company, battery, squadron, and detachment of the National 
Guard, unless excused by the Secretary concerned, shall 
REPLY IN S-UPPORT OF 
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(1) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor 
target practice, at least 48 times each year; and 
(2) participate in training at encampments, maneuvers, 
outdoor target practice, or other exercises. at least 15 days 
each year. 
P. 4,..11 
It is undisputed that on January 7, 2007, Ms. Martinez was traveling to Boise, 
Idaho from Lewiston, Idaho where she was required to attend a monthly training pursuant to 
32 U.S.C.A § 502. Plaintiff orgues that because the training portion of the weekend had 
concluded, Ms. Martinez had completed all activities listed under 32 U.S.C.A § 502 and 
presumably therefore, the exemption to liability under Idaho Code§ 6-904 would not apply. 
(See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, 5/29/2012, p. 5). 
However, this argument ignores the plain language of the statute and the affidavit submitted 
by Ms. Martinez's superior officer, SSG Tony Rice. 
The exemption under Idaho Code§ 6-904( 4) is not limited to training activities 
performed pursuant to 32 U.S.C.A § 502 but "training or duty." I.C. § 6-904(4). SSG Rice 
expla1ned in his affidavit that National Guard members are on duty until 11 :59 p.m. on the 
last day of the mandatory drill. (See Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, 4/26/2012~ ,1 5), In 
addition, the National Guard detennined in its own investigation that Ms, Martinez was on-
duty at the time of the accident on January 7, 2007 and paid for her medical expenses. (See 
Rice Aff., Exh. A; see also Affidavit ofMallory E. Martinez, 12/30/l 1, 18). If Ms. Martinez 
wus not on-duty, her medical bills would not have been paid by the National Guard. 
Therefore, the exemption under Idaho Code § 6-904(4) applies and plaintiff's Complaint 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
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should be dismissed. 
B. ON JANUARY 7, 2007,Ms. MARTINEZWASACTJNGWITHn-IE COURSE AND SCOPE 
OF 8ER EMPLOYM1'~N'f WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD. 
Plaintiff next argues that Ms. Martinez was not acting within the course and 
scope of her employment with the National Guard on January 7, 2007, when the accident in 
this case occurred. Plaintiff's argument is based on the application of a rule used in workers' 
compensation cases which "provides that an employee is ordinarily not in the course of 
employment when going to or coming from work." Caseyv, Sery, 129 ldaho 13, l 7t 921 P.2d 
I 90, 194 (Ct. App. 1996). The rule is commonly referred to as the coming and going rule to 
which there are numerous exceptions. 
One such exception is that of the travelling employee. Pursuant to Andrews v. 
Les Boise Masonry, Inc., 127 Idaho 65, 67,896 P.2d 973,975 (1995), the Supreme Court of 
Idaho stated the travelling employee doctrine in Idaho is as follows: 
When an employee's work requires the employee to travel away 
from the employer's place of business or the employee's normal 
place of work, the employee will be held to be within the course 
and scope of employment continuously during the trip, except 
when a distinct departure for personal business occurs. 
Id. (emphasis added). In Ridgeway v. Combined Ins. Cos. of Am., 98 Idaho 410, 565 P.2d 
1367 (1977), the court applied the travelling employee exception to a. two week business trip 
the employee was required to take and stated that injuries incurred on the trip including " ... 
'injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants away from 
home are usually held compensable. m Id. at 411-412, 565 P.2d at 1368-69 (internal citations 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
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omiued). 
It is undisputed that in January of 2007 Ms. Martinez lived and worked in 
Boise, Idaho. (See Affidavit ofNed Cannon, 5/29/12, Exh A- (Exh. F, p. 1)). As part of her 
employment with the Idaho National Guard, Ms. Martinez was required to drive from Boise, 
Idaho to Lewiston, Idaho once a month to attend required training dril Is. (See Martinez Aff., 
p. 2), Although the Guard did not pay for Ms. Martinez's traveling expenses, that factor 
alone is not dispositive of whether an employee will be considered a travelling employee. See 
Andrews, 127 Idaho at 67, 896 P.2d at 975. 
The more significant factor is that Ms. Martinez participated in the two day 
drills and was paid by the National Guard for her onwduty time which ended at 1 l :59 p.m. on 
the evening of January 7, 2007. (See Cannon Aft~. p. 2; see also Rice Aff., ii 5). In citing 
Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, inc., 110 Idaho 871,872,719 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1986), 
plaintiff acknowledged that compensation of an employee while they are traveling wiH justify 
a finding that the employee is a travelling employee acting within the course and scope of 
their employment. See id. Based on the facts in this case, Ms. :Martinez was a travelling 
employee to whom the coming and going rule does not apply .1 
1 Plainiiffcilcs Stare v. Superior Coun o/the Stale of Arizona ct. al,, 524 P,2d 95 I ( 1974), for the proposition thnt 
the coming and going rule should apply to national guardsmen driving to trn ining drills, l n Arizona, the guardsman 
was in an accident while traveling to the training but before the time he was scheduled to report for duty, See Id. at 
9S3. ihis factor was significant to the court and there was no evidence that the gunrdsman was considered "on 
duty" at the time of the accident, In addition, state law applies to detennine when an employee is acting within the 
course and scope of their employment. There is no discussion ofany ofthe exceptlons to the coming and going 
rule in the Arizona court's opinion so it is unclear whether, in 1974. Arizona even recognized the same exceptions 
to the coming and going rule that Idaho does today, Therefore, this case is distinguishable and is not controlling on 
the Court in reaching it's determinntion in this case. 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
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InFinholdtv. Cresto, 143 ldaho 894,155 P.3d 695 (2007), the Supreme Court 
of Idaho renewed its approval of a second exception to the coming and going rule for "an 
employee who, 'although not at his regular place of employment, even before or after 
customary working hours, is doing, is on his way home from performing, or on the way from 
his home to perform, some special service or errand or the discharge of some duty incidental 
to the nature of his employment in the interest ot: or under direction of his employer.'" Id. at 
898, 155 P.3d at 699 (internal citations omitted), 
It is undisputed that at the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez was carrying out 
a specific order from her superior o:tl:icer to transport a fellow guardsman to Boise. (See Rice 
Aff.,, 6; see also Martinez Aff, ii 6). Plaintiff argues that because the other guardsman 
assisted in paying the gas expense incurred while traveling to Boise that it somehow negates 
the fact that that Ms. Martinez was complying with her superior officer's instruction. In 
Mortimer v, Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839,840 P.2d 383 (1992), the Supreme Court of 
Idaho stated that "[a]n act done partly for personal reasons and partly to serve an employer is 
sti 11 within the scope of employment." Id. at 845, 840 P .2d at 389 (internal citations omitted). 
While sharing the expense was beneficial to Ms. Martinez, it doesn't change 
the fact that she was acting at the direction and control of her superior officer and carrying 
out a special errand/ order on behalf of the National Guard while traveling on January 7, 
2007. Because the special errand exception also applies to the facts of this case. the Court 
should find that, at the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez was acting within the course and 
scope of her employment with the Idaho National Guard. 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ·6· 
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A third applicable exception to the coming Md going rule in this case is when 
the employer agrees, either expressly or impliedlyt that the employment relationship shall 
continue during the period of coming and going. See Colorado Civil Air Patrol v. Hagans, 
662 P.2d 194 (1983). In Hagans, Thomas Hagans was a volunteer member of the Colorado 
Civil Air Patrol ("C.A.P.")who crashed inn plane during a 75 mile trip from his home while 
he was on his way to attend a regularly scheduled C.A.P. training. See id. at 195. The 
following facts were noted by the court: 
Id. 
On March 11, 1980, Hagans and his brother, who was also a 
C.A.P. member, left Hagans' ranch in the brother's plane to 
attend a regularly scheduled C.A.P. meeting. The ranch was 
about 75 miles away from the Lamar Municipal Airport. The 
mode of transportation to the meetings was the individual 
member's choice, and the commander of the Lnmar squadron of 
the C.A.P. had approved of the I-fagans tlying to meetings. The 
cost of transportation was borne by the individual members. 
Enroute to the meeting, Hagans and his brother received word 
that they could not land at Lamar because of weather conditions. 
After tuming around to return to the ranch~ the plane crashed 
and Hagans was injured. 
The referee found that Hagans was considered to be under 
C.A.P. jurisdiction from the time of leaving home until his 
return following the meeting, and that the only purpose for 
undertaking the travel was to attend the meeting. 
The court agreed that "traveling to attend [the train.ing] was included in the 
activity by necessity; that Hagans' duty encompassed all of his activity from leaving for the 
meeting until his return; that he was traveling at the behest of his employer; that, therefore, 
his injury during travel arose out of and in the course of his employment; and that Hagans' 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT .7. 
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activities generated some benefit to the C.A.P. and, thus, had a dual purpose." Id, The court 
acknowledged the coming and going rule but found an exception applied. 
Among such special circumstances is the exception that an 
employer may agree, expressly or impliedly, that the 
employment relation shaU continue during the period of coming 
and going. , .. Such an agreement may be inferred here. The 
C.A.P. commander testified that, under patrol regulations, its 
members are pursuing C.A.P. duties from the time they leave 
home to attend a meeting until they return. This testimony 
supports the finding of the Commission that ''traveling to attend 
was included in the activity by necessity; the duty of claimant 
encompassed all of his activity from the moment of entering the 
aircraft to depart for the meeting, through the time of travel." 
Thus, when a claimant, at the time of his injury, is performing a 
duty with which he is charged as a part of his contract for 
service, or under the express or implied direction of his 
employer, he is within the course of his employment under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Id. at 196 (internal citations omitted). 
The C.A.P. analysis is 1he most comparable to the employment situation that 
exists between Ms. Martinez and the Idaho National Guard. As with the C.A.P ., Idaho 
National Guard has agreed, either expressly or impliedly, that the employment relation 
continues during the period of coming and going. See id. This agreement is apparent based 
on the following facts: Ms. Martinez was on duty until 11 :59 p.m. on January 7. 2007; she 
was being paid at the time of the accident by the National Guard; she was complying with a 
direct order from her superior officer to transport a fellow guardsman to Boise, Idaho; and 
because Ms. Martinez was injured "in the line of duty," her medical bills incurred as a result 
of the accident were paid by the Anny National Guard. (See Martinez Aff., pp.2-3, .Exh A; 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
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see also Rice Aff., pp. 2-3, Exh. A). Ms. Martinez's traveling to Boise was within the course 
and scope of her employment with the National Guard. 
Of course, this entire analysis is redundant in light of the fact the National 
Guard Bureau already completed an Investigation/ Line of Duty Report and detennined that 
Ms. Martinez was acting "in the line of duty" at the time of the accident. See id. However, 
even if the Court were to strike that testimony from the record, the remaining facts are just as 
strong for this Court to reach the same conclusion as the National Guard that Ms. Martinez 




Because, in accordance with Idaho Code § 6-904(4). Idaho National Guard 
members cannot be held liable for state law claims arising out of their activities when they 
are acting within the course and scope of their employment. and pursuant to duty, plaintiffs 
Complaint should be dismissed. 
DA TED this 5lh day of June 2012. 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
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Case No: CV09-420 
AFFIDAVIT OF SONY ALEE 
R. NlJTSCH IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
SONY ALEE R. NlJTSCH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, over the age of 
twenty-one (21 ), competent to testify as a witness, and make this affidavit on personal 
knowledge. 
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2. I am one of the attorneys representing the defendant in this matter. 
3. On April 26, 2012, I contacted Ned Cannon, counsel for the plaintiff, 
and informed him that I was cancelling the deposition I had noticed up of SSG Tony Rice. I 
explained to Mr. Cannon that I had noticed up the deposition because I was unable to get a 
hold of SSG Rice. I learned on April 26, 2012, that he had been out of the country and was 
willing to sign an Affidavit, negating the need for his deposition. I provided Mr. Cannon 
with SSG Rice's phone number and best contact time. A fair and accurate copy of the e-mail 
I sent to Mr. Cannon in follow-up to our phone conversation earlier that day is attached as 
Exhibit A. SSG Rice's phone number has been redacted to maintain his privacy. 
4. To date, I have never received a request from plaintiffs counsel for 
available dates to take the depositions of my client, Mallory Martinez, SSG Tony Rice, or any 
other witnesses in this case. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of June 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 8th Street 
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From: Sonyalee [snutsch@clbrmc.com] 
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2012 5:39 PM 
To: 'Ned Cannon' 
Subject: Re: SSG Rice 
Ned, 
Page 1 of 1 
SSG Rice signed his affidavit today. We noticed up the deposition because we couldn't get 
him to respond to my letters. Come to find out, he was in Cambodia doing a peace keeping 
mission. I mailed a copy to you with our motion so you should receive it tomorrow. The 
affidavit is pretty straight forward so I'm not sure you will have any questions but if you do, 
SSG Rice's phone number is ' He does not have to work on Fridays so he said 
that was the best time to contact him. 
SN 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Attorney 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1510 
321 13th Street 




CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE --This email and any attachments are ONLY for the person(s) named in the message header. 
Unless otherwise indicated, it contains information that is confidential, privileged or exempt from disclosure under applicable 
law. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender and delete the message/attachments. 
6/4/2012 page / I 
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Case No: CV09-420 
AFFIDAVIT OF SONY ALEE 
R. NUTSCH IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO SWIFT 
TRANSPORTATION'S MOTION 
TO INTERVENE 
SONY ALEE R. NUTS CH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, over the age of 
twenty-one (21 ), competent to testify as a witness, and make this affidavit on personal 
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2. I am one of the attorneys representing the defendant in this matter. 
3. I have had various phone conversations with plaintiffs attorney, Ned 
Cannon, throughout the litigation of this case. Mr. Cannon has stated to me on several 
occasions that any settlement of the case will need to include the significant Worker's 
Compensation subrogation being claimed by Swift. 
4. The last phone conversation I had with Mr. Cannon was on April 26, 
2012. I infonned Mr. Cannon, as I had on several prior occasions, that my client was not in a 
position to consider settlement negotiations or participate in a mediation until discovery was 
completed and dispositive motions resolved. Mr. Cannon made reference to the Swift 
Transportation subrogation claim during this phone conversation. 
5. Had settlement discussions occurred or a mediation been scheduled, as a 
significant subrogation claimant, I would have insisted that Swift, through its counsel Mark 
Peterson, been involved so that a global Release could have been obtained should settlement 
have occurred. 
Notary Public in and for the State of o 
residing at l.ec..,..;, b Hv, , therein. 
My Commission Expires : q ~ 1.5' · ~c/ 7 
AFFIDAVIT OF SONY ALEE R. 
NUTSCH IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of June 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Fax (208) 746-8421 
Mark C. Peterson 
Andrea J. Rosholt 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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Case No: CV09-0420 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 26, 2012, Mallory Martinez flea Larson ("Ms. Martinez" or 
"defendant") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment due to the fact that she was on duty 
with the Idaho National Guard at the time of the accident that is the subject matter of 
William Teurlings' ("plaintiff') Complaint. In support of that Motion, defendant filed 
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two affidavits. On May 29, 2012, plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike certain paragraphs of 
those Affidavits. This Response is submitted in opposition to plaintiffs Motion to Strike. 
As explained below, the paragraphs and exhibit identified by plaintiff should not be 
stricken from the Affidavits of SSG Tony Rice or Ms. Martinez. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. SSG Tony Rice and Mallory Martinez's Affidavits Do No Contain 
Inadmissible Legal Conclusions 
Paragraph 5 of SSG Tony Rice's Affidavit states: "January 7, 2007, was the 
final day of one of the 145th ' s regularly scheduled instruction drills in Lewiston, Idaho 
and SPC Mallory Larson was in attendance. SPC Larson was on duty from 12:00 a.m. 
from January 6, 2007 to 11:59 p.m. on January 7, 2007." Paragraph 6 of Ms. Martinez's 
Affidavit states that "[a]t the time of the accident on January 7, 2007, I was on duty with 
the Idaho National Guard and was acting under my superior's orders by transporting a 
fellow guardsman to Boise, Idaho." Ms. Martinez's superior officer is SSG Rice. 
Paragraph 7 of SSG Rice's Affidavit states: 
SPC Larson notified me of the accident after it occurred. A 
Line of Duty Report of Investigation was completed. The 
result of the investigation determined that SPC Larson was on 
duty at the time of the accident and her medical bills were 
paid as a result of that determination. A fair and accurate 
copy of the Report of Investigation which is maintained as a 
regular course in the personnel file of SPC Larson of which I 
am personally familiar, is Attached as Exhibit A .... 
Paragraph 7 of Ms. Martinez's Affidavit states: 
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After the accident, I reported it to SSG Rice and an 
investigation was completed to determine if I was on duty. I 
cooperated in that investigation and received a copy of the 
report once it was completed. A fair and accurate copy of the 
report I received is attached as Exhibit A ... 
As the superior officer of Ms. Martinez, SSG Rice would know when Ms. 
Ms. Martinez, as well as himself, was considered to be "on duty" for the purpose of the 
Idaho National Guard's policies and procedures. While this factual question is what the 
Motion for Summary Judgment turns on, it doesn't change the fact that it is a factual 
question of which SSG Rice has personal knowledge to which he can testify. Similarly, 
Ms. Martinez knew she was getting paid by the guard until 11 :59 p.m. on January 7, 2007 
and notified her supervising officer after the accident. All of which is consistent with her 
understanding that she was "on duty," a factual question that as a member of the National 
Guard, she would have personal knowledge of. 
As explained below, because the document attached to the Affidavits as 
Exhibit A is admissible pursuant to the Records of Regularly Conducted Activity and the 
Public Records and Reports exceptions to the hearsay rule, the information contained in 
that report is likewise not an inadmissible legal conclusion but rather a factual 
determination of which SSG Rice and Ms. Martinez were personally involved in and of 
which they were made aware. 
B. Exhibit A to SSG Rice and Ms. Martnez's Affidavits is Admissible 
Pursuant to the Records of Regularly Conducted Activity and Public 
Records and Reports Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6) and (8) state the following documents are 
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admissible even though they contain hearsay: 
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any 
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted 
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular 
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by 
certification that complies with Rule 902( 11 ), unless the 
source of information or the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term 
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business, 
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of 
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(8) Public Records and Reports. Unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness, records, reports, statements, or data 
compilations in any form of a public office or agency setting 
forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, 
or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as 
to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law. The following are not within this exception to 
the hearsay rule: (A) investigative reports by police and other 
law enforcement personnel, except when offered by an 
accused in a criminal case; (B) investigative reports prepared 
by or for a government, a public office or an agency when 
offered by it in a case in which it is a party; (C) factual 
findings offered by the government in criminal cases; (D) 
factual findings resulting from special investigation of a 
particular complaint, case, or incident, except when offered 
by an accused in a criminal case. 
As explained by SSG Rice, Exhibit A attached to his Affidavit is a Line of 
Duty Report that was completed after the accident in this case. This report is kept during 
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the regular course of the Idaho National Guard in Ms. Martinez' personnel file which 
SSG Rice, as her superior officer, is personally familiar with. As such, SSG Rice is a 
qualifying witness pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 902( 11) and has met all criteria to 
establish the admissibility of Exhibit A as a record of regularly conducted business 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6). 
In addition, the National Guard is a public office or agency which issued 
this Line of Duty Report as factual findings resulting from an investigation made 
pursuant to authority granted by law. Therefore, the Line of Duty Report is also 
admissible pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(8). 
C. Plaintiff's Request for Relief Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(f) 
Plaintiffs final request is that if the Court denies his Motion to Strike that 
he requests additional time to depose the affiants. Other than the time that she was 
deployed, Ms. Martinez has been available for over two years for her deposition to be 
taken and plaintiffs counsel has never once requested to do so. (See Affidavit of 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch in Support of Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion to Strike, ,r 4). SSG Rice's contact information was provided to plaintiffs 
counsel on April 26, 2012 and no attempt to take his deposition has been made by 
plaintiff. (See id. at ,r 3). The request for additional depositions is just a delay tactic to 
avoid having the Court rule on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant 
respectfully requests the Court rule on her Summary Judgment Motion without the delay 
requested. 
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Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that Plaintiffs 
Motion to Strike be denied. 
DATED this 4th day of June 2012. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
~. -.:12...~.L so EER. NUTSCH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of June 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 8th Street 
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Case No: CV09-0420 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO SWIFT 
TRANSPORTATION'S MOTION TO 
INTERVENE 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 29, 2012, Swift Transportation Company ("Swift"), served on 
counsel for the existing parties a Motion to Intervene in this case. Swift is an entity that 
paid workers compensation benefits to William Teurlings ("plaintiff') after the accident 
that is the subject matter of plaintiffs Complaint. As explained below, Swift's Motion to 
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Intervene should be denied. 
II. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On January 7, 2007, Mallory Martinez fka Larson ("Ms. Martinez") was on 
duty with the Idaho Army National Guard when she was involved in an automobile 
accident with plaintiff. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was an employee of Swift 
and was driving a Swift semi-truck. According to Swift, on April 23, 2008, it entered 
into a Compromise and Release agreement with plaintiff to settle his worker's 
compensation claim with Swift for Fifty Five Thousand Dollars ($55,000). (See 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, 5/25/12, p. 2). 
On January 6, 2009, plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter alleging one 
claim of negligence against Ms. Martinez. Plaintiffs damages claimed in his Complaint 
were damages including but not limited to, "bodily injury, emotional distress, medical 
expenses, and economic losses, together with future damages for person injury 
proximately caused by defendant's negligence." (Plaintiffs Complaint, 1/6/2009, p. 2). 
On July 23, 2010, counsel for Ms. Martinez received correspondence from 
Mark Peterson. (See Affidavit of Mark C. Peterson in Support of Motion to Intervene, 
5/25/2012, Exhibit A). Mr. Peterson informed counsel that Swift has paid workers' 
compensation benefits to plaintiff and "[t]o the extent that Teurlings is entitled to an 
award of damages against Mallory Larson (Larson) for the injuries Teurlings sustained in 
the traffic accident, the surety has the right to recover from all damages awarded 
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Teurlings for the compensation it had paid to Teurlings." Id. Mr. Peterson also stated, 
"[i]f Teurlings and Larson are interested in settling the case, my clients are willing to 
participate in settlement negotiations." Id. Ms. Martinez's counsel responded to 
correspondence from Mr. Peterson keeping him apprised of the status of the stay of the 
litigation as a result of Ms. Martinez's deployment to active duty. (See Peterson Aff., 
Exh(s). C & E). After the stay was lifted, Mr. Peterson sent letters on January 9, 2012 
and March 7, 2012, stating that Swift was still asserting its subrogation interest and 
asking to be included in any mediation or other efforts to settle the case. (See id. at 
Exh(s). F & G). 
To date, no settlement discussions of any kind have taken place and 
mediation has not been scheduled in this case. (See Affidavit of Sonyalee R. Nutsch, 
6/4/12, 1 4). Had such discussions occurred or a mediation been scheduled, as a 
significant subrogation claimant, defense counsel would have insisted that Mr. Peterson 
been involved so that a global Release could have been obtained should settlement have 
occurred. See id. at 15. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. SWIFT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT SHOULD BE DENIED 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) requires the following be met for an 
applicant to be allowed to intervene as a matter of right: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
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intervene in an action: ( 1) when a statute of the state of Idaho 
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant 
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede applicant's ability to protect 
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
Swift argues in its Memorandum that Idaho Code §72-223 is the Idaho 
statute which confers the unconditional right of Swift to intervene in this matter. 
Specifically, Swift argues that "Idaho Code §72-223(3) confers on an employee the right 
to join an action between its employee and a third party tortfeasor to recover damages." 
(Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, 5/25/2012, p. 6). 
Idaho Code §72-223(3) states an "[a]ction may be instituted against such 
third party by the employee, or in event compensation has been claimed and awarded, by 
the employee and employer jointly, in the employee's name, or, if the employee refuses to 
participate in such action, by the employer in the employee's name." Fourth Judicial 
District, Judge Darla Williamson, recently addressed whether Idaho Code §72-223(3) 
gives an employer who has paid workers' compensation benefits the right to join a 
personal injury suit brought against a third party by its employee. In holding that the 
statute did not confer such a right, Judge Williamson stated: 
The Plaintiff cites to Idaho Code section 72-223(2) in support 
of his argument that the City should be named as a plaintiff. 
Section 72-223(2) states: "Action may be instituted against 
such third party by the employee, or in the event 
compensation has been claimed and awarded, by the 
employee and employer jointly, in the employee's name, or, if 
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the employee refuses to participate m such action, by the 
employer in the employee's name." 
Nothing in section 72-223(2) gives the City the right to join 
this action as a named party. It gives the City the right to 
institute an action against a third party, here Ada County, but 
only in the employee's name. This section in fact appears to 
contradict the Plaintiffs argument because it says that the 
City may only sue in the employee's name. The Court 
therefore denies the Plaintiffs Motion to Add Boise City as a 
Party. 
Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics, 2009 WL 7366868, p.5 (Idaho Dist.) (attached as 
Appendix A). 
Because there is no Idaho statute that confers an unconditional right for 
Swift to intervene in this case, in order to do so, Swift must show that it has such an 
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject matter of the case that 
disposition of the action may impair or impede Swift's ability to protect that interest 
unless Swift's interest is being adequately represented by existing parties. See I.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2). 
Although we have no Idaho case addressing whether a subrogation claimant 
who has a right of recovery if a judgment is awarded in a personal injury case meets the 
criteria of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), the Supreme Court of Virginia did 
recently address the issue with a similar rule in Hudson v. Jarrett, 606 S.E.2d 827 (2005). 
In Hudson the court held that neither the employer nor the employer's workers' 
compensation carrier was entitled to intervene in the underlying personal injury case. 
The court held: 
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The claim of the intervenors in this case is limited to the 
protection of their right to reimbursement from the 
employee's third-party recovery for the amounts paid in 
compensation benefits. . . . In other words, Signal and 
Universal have a lien on any proceeds Hudson may recover in 
his action against Jarrett and Cooper, but Signal and 
Universal do not have a cause of action against Jarrett and 
Cooper based on Hudson's injuries .... 
In their motion to intervene and motion for judgment in this 
case, Signal and Universal did not raise a claim against 
Hudson, Jarrett, or Cooper. The only relief sought was entry 
of a judgment against any proceeds awarded to Hudson for 
the amount of the workers' compensation paid Hudson. 
Furthermore, on brief and at oral argument, the intervenors 
stated that they "do not want to participate in the trial." They 
seek only to "follow" the trial and "be assured" their lien is 
protected. 
While intervention under Rule 3: 19 is within the discretion of 
the trial court, the intervention must meet the requirements of 
the Rule. The allegations of the intervenors here fall far short 
of showing any claim that they could assert as a plaintiff or 
defendant that is germane to the issues in the tort case. 
Hudson, 606 S.E.2d at 831 (internal citations omitted). 
Even if this Court were to determine that a subrogation claim is an 
independent claim that complies with the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a)(2), Swift has failed to demonstrate that its interest is not adequately being 
represented by the plaintiff in this case. Swift argues that "[i]t is proper to allow 
intervention where an applicant shows merely that he 'may' be bound by the judgment or 
representation as to him 'may' be inadequate." (See Memo. in Support, p. 5). Swift cites 
Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 302 (1974) as support for this proposition. See id. Duff, 
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however, was decided based on a previous version of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a)(2) which contained significantly different language. The current version of Rule 
24(a)(2) does not contain the word "may" to modify the showing required whereas the 
previous version of the rule did. See Duff, 96 Idaho at 301. The current version of Rule 
24(a)(2) simply states if the additional requirements of the rule are met, intervention will 
be allowed "unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
In The Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 2008 WL 41890006 (Idaho 
Dist.)(attached as appendix B), Third Judicial District Judge Thomas Ryan looked to 
federal case law for guidance in determining what is required to prove whether the 
intervening applicant's interest are being adequately represented by the existing parties. 
Judge Ryan held: 
There are three factors used in determining the adequacy of 
representation: ( 1) whether the interest of a present party is 
such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed 
intervenor's arguments; (2) whether the present party is 
capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether 
a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to 
the proceeding that other parties would neglect. Arakaki v. 
Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir.2003) .... 
The most important factor in determining the adequacy of 
representation is how the interest compares with the interests 
of existing parties. Id. When an applicant for intervention 
and an existing party have the same ultimate objective, a 
presumption of adequacy of representation arises. Id. If 
the applicant's interest is identical to that of one of the 
present parties, a compelling showing should be required 
to demonstrate inadequate representation. Id. 
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The Vanderford Co., Inc., 2008 WL 41890006 at p. 3. 
Plaintiff pied all economic damages in his Complaint and has asserted the Workers' 
Compensation lien as part of his damage calculations during discussions with defense 
counsel. (See Nutsch Aff., ,i,i 3-4). Because Swift has a subrogation claim against any 
recovery plaintiff may obtain in this case, plaintiff and Swift's interest are identical. 
Swift and plaintiffs share the same interest of obtaining the largest recovery possible for 
plaintiffs alleged injuries in this action. Swift has failed to show that plaintiff will not 
make all arguments necessary to assert a claim for the economic damages paid by Swift 
or that Swift would offer any necessary element to the proceedings that plaintiffs counsel 
would neglect. See The Vanderford Co., Inc., 2008 WL 41890006 at p. 3. 
Failing to respond to correspondence that requests to be involved m 
settlement discussions or mediation when neither has occurred, is not enough to 
overcome the presumption of adequate representation that exists because plaintiff and 
Swift's interest in this case are identical. (See id; see also Nutsch Aff., ,i 4). Therefore, 
plaintiffs Motion to Intervene as a Matter of Right should be denied. 
B. SWIFT'S MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION SHOULD BE DENIED 
Swift asserts that if this Court denies its Motion to Intervene as a Matter of 
Right, it should be entitled to permissive intervention. (See Memo. in Support, p. 7). 
Permissive intervention is permitted: "(l) when a statute confers a conditional right to 
intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a 
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question of law or fact in common .... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider 
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of 
the original parties." I.R.C.P. 24(b). In support of permissive intervention, Swift repeats 
its argument that Idaho Code §72-223(3) confers on an applicant "the right to join an 
action between its employee and a third-party tortfeasor" and is therefore also the Idaho 
statute which confers a conditional right to intervene as required by Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(b ). (See Memo. in Support, p. 7). As explained supra, Judge Williamson 
specifically rejected the argument that Idaho Code §72-223(3) confers on an employer 
the right to join an action between the employee and third-party tortfeasor and found that 
once the action is brought by the employee, the exact opposite is true. See Ruffing v, 
2009 WL 7366868, at p.5. 
In the alternative, Swift argues that its subrogation claim is a separate claim 
or defense that has a question of law or fact in common with the main action because its 
claim "goes to damages in the present action ... " and "[p ]ursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
223(3), Applicant has all the claims or defenses in the main action as the Plaintiff against 
Defendant." (Memo. in Support, p. 7). Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) however only states that 
"[i]f compensation has been claimed and awarded, the employer having paid such 
compensation or having become liable therefor, shall be subrogated to the rights of the 
employee, to recover against such third party to the extent of the employer's 
compensation liability." 
Nothing in the statute allows for the employer to bring a separate claim 
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against the allegedly negligent third party once the employee has already filed the 
Complaint. Swift's right of subrogation as to the amount it has paid plaintiff as workers' 
compensation benefits has no bearing on the legal and factual determinations that must be 
made as to whether or not Ms. Martinez can be found liable in this matter. 
Finally, the last sentence of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) states that 
"the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the rights of the original parties." Because the claim Swift wants to 
intervene to present in this action is part of the same claim for damages being made by 
plaintiff, the prejudice to Ms. Martinez to have to defend plaintiff and his subrogation 
provider(s) would be significant. In addition, the potential for confusion to the jury of 
having duplicate claims presented would also create undue delay and prejudice. If a 
subrogation claim was enough to justify permissive intervention, a trial could easily 
consist of evidence presented by the plaintiff and every medical insurer, workers 
compensation insurer and other carriers who paid any moneys in the aftermath of an 
accident to the plaintiff. This is not the type of claim or party for which intervention 
should be permitted and Swift's Motion in the Alternative for Permissive Intervention, 
should be denied. 
C. SWIFT'S MOTION FOR INTERVENTION SHOULD BE DENIED FOR FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH I.R.C.P. 24(c) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c) states that "[a] person desiring to 
intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon all parties affected thereby. The motion 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 





shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the 
claim or defense for which intervention is sought." 
Swift has failed to accompany their Motion to Intervene with a pleading 
setting forth the claim or defenses for which intervention is sought as required by the 
rules. Perhaps this is because the pleading would be identical to the plaintiffs Complaint 




Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that Swift's Motion 
to Intervene be denied. 
DATED this 4th day of June 2012. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO SWIFT 
TRANSPORTATION'S MOTION 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
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2009 WL 7366868 (Idaho Dist.) 
H 
Idaho District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District. 
Ada County 
Charles RUFFING, an individual, Plaintiff, 
V. 
ADA COUNTY PARAMEDICS, Barbara Lindy McPherson, and John Does I through II, Defendants. 
No. CV Pl 0500246. 
November 20, 2009. 
Page 1 
Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Defendants' Motions in Limine and Plaintiffs Motion to add Boise 
City as a Party 
Darla Williamson, District Judge. 
Hearing on Defendants' Motions in Limine, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, and Plaintiffs Motion to Add Boise City 
as a Party were heard on November 18, 2009. Richard S. Owen argued on behalf of Plaintiff, and Ray J. Chacko and 
James K. Dickenson on behalf of Defendants. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Before the Court at the November 18, 2009, hearing were three motions. The Court took Defendants' Motions in 
Limine and Plaintiffs Motion to Add Boise City as a Party under advisement. The Court ruled from the bench on 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, directing counsel for Plaintiff to submit an order to the Court ordering Defendants to 
tum over the training records for Defendant Barbara McPherson by November 20, 2009. The Court also ordered 
Plaintiff to produce the personnel files for Barbara McPherson to the Court by November 20, 2009, so that the Court 
could conduct and in-camera review of the files. 
I) DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
Defendants have filed four Motions in Limine: 1) Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence (l.R.E.) 407; 2) Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Pursuant to I.R.E. 409; 3) Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Expert Testimony of Parker Sheehan; and 4) Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Karen 
Meredith. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A motion in limine enables a judge to rule on evidence without first exposing the evidence to the jury, thus avoiding 
juror bias that may be generated by objections to the evidence during trial and allows counsel, on both sides, to 
make strategic decisions before the trial concerning the context and order of the evidence to be presented. Davidson 
v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560,563,733 p.2d 781, 784 (1986): State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 120, 29 P.3d 949,956 
{2001). I.RE. 103{c) directs that proceedings shall be conducted so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being 
suggested to the jury, to the extent practicable. The trial court may reconsider a motion in limine at any time, includ-
ing when the actual presentation of facts is made. Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 605, 83 P.3d 773, 779 (2003). 
The court has considerable discretion in excluding evidence if it will be prejudicial or lead to confusion of the jury. 
Burgess v. Navistar Int'/ Trasp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 827 P.2d 790. 
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ANALYSIS 
1) Motion to Exclude Evidence Pursuant to I.R.E. 407 
Defendants argue that pursuant to I.R.E. 407 Plaintiff may not present evidence at trial that Ada County installed 
backing cameras and monitors in a number of ambulances, including the ambulance involved in this incident, after 
the incident involving the Plaintiff. I.R.E. 407 provides, in relevant part, "[ w ]hen, after an injury or harm allegedly 
caused by an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, 
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct... ." The rule does 
allow such evidence if offered for other purposes, such as "proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precaution-
ary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." 
Plaintiff responded that he would seek to introduce evidence of backing monitors subsequently installed not as evi-
dence of a remedial measure, but to demonstrate that the ambulances used by Ada County were not all the same. 
Plaintiff argues this evidence will go to how the Plaintiff interacted with the ambulance. However, when questioned 
at the hearing on November 18, 2009, counsel for Plaintiff did not know whether the Plaintiff knew at the time of 
the incident whether the ambulance in question had a backing camera installed or not. It appears that the prejudicial 
effect of the jury knowing that Ada County installed backing monitors after the incident with the Plaintiff will out-
weigh any probative value of the evidence as to the Plaintiffs interaction with the ambulance. The court therefore 
finds that evidence of such subsequent remedial measure is inadmissible under I.R.E. 407. 
2) Motion to Exclude Evidence Pursuant to I.R.E. 409 
The second evidence that Defendants argue is inadmissible, pursuant to I.R.E. 409, is evidence that Ada County paid 
money to a third party who owned a car that was struck and damaged during the same incident as the Plaintiff. I.R.E. 
409 states that "[e]vidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital, funeral , or similar ex-
penses occasioned by an injury or death, or damage to or loss of property of another, is not admissible to prove li-
ability for the injury, death, or damage." 
Plaintiff concedes that the evidence is not admissible to prove lfability or culpability. The Plaintiff argues, however, 
that evidence of the payment is admissible to demonstrate that it is a policy of Ada County to assume responsibility 
for any damage their ambulances caused. The Plaintiff argues the fact that the Defendants have denied any responsi-
bility or liability for the injury to the Plaintiff demonstrates an inconsistency with the policy of Ada County and 
should be brought to the attention of the jury. 
Such evidence would be evidence that Ada County furnished payment for damage to property of another and there-
fore under I.R.E. 409 is not admissible to prove liability for the injury caused to the Plaintiff. Plaintiffs argument 
that an inconsistency is demonstrated by Ada County paying for the car but not paying the Plaintiff is without merit. 
That argument assumes that that Ada County paying for the damage to the car means that it assumes liability for the 
damage. The argument also fails to consider the fact that Ada County has denied all liability in the incident involv-
ing the Plaintiff, and has alleged that the Plaintiff was at least contributorily negligent. Therefore, any probative 
value the evidence may have for other reasons such as demonstrating any policies of Ada County seems to be out-
weighed by the prejudicial effect of appearing that Ada County had admitted liability. The court finds that evidence 
of payment to the third party for damage to the vehicle is inadmissible under I.R.E. 409. 
3) Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony of Parker Sheehan and Karen Meredith 
Defendants have filed two Motions in Limine to exclude testimony, pursuant to I.R.E. 702, by two of Plaintiffs 
named experts: Parker Sheehan and Karen Meredith. Defendants argue that both witnesses should not be allowed to 
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testify as experts because they are not qualified and because their testimony will be based on speculation and unsub-
stantiated facts. 
The court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert. Weeks v. Eastern Idaho 
Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 837 153 P.3d 1180. 1183 (2007). The rule governing the admissibility of expert 
testimony is I.R.E. 702, which states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." A party seeking to 
offer expert testimony must first demonstrate that the witness is qualified as an expert on the matter at hand. State v. 
Hopkins, 113 Idaho 679,680, 747 P.2d 88, 89 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987_} (internal citation omitted). The party seeking to 
put on expert testimony has the burden of demonstrating that the witness is qualified as an expert. Weeks, 143 Idaho 
at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183. Ifa witness is determined to be qualified as an expert, the court must next determine if the 
testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. Hopkins, 113 Idaho at 680-81. 747 P.2d at 89-
90. A two part analysis must therefore be conducted to determine if an expert may testify at trial: 1) whether the 
individual is qualified; and 2) whether the testimony to be proffered is admissible. 
i) Qualification of Witness as an Expert 
A witness is qualified to testify as an expert if he or she has specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in 
understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. Jones v. Jones, 117 Idaho 621, 627. 790 P.2d 914, 920 
(1990). In determining if an expert is qualified, the court should also take into account I.R.E. 703. Egbert v. Idaho 
State Ins. Fund, 125 Idaho 678. 680, 873 P.2d 1332, 1334 (1994). I.RE. 703 states: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived 
by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence 
in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be dis-
closed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value 
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
The court may allow an expert to render an opinion based in part on hearsay or other inadmissible evidence if the 
expert testifies as to the specific basis of his or her opinion and reaches an opinion through his or her own independ-
ent judgment. Egbert, 125 Idaho at 680, 873 P.2d at 1334. 
The Egbert case is factually similar to the proffered testimony of Karen Meredith. In Egbert, there was an automo-
bile accident resulting in injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 679, 1333. The trial court refused to admit testimony of a claim 
supervisor for the State Insurance Fund regarding an estimate of the future medical and disability benefits that the 
State Insurance Fund would pay to the plaintiff. Id. The grounds of the rejection were that the claims supervisor did 
not have the medical expertise that was necessary to lay a foundation for the estimates. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court 
found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to allow the testimony. Id. at 680, 1334. However, 
the Court stated that it would have been proper to allow the claims supervisor to testify as to future payments for 
medical procedures based on a review of the claim file, and medical reports and evaluations contained in the file, in 
estimating future payments. Id. The court held that it was proper to refuse to allow the testimony because it had not 
been proven that the plaintiff was completely disabled. Id. The court reasoned that the claims supervisor could not 
resolve the disputed issue of whether the plaintiff was fully medically disabled because that determination had to be 
established through medical testimony. Id. 
This case differs from Egbert in that Karen Meredith, a claims adjuster, is not going to testify as to whether the 
Plaintiff is injured or whether it is her opinion that the Plaintiff will need future medical procedures. According to 
her report, Meredith is only testifying as to the costs of two particular future medical procedures. As the Court stated 
in Egbert, Meredith is qualified, as a claims adjuster, to look at medical reports or a claim file and determine the 
costs of future medical procedures. Defendants' argument that because Meredith does not know who creates the 
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"CPT Codes," which are given to medical procedures so that they can be billed and labeled, she is not qualified to 
testify as an expert is without merit. The fact that Meredith does not know who creates a five-digit code does not 
affect her ability to testify as a claims adjuster. Similarly, Defendants' argument that because Meredith cannot ex-
plain the technical procedures involved in the two knee surgeries she is not qualified is equally without merit. Mere-
dith does not need to know how to perform a knee arthroplasty in order to testify as to what its standard cost is and 
how it is billed. Meredith is qualified to testify as an expert with regards to the information contained in her report. 
Defendants also seek to prohibit expert testimony from Captain Parker Sheehan, a training and safety officer with 
the Boise Fire Department. Defendants argue that Sheehan's report exceeds the scope of his expertise as it makes 
conclusions regarding the physical mechanics of an automobile accident and relies on scientific analysis of speed, 
distance, acceleration, and response times. Sheehan does admit in his deposition that he doesn't know where the am-
bulance was situated, how fast it was moving, or whether there was sufficient time for the Plaintiff to move clear. 
The fact that Sheehan was not at the scene when the incident occurred does not prevent him from testifying as an 
expert. However, it appears that it may be appropriate to limit the sphere of testimony somewhat for Sheehan. See 
Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 54, 995 P.2d 816, 824 (2000) (finding that social 
worker was not qualified to testify as an expert on particular issue but was qualified to testify to another issue). 
Sheehan is not qualified to testify as to the cause of the accident, how fast the ambulance was moving, or whether 
the Plaintiff could have successfully gotten out of the way. It appears that based on Sheehan's training, his testimony 
will be limited to the training received by firefighters in backing techniques and whether it appears from the evi-
dence Sheehan reviewed that the proper techniques were followed in this case. 
ii) Admissibility of Testimony 
After a witness is qualified as an expert, the court must determine if the expert opinion testimony will assist the trier 
of fact in understanding the evidence. Hopkins, 113 Idaho at 679-80, 747 P.2d at 89-90. If the testimony is compe-
tent and relevant, it may be admissible with the trier of fact weighing its credibility. Id at 681, 90. An expert opinion 
that is speculative or unsubstantiated by the record is not admissible because it would not assist the trier of fact in 
understanding the evidence. Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of!daho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 72 
(2003). There must be a scientific basis for the expert's opinion and if the reasoning or methodology is not scientifi-
cally sound, the testimony is not admissible. Id. 
It appears as though at least some of the information contained in Meredith's report, and what she plans to testify to 
at trial, is based on reasoning or methodology that may or may not be scientifically sound. Meredith's report contains 
the costs for two procedures: knee arthroplasty (procedure one) and patella femoral joint replacement (procedure 
two). The report also contains an estimate of time off of work following each procedure, as well as a "PPI rating," or 
lower extremity impairment rating, for each procedure. In her deposition, Meredith states that her cost estimate and 
PPI rating for procedure one are based on two prior claims for the same procedure, but that she does not know what 
Ruffing's PPI rating would actually be. With respect to procedure two, Meredith stated that here cost estimate and 
PPI rating were guesses and that she obtained the figures from lowering them somewhat from procedure one. 
However, at the hearing on November 18, 2009, Plaintiffs counsel stated that he could lay a sufficient foundation to 
allow Meredith to state that she had conducted these types of estimates many times in the past and that the estimates 
in her report are educated guesses based on her training and expertise. The Court will wait until trial when Meredith 
is on the stand to determine if counsel for Plaintiff has laid a sufficient foundation to allow Meredith to testify as to 
specifics of her report. 
With respect to the testimony of Sheehan, as long as his testimony is limited to the backing procedures of the de-
partment and his opinion as to whether those procedures were followed, Sheehan's testimony is admissible. Sheehan 
has extensive training in safety procedures and stated in his deposition that if anyone in the department had a ques-
tion regarding backing, he is who they would call. There is therefore a reliable basis for the opinion and the opinion 
will assist the jury in understanding the evidence. 
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
 
298
2009 WL 7366868 (Idaho Dist.) Page 5 
2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ADD BOISE CITY AS A PARTY 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Add Boise City, pursuant to l.R.C.P. 17 and Idaho Code section 72-223, on August 4, 
2009. [FNIJ At issue in this motion is ultimately whether the City of Boise has any legal right to recover money it paid 
to the Plaintiff, over and above what it was required to pay under the Worker's Compensation Statute. The Plaintiff 
was paid his entire normal wages during his time off of work due to the injury. The City of Boise (the City) paid him 
two-thirds of his wage as required under the Worker's Compensation Statute, Idaho Code section 72-408. The City 
also paid the Plaintiff the remaining one-third of his usual salary (one-third payment) for the time he was off of work 
pursuant to a Collective Labor Agreement between the City and the Firefighter's Union (the Agreement), of which 
the Plaintiff belongs. The Plaintiff seeks to add the City as a named plaintiff in this action in order to ensure that the 
City can recover the one-third of Plaintiffs wages it paid. 
FNI. The Plaintiff has not argued that the City must be added pursuant to I.R.C.P. 24( a) so the Court will 
not address that issue. 
ANALYSIS 
The Court finds that it is not proper to add the City as a named party at this late stage before trial. Rule l 7(a), which 
provides that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," does not provide a ground 
to add the City as a party. This is a personal injury suit brought by Plaintiff Ruffing. Ruffmg is the real party in in-
terest. As Defendants have pointed out, adding the City as a named party could influence the jury by inferring liabil-
ity on the part of Ada County based on the perception of the City suing Ada County. Additionally, with the trial set 
for December 7, 2009, adding the City as a named party could lead to discovery issues and complications, over and 
above the discovery issues that already plague this case. 
The Plaintiff cites to Idaho Code section 72-223(2) in support of his argument that the City should be named as a 
plaintiff. Section 72-223(2) states: "Action may be instituted against such third party by the employee, or in the 
event compensation has been claimed and awarded, by the employee and employer jointly, in the employee's name, 
or, if the employee refuses to participate in such action, by the employer in the employee's name." Nothing in 
section 72-223(2) gives the City the right to join this action as a named party. It gives the City the right to institute 
an action against a third party, here Ada County, but only in the employee's name. This section in fact appears to 
contradict the Plaintiffs argument because it says that the City may only sue in the employee's name. The Court 
therefore denies the Plaintiffs Motion to Add Boise City as a Party. However, as discussed below, the decision not 
to add the City as a named party does not foreclose the ability of the City to recover its one-third payment. 
The Court will first address the Defendants' argument that the Agreement is unconstitutional. The Defendants argue 
that because the term of the Agreement is from April 1, 2002, to March 31, 2006, it violates Article VIII, Section 3 
of the Idaho Constitution. Article VIII, Section 3 prohibits a city from incurring any debt or liability beyond the fis-
cal year. Any indebtedness or liability incurred beyond a year is void, unless it is incurred as an ordinary and neces-
sary expense authorized by the general laws of the state. IDAHO CONST. art. VIIT § 3. There is no dispute that the 
Agreement obligates the City to a liability beyond a year. The issue therefore is whether the Agreement falls within 
the "ordinary and necessary" exception to Article VIII, Section 3. 
There does not appear to be any Idaho case law directly addressing whether payment of wages for a work-related 
injury above that required by worker's compensation is an ordinary and necessary expense. However, there are cases 
that are analogous. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that employment contracts for city officers and employees for 
more than one year can be ordinary and necessary expenses. Ray v. Nampa School District No. 131, 120 Idaho 117, 
120 182 P.2d 17, 20 (1991) citing Butler v. Lewiston, 11 Idaho 393, 83 P. 234 (1905). The court has also held that 
the establishment of a policeman's retirement fund was an ordinary and necessary expense because it was merely an 
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extension of the city's compensation scheme. Id. citing Hanson v. City of!daho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 446 P.2d 634 
(1968). However, the general test, as recently articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court, is that an expense must be 
both ordinary and necessary. City of Boise v. Frazier 143 Idaho 1, 4, 137 P.3d 388,391 (2006). An expense is ordi-
nary "if in the ordinary course of municipal business ... it may be and is likely to become necessary. Id. (citation 
omitted). An expense is necessary if there exists "a necessity for making the expenditure at or during such a year." 
Id. at 5, 392. 
The Defendants argue that the payment is not ordinary because it is not "salary" but really a bonus paid to injured 
firefighters. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. Here the city is paying the full salary to an injured fire-
fighter. Based on the hazardous nature of the job, firefighters may often become injured and receive full salary pay-
ment under the agreement. The expense is ordinary as it becomes required in the ordinary course of municipal busi-
ness to maintain experienced firefighters. 
The Agreement also meets the necessity prong. If a firefighter is injured, there is a necessity that the City pays the 
firefighter the one-third amount during the year of the injury because that is when the firefighter is unable to work 
and requires the payment. The purpose of compensating the firefighter while he or she is unable to work would not 
be accomplished if the firefighter was not paid until a subsequent year; when he or she may then be able to work and 
earn his or her typical wage. 
Finding that the Agreement is an ordinary and necessary expense is supported by the Hanson case, where the court 
found that a policeman's retirement fund was an ordinary and necessary expense because it was an extension of the 
city's compensation scheme. While this case does not involve a retirement fund, payment under the Agreement can 
be seen as merely an extension of the City's compensation scheme. Firefighters have a unique job with more risks 
and dangers than other positions. It is therefore logical that firefighters could receive additional compensation above 
that required by Worker's Compensation statutes. Compensation for work-related injuries is not the only area where 
firefighters receive special treatment. Under Idaho Code section 72-1401 through 1444 firemen receive special re-
tirement benefits that other state or city employees do not receive. Under Idaho Code section 67-820, flags at gov-
ernment buildings are to be flown at half staff on the death of a firefighter who died in the line of duty. 
The Court finds that payment under the Agreement is ordinary and necessary and therefore constitutional under 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. 
It must next be determined if the City has any legal right to recover payments it made to the Plaintiff pursuant to the 
Agreement. Both parties admit that there is no provision in the Agreement itself requiring the Plaintiff to pay back 
the City. The City must therefore attempt to recover under an equitable principal such as subrogation or indemnity. 
The Plaintiff argues that the City has a subrogated right to all money it paid to the Plaintiff under Worker's Compen-
sation, Idaho Code section 72-223(3). That section states: "[i]f compensation has been claimed and awarded, the 
employer having paid such compensation or having become liable therefore, shall be subrogated to the rights of the 
employee, to recover against such third party to the extent of the employer's compensation liability." Under section 
72-223(3) the employer can subrogate to the employee's recovery against a third party and obtain a reimbursement 
of the worker's compensation benefits it paid. Schneider v. Farmers Merchant, Inc., 106 Idaho 241, 244 ( 678 P .2d 
33, 36 (1983). It is clear that the City has a subrogated interest in the two-thirds of the Plaintiffs salary it paid pursu-
ant to the Worker's Compensation laws. It is not clear, however, whether the City has a subrogated interest under 
section 72-223(3) in the one-third of the Plaintiffs salary it paid pursuant to the Agreement. 
There does not appear to be any case law discussing whether benefits paid above those required by worker's com-
pensation qualify for subrogation under section 72-223(3). The term "compensation," as used in section 72-223(3), 
is defined broadly to mean "any or all of the income benefits and the medical and related benefits and medical ser-
vices." LC. § 72-102(7). The phrase "any or all of the income benefits" could be interpreted to include the excess 
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money paid by the City pursuant to the Agreement. However, there are many detailed and specific statutes that gov-
ern worker's compensation and exactly how much to pay, when, and to whom. It does not appear that section 72-
223(3) was intended to cover money paid above that required by Worker's Compensation. The Plaintiff therefore 
does not have a subrogated interest in the one-third payment made pursuant to the Agreement under section 72-
223 (3). 
The Plaintiff will therefore have to rely on an equitable remedy. Both indemnity and subrogation are equitable prin-
ciples that one compelled to pay damages caused by another can seek recovery from that party. May Trucking Co. v. 
International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319, 320, 543 P.2d 1159, 1160 0975). The doctrine of equitable subrogation 
is the substitution of one person for another, so that he may succeed to the rights of the creditor in relation to the 
debt or claim. Williams v. Johnson. 92 Idaho 292, 298, 442 P.2d 178, 184 (1968) (internal citation omitted). Equita-
ble subrogation allows the one who paid money on behalf of another to be substituted in place of the party the 
money was paid on behalf of, without any express agreement. May Trucking. 97 Idaho at 321, 543 P.2d at 1161. 
There is no general rule as to when the doctrine should apply; rather its application depends on the facts and circum-
stances of each case in order to serve the ends of justice. Williams, at 299, 185. The party seeking subrogation must 
have been under an obligation to make the payment. Id. A person that was merely a volunteer cannot invoke the aid 
of subrogation. Id 
In this case, the City paid the Plaintiff one-third of his usual salary during his time off of work. The City was con-
tractually obligated to make that payment under the Agreement. It appears that it would serve the ends of justice to 
allow the City to subrogate and recover the money that it paid. This would also prevent the Plaintiff from receiving 
double recovery since he will not be allowed to keep the money damages as well as the compensation he was al-
ready paid. The City does not have to be a party to this litigation in order to recover the one-third payment made 
under the Agreement because it has an equitable right to be subrogated against any recovery the Plaintiff receives in 
this action. The City is also adequately represented in the case as counsel for Plaintiff is also representing the City. 
The Court finds that the City will have the right to recover its one-third payment through the doctrine of equitable 
subrogation and it is therefore not necessary to add the City as a party. 
The doctrine of indemnity is not available to the City in this case because the statute of limitations has run. A pri-
mary distinction between the equitable doctrines of subrogation and indemnification is the effect each has on the 
statute oflimitation. May Trucking. 97 Idaho at 321, 543 P.2d at 1161. A claim of subrogation is derivative and is 
subject to the same statute of limitation as though the action were sued on by the indemnitor. Id. The statute of limi-
tation for an indemnity action, however, begins to run from the time of payment by the indemnitee. Id. at 322, 1162. 
This case is a personal injury lawsuit and therefore the statute of limitations to bring a claim is two years pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 5-219(4). The accident involving the Plaintiff occurred in 2004 and therefore the statute of limi-
tations would have run in 2006. Plaintiff brought this action within the statute and therefore a claim for subrogation 
can still be brought because it is derivative and subject to the same statute of limitation. The statute of limitation for 
an indemnity action, however began to run with the City (indemnitee) paid the Plaintiff the one-third payment under 
the agreement. This occurred in 2004 or 2005, meaning that the statute of limitation had run at the latest in 2007. 
The City is therefore precluded from seeking repayment under the equitable doctrine of indemnity; however, it can 
recover under the equitable doctrine of subrogation through the plaintiff of having filed his claim within the statute 
of limitations .. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' Motion to Exclude Evidence pursuant to Rule 407 and 409 is granted. The expert testimony of Karen 
Meredith and Captain Parker Sheehan is limited as stated herein. The Plaintiffs Motion to add the City as a party is 
denied. The City's interests are protected under the equitable doctrine of subrogation. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
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Dated this 20th day of November 2009 
<<signature>> 
Darla Williamson, District Judge 
Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics 
2009 WL 7366868 (Idaho Dist. ) (Trial Order) 
END OF DOCUMENT 








2008 WL 4189006 (Idaho Dist.) 
H 
Idaho District Court, 
Third Judicial District. 
Payette County 
Page 1 
THE VANDERFORD COMP ANY, INC., a Nevada corporation; and Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation, fka Vanderford Center, Inc., Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants, 
V. 
Paul KNUDSON, personally and Individually, Austin Homes, LLC., a Utah limited liability Company, J.r. Devel-
opment, LLC A Utah limited liability Company, and John Does 1-20, Defendants; 
andThe Pines Townhomes, LLC, an Idaho limited liability, Defendant-Counterclaimant, 
West Headnotes 
Parties 287 ~40(7) 
287 Parties 
andRichard I. Greif and Jody Greif, Defendants-Counterclaimants. 
No. CV-OC 0l-7380*D. 
January 24, 2008. 
2871V New Parties and Change of Parties 
287k37 Intervention 
287k40 Persons Entitled to Intervene 
287k40(7) k. Persons Primarily or Ultimately Liable. Most Cited Cases 
Insurer for defendants-counterclaimants was not entitled to intervene in lawsuit, where insurer had no interest relat-
ing to the property or transaction that was the subject of the action. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 24. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Ion to Upon Motion to Intervene 
Thomas J. Ryan, District Judge. 
This matter came on for hearing on December 20, 2007 upon State Farm's Motion and Verified Petition for Leave to 
Intervene. Mr. Jeffrey A. Thomson presented oral argument on behalf of State Farm. Mr. Douglas J. Parry presented 
oral argument on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. William F. Lee presented oral argument on behalf of Paul Knudson. 
Mr. R. Brad Masingill presented oral argument on behalf of the Greifs. 
The Court has reviewed the written briefs submitted on behalf of the parties and considered the oral arguments pre-
sented and finds as follows: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On July 13, 2007, the Supreme Court filed its Opinion in the above-entitled case remanding the case for a new trial. 
On August 17, 2007, State Farm filed its Motion and Verified Petition for Leave to Intervene. On September 17, 
2007, the plaintiffs filed their Reply Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's Motion for Leave to Intervene. On 
September 19, 2007, defendant Knudson filed his Memorandum concurring with Plaintiffs' opposition to State 
Farm's Motion. 
LAW 
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l.R.C.P. 24 provides: 
(a) Intervention of right. 
Page 2 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the state of Idaho 
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as 
a practical matter impair or impede applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties. 
(b) Permissive intervention. 
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional 
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in 
common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order admin-
istered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement 
issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be per-
mitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will 
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 
(c) Procedure. 
A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon all parties affected thereby. The motion shall 
state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which inter-
vention is sought. 
The procedural decision to grant a motion to intervene is governed by 
Rule 24 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to intervene 
is a matter of discretion. Farrellv. Board o(Com'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378,383, 64 P.3d 304 (2002). 
Interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is guided by the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in federal cases. Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270,275,723 P.2d 814 (1986). Part of the reason for 
adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Idaho, and interpreting our own rules adopted from the federal 
courts as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, was to establish a uniform practice and procedure in both the 
federal and state courts in the State of Idaho. Id. 
To intervene as ofright under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). the applicant must claim an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and that the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's inter-
est is adequately represented by existing parties. U.S. v. Alisa/ Water Corp .. 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.2004). 
In particular, an applicant for intervention as of right is required to demonstrate that (1) it has a significant protect-
able interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the disposition of the action 
may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; (3) the application is timely; 
and (4) the existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interest. Id. The party seeking to intervene 
bears the burden of showing that all the requirements for intervention have been met. Id. 
In determining whether intervention is appropriate, courts are guided primarily by practical and equitable considera-
tions, and the requirements for intervention are broadly interpreted in favor of intervention. Id. 
Protectable Interest 
To trigger a right to intervene, however, an economic interest must be concrete and related to the underlying subject 
matter of the action. U.S. v. Alisa/ Water Corp .. 370 F.3d 915, 919-920 (9th Cir.2004). Regardless of the phase of 
litigation at which an interest arises, that interest must be related to the underlying subject matter of the litigation. Id. 
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An applicant has a significant protectable interest in an action if (1) it asserts an interest that is protected under some 
law, and (2) there is a relationship between its legally protected interest and the plaintiffs claims. Southern Califor-
nia Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 802-803 (9th Cir.2002). The relationship requirement is met if the resolution 
of the plaintiffs claims actually will affect the applicant. Id. The interest test is not a clear-cut or bright-line rule, 
because no specific legal or equitable interest need be established. Id. Instead, the interest test directs courts to make 
a practical, threshold inquiry, and is primarily a practical guide to disposing oflawsuits by involving as many appar-
ently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process. Id. 
Adequacy of Representation 
There are three factors used in determining the adequacy of representation: ( 1) whether the interest of a present party 
is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor's arguments; (2) whether the present party is capa-
ble and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements 
to the proceeding that other parties would neglect. Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir.2003). If an 
absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he should, as a 
general rule, be entitled to intervene. Id The burden on proposed intervenors in showing inadequate representation 
is minimal, and would be satisfied if they could demonstrate that representation of their interests may be inadequate. 
Id. 
The most important factor in determining the adequacy ofrepresentation is how the interest compares with the inter-
ests of existing parties. Id. When an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same ultimate objec-
tive, a presumption of adequacy ofrepresentation arises. Id. If the applicant's interest is identical to that of one of the 
present parties, a compelling showing should be required to demonstrate inadequate representation. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
State Farm argues that it insured and provided the Griefs a defense under an insurance policy and paid attorney fees 
and costs through trial and post judgment motions in the original trial in this matter. Following the trial and while 
the appeal was pending, State Farm and Richard Grief agreed that the judgment entered against the Griefs was not 
covered under the policy and that State Farm had no further duty to defend. State Farm was allowed to intervene in 
the appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the verdict and remanded the case for retrial. Therefore, the determi-
nation at trial that the Griefs were a prevailing party and the award of fees was also vacated. Because of this, State 
Farm argues it has an interest in the remanded case as it will determine whether the Griefs are the prevailing parties 
and are entitled to fees. 
State Farm further asserts that the Griefs no longer have any interest in pursuing the issues relating to attorney fees 
and costs paid by State Farm in the first trial and on appeal. State Farm's rights in insuring that it recovers its costs 
for the Greifs' defense on the basis that the Greifs are the prevailing party would be adversely affected and justice 
will not be achieved without State Farm. State Farm also argues that it is not adequately represented by the existing 
parties as its interests are unique and more focused and the Griefs no longer have an interest in recovering the fees 
paid on their behalf. Lastly, State Farm points out that the Griefs have no objection to the intervening. 
The Plaintiffs, with whom Knudson concurs, argue that State Farm does not meet the requirements of IRCP 24( a)( 
2) and ( c) as State Farm does not claim an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the 
action. Specifically, the plaintiffs' argue: 1) State Farm does not claim an interest in the town homes or in the claims 
of breach of contract, fraudulent conveyance, breach of guarantee, etc., or in the Griefs' counterclaim against the 
Plaintiffs for breach of contract; 2) State Farm has no significant protectable interest in the property or transaction 
that will be impaired without its intervention; 3) the Griefs will adequately represent State Farm's interest in the out-
come of the action as they seek to prevail on their claims which will allow for an award of attorney fees; 4) State 
Farm's motion is not accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claims or defense for which intervention is sought; 
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and, 5) its inclusion in the case would greatly multiply the incomprehensibility of the case. 
The basic argument presented to the Court by State Farm is that the Griefs will not adequately protect its interest in 
attorneys fees paid by State Farm under a duty to defend provision contained in a contract of insurance between 
State Farm and the Griefs. Apparently, there were questions as to whether or not that insurance contract applied to 
the issues presented in this litigation. Ultimately, the parties to that insurance contract agreed that it did not relate to 
the issues in this litigation. That clarifies to this Court that State Farm has no "interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action". The issue of whether there was insurance coverage and a duty to de-
fend has always been between the Griefs and State Farm and does not relate to the issues presented in the pleadings 
of this case. The Griefs have every incentive to prevail upon their claims in this litigation. If they do prevail, they 
will have a claim for attorneys' fees that will have to be addressed. At that time, if State Farm does not believe that 
the Griefs are adequately protecting their interest, State Farm can seek to intervene. 
Therefore, 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that State Farm's Motion to Intervene is DENIED. 
Dated this 25th day of January, 2008. 
<<signature>> 
Thomas J. Ryan 
District Judge 
The Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson 
2008 WL 4189006 (Idaho Dist. ) (Trial Order ) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Attorneys for Applicant Swift Transportation Co., Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLIN GS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2009-0420 
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO., 
INC. 1S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO INTERVENE 
2 /1 9 
Swift Transportation Company, transacting business as Swift Transportation Co., 
Inc, (''Swift") should be allowed to intervene in this matter. Swift is an interested party who has 
a protected interest in the outcome of this litigation. Despite its attempts to remain apprised of 
the status of the pending litigation between Mr. Tuer lings and Ms. Larson, Swift has essentially 
been left in the dark. As a result, Swift felt it had no other a.lternative than to file a motion and 
supporting documentation with this Court seeking to intervene to protect its interest. 
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO., lNC.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO INTERVENE - I Clltint:2408097 .1 
 
308
Jun-08-2012 03:26 PM Moff;att Thomas 2083855384 3/19 
I. ARGUMENT 
Swift has moved this Court to inter:vene as a Plaintiff as a matter of right under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 24(a), or in the alternative under Rule 24(b), on the 
ground that it paid Teurlings' worker's compensation benefits and is thus entitled to be 
subrogated to Teurlings' recovery against Defendant, Mallory E. Larson. Under either Rule 
24(a) or Rule 24(b), Swift has satisfied the procedural requirements entitling it to intervene. 
A. Swift Is Entitled to Intervene Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(a) ns a Matter of Right Because Swift's Interests Are Not Being 
Adequately Protected, 
A motion to intervene as a matter of right should not be dismissed unless it 
appears to a certainty that the intervenor is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that could 
be provided. Willis v. Flres1one Bldg. ProducJs Co., 231 F.R.D. 447,449 (D. Conn. 2005), 
citing Reich v, ABC/York-Estate Corp., 64 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1995). Here. the Court can 
grant Swift's motion to intervene as a matter ofright in one of two ways: (1) where an Idaho 
statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or {2) when the applicant claims an interest 
relating to the property or transactio11 that is the subject of the action and the applicant is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter irnpair or impede the 
applicant's ability to protect that interest. IDAHO CODE § 24(a). 
1. Idaho Code Section 72w2:23 grants Swift the right to participate. 
Rule 24(a) permits intervention as a matter of right when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the transaction at issue and the applicant's ability to protect that interest may 
be impaired by the disposition. City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794, 803, 215 P.3d 514, 
523 (2009) {internal citations omitted). 
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. 'S REPLY lN SUPPORT OF 
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Id 
Courts have the inherent power to grant intervention to perSons 
who may be adversely affected by the outcome of a proceeding or 
when equitable principles otherwise require. See 67 A C.J.S. 
Parties 93 (2009), It is generally recognized that "courts [should] 
look with favor on intervention in a proper case, and . . . be liberal 
in permitting parties to intervene under the proper circumstances." 
Id. Ifthere is any doubt as to whether intervention is appropriate, a 
motion to intervene should usually be granted. Id. These 
principles hold true in various forms of proceedings, not just those 
involving the litigation of claims between adverse parties. 
4/19 
According to both the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and its counterpart, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. the Court has discretion to permit intervention. In determining 
whether intervention is appropriate, courts arc guided primarily by practical and equitable 
considerations, and the requirements for intervention are broadly construed in favor of 
intervention. The Vanford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 2008 WL 4189006 (ldaho 2008), citing 
U.S. Alisa/ Warer Corp., 370 F.3d 915,919 (9th Cir. 2004). 
As articulated by the Ninth Circuit, ucourts have long recog11ized a right of 
subrogation to the extent of payments made, and have permitted the employer or its insurer to 
intervene in the employee's suit to protect its right," even where the campensution was put,! 
withoUI the entry of a.formal compensation award. Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko k. Tokyo, 
528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975), citing Allen v. Texaco, Inc., 510 F.2d 977, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(emphasis added), in accord, Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 F. Supp, 461; 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd sub nom .. 
Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 866, 74 S. Ct. 137, 98 
L. Ed. 390 (1953). 
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO,, [NC. ~s REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
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Despite Defendant's contention, "[a] party seeking to intervene need not have an 
independent cause of action to be considered to have an interest within the scope of Rule 24(a)_" 
Willis, 231 F.R.D. at 449, citing Troborlch v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 530, 
92 S. Ct. 630, 30 L. Ed. 2d 686 ( 1972); Fores/ Consv. Council v. United States Forest Serv .• 66 
F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, courts have recognized that an employer's right to 
subrogation pursuant to a statutory right to reimbursement confers on an employer a right to 
intervene. id,, citing Camleyv. Aid Hasps., Inc. 975 F. Supp. 252,257 (W,D.N.Y. 1997) 
(holding workers compensation board had established a property right entitling it to intervene 
because it had paid over $46,000 for wages and medical expenses.) 
In Willis, the court held that an employer who paid worker's compensation 
benefits to its employee, a semitruck driver, was entitled to intervene in a third party action. 
Specifically, the court concl1.1ded that the statutory right to reimbursement conferred a property 
right on the employer. Id., attached hereto as Exhibit A. Here, Idaho Code Section 72 .. 223 
contemplates that an employee and employer may pursue a third party action, in the employee's 
name. IDAHO CODE§ 72-223. The statute makes clear that the employer can subrogate to the 
employee's recovery against a third party and obtain a reimbursement of the worker's 
compensation benefits it has paid. Ruffing, 2009 WL 7366868 at *6, citing Schneider v. Farmers 
Merchant, Inc:., 106 Idaho 241 1 244, 678 P,2d 33, 36 (1983); IDAHO CODE§ 72-223(3). Here, 
Swift is seeking to intervene in order to enforce its statutory right. As such. this Court should 
grant Swift's motion to intervene. 
2. Swift's interests are not adequately protected. 
Alternatively, this Court should grant Swift's motion to intervene as a matter of 
right because Swift has a protectable interest that is not being adequately represented. Despite 
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO,, INC.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
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Defendant's contentions that "Swift has failed to demonstrate that its interest is not being 
adequately protected," the fact remains that although Swift made several attempts to remain 
apprised of the status of the underlying proceeding and any discussion regarding negotiation, 
Swift has been left in the dark; having to resort to checking the court repository to stay abreast of 
the case. Swift was not privy to any conversations between Defendant's and Plaintiff's counsel. 
See Affidavit of Sonya.lee R. Nutsch, 13. Rather, despite its inquiries, the parties have been 
nonresponsive as to the status of the case. 
As demonstrated in Willis, and the cases cited therein, Swift's right to 
subrogation is a protectable interest. Id., 231 F,R.D. at 449 ; see also The Vanford Co., Inc., 2008 
WL 4189006 at 2. As articulated in Vanderford: 
If an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense 
by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general 
rule, be entitled to intervene. Id The burden on proposed 
intervenors in showing inadequate representation is minimal and 
would be satisfied if they could demonstrate that representation of 
their interests may be inadequate. 
Id. Additionally, despite Defendant's contentions, Swift's and Teurlings 1 interests are not the 
same. Although both have an interest in maximizing recovery, they do not have identical 
interests because each competes for a portion of the fixed recovery. Willis at 450. 
Here, Swift has an interest in participating in any proceeding, but especially a 
proceeding where the Defendant is seeking to dismiss all claims. Such a proceeding would 
· impair Swift's pi-otectable interest. 
3. The Idaho cases cited by Defendant are distinguishable. 
Defendant cites two Idaho c:ases as the basis for the authority that Swift is not 
entitled to intervene: Ruffing 11. Ada County, 2009 WL 7366868 (Idaho 2009), and The Vanjurd 
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
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Co .. Inc. v. Knudson, 2008 WL 4189006 (Idaho 2008). These cases are factually distinguishable 
from the present case. First. Rtif]ing concerned whether plaintiff could add Boise City as a 
plaintiff pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17. The court held that because Idaho Code 
Section 72-223(2) only permits an employer to sue on behalf of an employee, the employer is not 
a proper party in interest for purposes of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 7, which requires that 
every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Ru_ffeng did not concern 
an application by the city to intervene. Rather, as articulated by the court, u[t]he Plaintiff has not 
argued that the City must be added pursuant to I.R.C.P.24(a) so the Court will not address the 
issue." Id. 
Secondly, Defendant relies on Variford. The applicant seeking intervention in 
Vanfordwas the insurer, State Farm. State Farm was the party paying for the insured's defense 
in the original state court action. Id. After a judgment was awarded age.inst the insured, State 
Farm was permitted to intervene in the appeal. Id. It was only after State Fann and the insured 
determined that the claims asserted agafost the insured were not covered under the policy, and 
that State Farm had no further duty to defend, did the court determine that State Farm no longer 
had a right to intervene. Specifically, State Farm was only claiming the right to recover attorney 
fees relating to the original state action. As such, State Fann did not claim an interest relating to 
the property or transaction that was the subject of the action. Unlike the present case, State Farm 
had no interest in a potential award of damages. Further. the court in Vanderford did not entirely 
foreclose State Fe.rm' s right to intervene but rather provided that should its insured prevail~ then, 
at that time "if State Farm does not believe that the [insured] is adequately protecting their 
interest, State Farm can seek to intervene." Id. 
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO., INC,'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO INTERVENE-6 C:licni:2458087 '\ 
 
313
Jun-08-2012 03:26 PM Moffatt Thomas 2083855384 
Neither Ruffing nor Vanderford stand for the proposition that an employer who 
has paid worker's compensation benefits, thus becoming subrogated to recovery of the 
employee, is precluded from intervening. 
B. Alternatively Swift Should be Entitled to Intervene Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 24(b). 
8/19 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure grants a party permissive intervention if either (I) a 
statute confers a conditional right to intervene, or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and 
the main action have a question of law or fact in common. IDAHO R. C1v. P. 24(b). Even if this 
Court detennines that Swift is not entitled to intervene as a matter of right, the Court should find 
that Swift has a pennissive right to intervene. 
The same statute that confers a right for Swift to participate, also serves as the 
basis for permissive intervention. That statute contemplates that an employer on its own. or with 
an employee. can participate in a third party suit against a tortfeasor. 
Second, as articulated herein, Swift has a claim to a.11 ultimate award of damages 
as a result of this lawsuit. Despite Defendant's contentions to the contrary. permitting Swift to 
intervene will not cause undue prejudice or delay. The same statute providing Swift a right to 
subrogation also contemplates that Swift and Teurlings can sue a third-party tortfeasor together 
to pursue recovery. IDAHO CODE§ 72-223. Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and 
supporting case law, if allowed to intervene, Swift must take the case as it finds it at the time of 
intervention. Swift is not asserting any additional theories of negligence. Whether or not this 
Court permits Swift to intervene, Defendant will have to defend a negligence action brought by 
Plaintiff. Rather, in this case, it is Swift, as opposed to Defendant, who will be prejudiced should 
this Court deny Swift the opportunity to intervene. Swift has a claim for damages that will be 
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impaired should Defendant succeed in its efforts to dismiss. As arcicolated in Wtllis, IUl 
employer's and employee1s rights are not the same. Specifically. although both have an interest 
in mu:imi:dng recovery. they do not have identical interests because each competes for a portkm 
of a fixed tccovery. Willis at 450. 
C. Pleading Setting Forth Oaim or DefeJUJe. 
Swift properly served the parties with its memorandum in support of its motion to 
intervene, wherein it identified that it is only claimmg a right to be subrogated to Plaintiff's 
recovery. Defendant is correct that Swift is not asserting any new Cl\U5CS of action or defenses. 
This is because an intervenor must take a case as he or she finds it. Moreover, Swift was never 
provided a copy of either the Complaint ar Answer. If it would better serve the parties and this 
Court, attached hereto is a proposed pleading setting forth Swift's claim that It be subrogated in 
accordance with statutory authority. 
ll. CONCLUSION 
In order to adequately protect its right to subrogation and to remain apprised of 
the status of this case, including the right to participate to protect that interest. Swift respectfully 
requests that this Court grant its Motion to Intervene. 
DATIID tills g:t_ day of r- 2012. 
MOFFATI, THOM.U, BARREIT, ROCK & 
S, CHAltTBRED 
l"U.Auca.J. Rosholt-OftheFiim 
Attorneys fur Applicaut 
Swift Transportation Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of June, 2012, I caused a true and 
comet copy of the foregoing SWIFl' TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.'S REPLY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE to be served by tb.e xnetbod indicatc:d below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Sonyalee R. Nut$ch 
CLEMENTS BROWN & McNICHOlS, PA 
32113thSt. 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston. ID 83501-1510 
Facsimile (208) 743-9295 
Attorneys fer Defendant 
Ned A. Cannon 
SMmI & CANNONPllC 
508 Eighth St 
():) U.S. Mall. Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mall 
( ) Facsimile 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mall 
( ) Facsimile Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile (208) 746~8421 
Attorneys for Pt"inrtff 
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WILLIS v. FIRESTONE BUILDING PRODUCTS CO. (D.Conn. I0~l9w2005) 
231 F.R,D, 447 
David WILLIS and Kathy Willis, Plaintiffs, v. FIRESTONE BUILDING PRODUCTS 
CO., Defendant. 
No. CIV. 3:0SCV43 (JBA). 
United States District Court, D. Connecticut. 
October 19, 2005 
Alan M. Barry, Gregory P. Klein, Alall Barry & Assoc .. Danbury. CT, for Plaintiffs. 
Matthew Feigenbaum, Cohn, Birnbaum & Shea, Westport, CT, for Defendant, 
RULING ON MOTION TO INTERVENE /DOC.# 15/ 
JANET ARTERTON, District Judge 
12/19 
In his complaint, plaintiffDavld Willis alleges he is a truck driver for Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 
("Melton'') and that in the course of his employment he was injured due to defendant's negligence. 
Employer Melton now moves to intervene 115 a plaintiff as a matter of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24{a), or, 
in the alternative, permlssively under Fed.R.Civ.P. 2.±(b), on the grounds that it paid Willis benefits under 
the Oklahoma Worker's Compensation Act related to the injuries claimed in this case, and is entitled to a 
portion of any recovery In Willis' favor. See Motion to Intervene [Doc.# 15]. Melton additionally argues 
that its interests are not sufficiently represented by Willis, notwithstanding the fact that both share an 
interest in recovery from Firestone, because the Willises have an interest in keeping as large as possible a 
share or any recovery for themselves and, b~ implication, an interest in minimizing Melton's 
reimbursement share. Melton represents that no delay will result from its intervention because the only 
additional step necessary is for Melton to be served with all the papers in this case, 
Firestone opposes Melton's motion to Intervene, see [Doc.# 16] on the grounds that Melton's interests 
are adequately represented by the Willises, and that Melton has not shown that its intervention will not 
unduly delay or prejudice the original parties. 
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I.STANDARD 
Rule 24(a) provides for intervention ofright upon a timely tiled motion''( 1) when a statute of the 
United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an inte1-est 
relating tot.he property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that 
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect 
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." Fed.R.Civ.P. 
24(a). As stated by the Second Circuit, "[t]o intervene as of right, a movant must (1) timely file an 
application, (2) show an interest in the notion, (3) demonstrate that the interest may be impaired by the 
disposition of the action, and (4) show that the interest is not protected adequately by the parties to the 
action." Brennan 11. N. Y. City Bd. of Educ., 260 F .3d 123, l 28-2lJ (200 !) (internal quotation mark.$ and 
citation omitted). Under the second prong of the test, for "an Interest to be cognizable ..• it must be direct, 
substantial, and legally protectable. An interest that is remote from the subject matter of the proceeding, or 
that is contingent 
\\ ~·,1 l';l~l· 449 
upon the occurrence ofa sequence of events before it becomes colorable, will not satisfy the rule." U11itt:d 
Stales v. Peoples Benefit Life ins. Co., 2 71 F .Jcl -' 11, 41 ~ (2d Cir. 2001) ( internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see also Res/or-A-Dent Dental Labs., Inc. v. Ce,·t. Alloy Prods., Inc., 7~~ 1:.2d_8.7 I, ~-7~ 
(2d Cir. 1984). A party seeking to intervene, however, need not have an independe1,t cause of action to be 
considered to have an interest within the scope of Rule 24(a). Trbovich v. Unitf!d Mine Workurs of Am., 
404 U.S. :i28, 530, 92 S,C't. 630, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 ( 1972); Fare.rt Consen1. Council v. Un/led States Fores/ 
Serv., fi6 F.3.JJ 1489, 1493 (9th Cir, 199S) ("Whether an applicant for intervention demonstrates sufficient 
interest in an action is a practical, threshold inquiry. No specific legal or equitable interest need be 
established.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted}, The party must show only an interest 
within the context of the case, and, as reqi1ired by the third prong of the test, demonstrate that its interest 
may be impaii'ed by an adverse decision In the case. Brennan, 260 F.'.hi nt l .}:?, Unde1· the fourth prong, 
representation by an existing party is determined to be adequate only if the party's "interests [are} so 
similar to those of [the intervenor] that adequacy of representation [ls] assured'' Jd. at 133 (ernphasis 
added). 
"When considering a motion to intervene, the court 'must accept as true the non-conclusory allegations 
of the motion.'" Bay Casino, LLC v, M/V Royal Empress, 199 F.R.D. 464. 466 (E.D.N.Y. l 999) (quoting 
Rttich v. ABC/York-Este,s Carp., 64 F,3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1995)). ''A motion to Intervene as a matter of 
right, moreover, should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that the intervener is not entitled 
to relief under any set of facts which could be proved under the complaint. Bach intervention case is 
highly fact specific and tends to resist comparison to prior cases." Id. (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
II. DISCUSSION 
Melton's property claim, stemming from a state statutory right to reimbursement under Oklahoma 
worker's compensation law, is the basis for its claimed right to intervene under Rule 24{a)(2). The statute 
provides: 
If[a worker] elects to take compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, the cause of action 
against [a third party] shall be assigned to the insurance carrier liable for the payment of such 
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compensation. and if [the worker] elects to proceed against such other person, .• the employer1s insurance 
carrier shall contribute only the deficiency, if any, between the amount of the recovery against such other 
person actually collected, and the compensation provided ... by the Worker's Compensation Act for .such 
case .... Whenever recovery against [a third party] is effected without compromise settlement by the 
employee or his representatives, the employer or insurance company having paid compensation under the 
Workers' Compensation Act shall be entitled to reimbursement ... and shall pay from its share of said 
reimbursement a proportionate share of the expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred in effecting said 
i-ecovery to be determined by the ratio that the amount of compensation paid by the employer bears to the 
amount of the recovery effected by the employee. After the e:-cpenses and attorneys fees have been paid, 
the balance of the recovery shall be apportioned between the employer or insurance company having paid 
the compensation and the employee and or his representatives in the same ratio that the amount of 
compensation paid by the employer bears to the total amount recovered .... 
Okla. Stat. tit. ~ §_ 44(a),UhlJ 
The court in Carnley v, Aid to Hospital~. lnc., 975 F.Supp. 252, 257 (W,D.N.Y. 1997), wa.s faced with a 
situation similar to the present case. An employee sued the third party on whose premises he had been 
injured and the worker1s compensation board moved 
W~·~t l'agl' ..,~o 
to intervene. The court held that the worker's compensation fund had established a property right entitling 
it to intervene because it had paid the employee over $461000 for wages and medical expenses, which the 
plaintiff also sought to recover from the third party business owner. The court held that while the worker's 
compensation board was 11ot required to intervene to protect its right to recover part of any award received 
by the employee, it did have a right to intervene "to protect its interest," Id. The court further held that the 
board was "in a much better position to protect [itsJ interest than any of the other parties." Id, 
Here, defendant does not dispute that under the Oklahoma Worker1s Compensation Act Melton has a 
right to an apportioned part of any recovery David Willis receives. Rather, defendant argues that Melton 
has failed to show that its interests are not adequately protected by the Willi.ses. Under Brennan, 
representation by an existing party is determined to be adequate only if the party's "interests [are] so 
similar to those of [the intervenor] that adequacy ofrepresentation [is] assured" Brennan. ~L}.\l at ! _;_; 
(emphasis added). As the court held in Carn!ey1 the interests of an employee and a worker's compensation 
boa1·d are distinct. The same t'easoning applies to an employee and his employer, While Melton and Willis 
both have a11 interest in maximizing recovery> they do not have identical intel'ests. because each competes 
for a portion of a fixed recovery amount. 
For this reason, Melton is entitled to intervene as a matter of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Melton's Motion to Intervene [Doc.# 15] is GRANTED and the Clerk is directed to 
docket Melton's Jntervening Complaint. The schedule ordered in this case [Doc. # I OJ remains unchanged 
in light of Melton's rep!'esentation that its intervention will cause no delay. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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[fnl] Melton also argues this issue under Connecticut's worker's compensation law, though under 
Connecticut choice-of-law principles, matters of worker's compensation are governed by the law of the 
state where the benefits were paid. See Snyder v. Seldin, 81 Cs,nn,App. 718, 724, 841 A.2d 70 I. 705 
(2004). Therefore Oklahoma law applies to the issue of whether Melton is entitled to indemnification 
from Mr. Willis. 
Copyright C 2012 CCH Incorporated or its affiliates 
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477 
Andrea J. Rosholt, lSB No. 8895 
MOFFATT, THOMAS1 BARRETT, ROCK & 
FJELDS1 CHARTERED 
l O 1 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 8370 I 
Telephone (208) 345w2000 




Attorneys for Applicant Swift Transportation Co., Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS. and SWIFT 
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2009-0420 
PROPOSED COMPLAINT OF 
APPLICANT SWIFT 
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. 
16/19 
COMES NOW the abovewnamed plaintifft Swift Transportation Company, Inc .. 
transacting business under the name Swift Transportation Co .• Inc. ("Swift''), by and through its 
undersigned counsel of record, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock, & Fields, Chartered, and 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c) hereby asserts its claim for subrogation. 
PROPOSED COMPLAINT OF APPLICANT SWIFT 
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. - l Cli11nt:.2411Hl~7. l 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
l. Swift Transportation Co., Inc., is a corporation duly organized under the 
laws of the state of Arizona_ 
2, Swift submits to the jurisdiction and venue as articulated in Plaintiff 
William Teurlings' ("Teurlings'') Complaint as answered by Defendant Mallory Martinez fka 
Larson ("Defendant"). 
FACTUAL ALLEGATION 
3. On January 7, 2007, while employed for Swift as a semitruck driver, 
Teurlings was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Defendant. 
4. Subsequently, Teurlings filed a claim for worker's compensation with 
Swift, Swift, by and through its surety, paid Teurlings' worker's compensation benefits. 
5. On April 23, 2008, Swift, by and through its surety, entered into a 
Compromise and Release Agreement with Teurlings to settle his worker's compensation 
agreement for a sum certain. 
6. As a result, Swift became entitled to be subrogated to Teurlings' recovery 
from Defendant pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-223(3). 
7. Upon information and belief; Teurlings filed a thfrd .. party action against 
Defendant seeking to recover damages based on a theory of negligence. 
I. CLAIM FOR SUBROGATION 
8. Swift realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 - 7 of 
this Complaint, and additionally complains and alleges as follows: 
9. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-223, Swift has a subrogated right to all 
money it paid to Teurlings pursuant to Teurlings' worker's compensation claims. 
PROPOSED COMPLAINT OF APPLICANT SW1FT 
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC, - 2 Clten1:2401~07 1 
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10. To the extent Teurlings succeeds in prosecuting his claims against 
Defendant, Swift is entitled to subrogation of the damages or settlement proceeds awarded to 
Teurlings. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Swift prays for judgment in its favor as follows: 
1. That the Court declare Swift to have a valid and enforcee.ble right to 
subrogation of the proceeds of any judgment or settlement that is the result of a cause of action. 
suit, claim, cmmterclaim, or demand accruing to Defendant on account of injuries giving rise to 
such a cause of action, claim, counterclaim, or demand; 
2. That the release of a cause of action; suit, claim, counterclaim, or demand 
accruing to Teurlings or to the legal representative(s) of Teurlings be declared ineffective as 
against Swift unless and until the full amounts owing to Swift by Defendant, inc:luding all 
interest which has accrued on her account with Swift, have been paid in full; 
3. Far costs, filing fees, and recording fees; and 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems just. 
DATED this __ day of June, 2012. 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By ______ ~-------
Andrea J. Rosholt- Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Applicant Swift 
Transportation Company 
PROPOSED COMPLAINT OF APPLICANT SWIFT 
TRANSPORTATION C0.1 INC. - 3 Cllent:l.4151357 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of June, 2012, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED COMPLAINT OF APPLICANT SWIFT 
TRANSPORTATION C0.1 INC to be setved by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS BROWN & MCNICHOLS, PA 
321 13th St. 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, 1D 8350Jwl510 
Facsimile (208) 743-9295 
Attorneys/or Defendant 
Ned A. Cannon 
SMITI-I & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth St, 
Lewiston. ID 83501 
Facsimile (208) 746-8421 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Andrea J, Rosholt 
PROPOSED COMPLAINT OF APPLICANT SWIFT 
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. - 4 Cllent24Si 357. I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
COURT MINUTES 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Presiding Judge 
CARL B. KERRICK 
Reporter 
NANCY TOWLER 
Date JUNE 12, 2012 

















SONY ALEE NUTSCH 
For, Defendant 
ANDREA ROSHOLT 
For, Swift Transportation 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I 
MOTION TO INTERVENE/ MOTION TO STRIKE 
BE IT KNOWN, THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO-WIT: 
COURTROOM #1 
90531 Ned Cannon present. Sonyalee Nutsch present. Andrea Rosholt on telephone. 
Court addresses counsel. 
90656 Ms. Rosholt presents argument re: motion to intervene. 
91004 Ms. N utsch presents argument re: opposition to motion to intervene. 
92112 Ms. Rosholt presents rebuttal argument re: motion to intervene. 
92447 Ms. Nutsch presents argument re: motion for summary jdmt and motion to strike. 
93624 Mr. Cannon presents argument re: motion for summary jdmt and motion to strike. 
94453 Ms. Nutsch presents rebuttal argument. 
94 714 Court addresses Ms. N utsch. 
94813 Mr. Nutsch responds. 





1 Page of 1 Pages CY<3I 
Presiding Judge 
COURT MINUTES JUNE 12, 2012 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 












CASE NO. CV2009-420 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 
COMP ANY'S MOTION TO 
INTERVENE 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Swift Transportation Company's Motion to Intervene. The Plaintiff 
was represented by Ned Cannon, of the firm Smith and Cannon. The Defendant 
was represented by Sonyalee Nutsch, of the firm Clements, Brown & McNichols. 
Swift Transportation Co. was represented by Andrea Rosholt, of the firm Moffatt, 
Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields. The Court heard oral argument on June 12, 2012. 
The Court, having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the 
matter, hereby renders its decision. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SWIFT 





On January 7, 2007, at about 12:43 p.m., Mallory Martinez1 was involved in a 
traffic accident with the plaintiff William Teurlings, a truck driver for Swift 
Transportation Company (Swift). Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, at 1. Martinez is a member of the Idaho Army National Guard, 145th HHC 
Support Battalion. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, at 2. As 
a National Guard member, Martinez is required to attend instructional drills once a 
month. Id. On January 7, 2007, Martinez was returning to her home in Boise, Idaho from 
Lewiston, Idaho where one of these instructional drills took place. Id. On her return to 
Boise Martinez was involved in the accident with Teurlings. She was driving her private 
vehicle and providing transportation to a fellow guardsman who also lived in Boise. Id. 
For purposes of the instructional drills, Martinez's commanding officers was 
Section Sergeant Tony Rice. Id. According to the affidavit provided by SSG Rice, each 
guardsman, including Martinez, was on duty from 12:00 a.m. on January 6, 2007 until 
11 :59 p.m. on January 7, 2007. Rice Aff. 15. SSG Rice avers he instructed Martinez to 
provide transportation to and from the training to the guardsman that was with her at the 
time of the accident. Rice Aff. 16. After the accident, Martinez informed SSG Rice of 
what had happened, and a Line of Duty Report of Investigation was completed. Rice Aff. 
16. The Guard, finding Martinez was on duty at the time of the accident, paid her 
medical bills. Rice Aff. 17. 
1 At the time of the accident, the Defendant was named as Mallory E. Larson. In the interim between filing 
suit and the motions currently before the Court, the Defendant has married, and thus, is now known as 
Mallory E. Martinez. For purposes of this document, the Defendant will be referred to by her currently 
known surname, Martinez. 
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Teurlings filed this negligence action against Martinez on January 6, 2009.2 
Martinez filed a motion for summary judgment relying on LC. § 6-904(4) which allows 
an exception to liability for Idaho National Guard members engaged in training or duty. 
Teurlings contends Martinez was not within the course and scope of her employment 
with the Guard at the time of the accident and is therefore not protected by LC. § 6-
904( 4) from liability should she be determined to have acted negligently in causing the 
collision. 
On May 25, 2012, Swift filed a motion to intervene in this action pursuant to 
LR.C.P. 24. These motions, as well as a motion to strike filed by the plaintiff, are 
currently pending before the Court. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. LR.C.P. 
56( c ). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must construe 
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943, 945, 188 P.3d 885, 
887 (2008); Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470,472 (2005), citing 
In/anger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002). 
When a motion for summary judgment is "supported by a particularized affidavit, 
the opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but 
must set forth "specific facts" showing a genuine issue. LR.C.P. 56(e); Verbillis v. 
2 Mr. Teurlings received worker's compensation from Swift in the amount of fifty five thousand dollars for 
injuries he sustained in the accident. See Swift's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, at 2. 
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Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). A 
"mere scintilla" of evidence or only a "slight doubt" as to the facts is insufficient to 
withstand summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697 
(2007); see also Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 
(2005). 
Finally, the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact is on the moving party, and once this burden is met, it is incumbent upon the 
non-moving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element. Meikle v. Watson, 
138 Idaho 680, 683, 69 P.3d 100, 103 (2003); Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 
Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996). 
ANALYSIS 
There are three motions currently pending before the Court: Defendant 
Martinez's motion for summary judgment; Plaintiff Teurlings' motion to strike the 
affidavits of Martinez and Rice,3 and Swift's motion to intervene. The motion for 
summary judgment shall be addressed first. 
1. Motion for Summary Judgment 
Martinez claims summary judgment is appropriate pursuant to LC. § 6-904(4). 
This section falls under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (hereinafter "ITCA") as an exception 
to liability for individuals participating in activities of the Idaho National Guard when 
engaged in training or duty. Teurlings contends first that there is a material question of 
3 Teurlings seeks to have attachments to the affidavits of Rice and Martinez stricken based on the argument 
that the records attached are inadmissible hearsay. The records would fall into an exception to the hearsay 
rule, I.R.E. 803(8). Regardless, the Court would reach the conclusion herein even if the attached record 
was stricken. Further, Teurlings contends that Martinez and Rice each make statements which are legal 
conclusions. The motion to strike is denied on this basis, as the Court finds the affiants are testifying as to 
facts they have personal knowledge about. 
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fact as to whether Martinez was on duty. Second, Teurlings argues that Martinez is not 
considered on duty, or within the course and scope of her employment with the Idaho 
National Guard, based upon the coming-and going rule. Each argument will be 
addressed individually. 
a. Whether Martinez was on duty with the Idaho National Guard. 
Martinez claims she is immune from liability pursuant to LC. § 6-904(4), which 
sets forth an exception to liability for individuals who are on duty for the Idaho National 
Guard when a negligent act occurred. LC.§ 6-904(4) is contained within the ITCA, 
which "abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity and renders a governmental entity 
liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions." Lawton v. City of 
Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454,458, 886 P.2d 330, 334 (1994). "The purpose of the ITCA is 
to provide 'much needed relief to those suffering injury from the negligence of 
government employees.' The ITCA is to be construed liberally, consistent with its 
purpose, and with a view to 'attaining substantial justice."' Rees v. State, Dept. of Health 
and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 19, 137 P.3d 397,406 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
LC.§ 6-904 generally sets forth several exceptions to liability. LC. § 6-904(4) 
pertains to activities of the Idaho National Guard: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall 
not be liable for any claim which: 
4. Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard when engaged in 
training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, 505 or 709, title 32, 
United States Code. 
Id. Martinez was participating in training exercises pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502. 
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(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or the 
Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, each company, battery, 
squadron, and detachment of the National Guard, unless excused by the 
Secretary concerned, shall-
( I) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target 
practice, at least 48 times each year; and 
(2) participate in training at encampments, maneuvers, outdoor 
target practice, or other exercises, at least 15 days each year. 
32 U.S.C. § 502(a)(l-2). 
Martinez states she was on duty with the Idaho National Guard and attending a 
regularly scheduled instruction drill in Lewiston, Idaho, on the day the accident occurred. 
Affidavit of Mallory E. Martinez. Martinez's supervisor, SSG Rice, attested that Martinez 
was attending drill pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502. Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, at 2. He 
further stated he ordered Martinez to provide transportation to a fellow guardsman, and 
thus, Martinez was following orders at the time she was in the collision. SSG Rice 
described the time on duty and his orders to Martinez4 as follows: 
Id. 
5. January 7, 2007, was the final day of the 145th 's regularly scheduled 
drill instructions in Lewiston, Idaho and SPC Mallory Larson was in 
attendance. SPC Larson was on duty from 12:00 a.m. on January 6, 2007 
to 11 :59 p.m. on January 7, 2007. 
6. I was aware that SPC Larson lived in Boise, Idaho and another 
guardsman who was also a member of the 145th lived in that area as well. 
I instructed SPC Larson to provide transportation for her fellow 
guardsman to and from the drill that was completed on January 7, 2007. I 
understood that she had complied with my order. 
The central issue in this case is whether Martinez was on duty when the collision 
occurred, while she was traveling home after participating in drill activities. According 
to Martinez and her supervising officer, she was on duty until 11 :59 p.m. on January 7, 
4 Within the affidavit, SSG Rice refers to the Defendant by her maiden name, Mallory Larson. 
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2007. Teurlings questions whether Martinez was on duty based on the following facts: 
Martinez was not reimbursed for mileage; Martinez was not ordered by the National 
Guard to travel home via a specific route; Martinez drove her own personal vehicle; 
training only occurred once a month and Martinez's training status did not equal full-time 
duty; Martinez was not hired by the National Guard to drive or transport other 
guardsmen; and Martinez was not driving between assignments-she was returning home 
after completing training. See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, at 2-3. 
Based on the affidavits submitted by the Defendant, it is undisputed that Martinez 
was participating in training or duty pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502. Participating in the 
training session required Martinez to travel from her home in southern Idaho to 
participate with her National Guard unit in exercises held in Lewiston, Idaho. There is no 
Idaho case law directly on point which addresses how duty is defined for purposes of LC. 
§ 6-904( 4). However, this code section refers to the United States Code to explain 
National Guard training or duties. The United States Code also defines "active duty for 
training." 
(22) The term "active duty for training" means--
(A) full-time duty in the Armed Forces performed by Reserves for training 
purposes; 
(B) full-time duty for training purposes performed as a commissioned 
officer of the Reserve Corps of the Public Health Service (i) on or after 
July 29, 1945, or (ii) before that date under circumstances affording 
entitlement to "full military benefits", or (iii) at any time, for the purposes 
of chapter 13 of this title; 
(C) in the case of members of the Army National Guard or Air National 
Guard of any State, full-time duty under section 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 
of title 32, or the prior corresponding provisions of law; 
(D) duty performed by a member of a Senior Reserve Officers' Training 
Corps program when ordered to such duty for the purpose of training or a 
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practice cruise under chapter 103 of title 10 for a period of not less than 
four weeks and which must be completed by the member before the 
member is commissioned; and 
(E) authorized travel to or from such duty. 
38 U.S.C. § 101(22). The "active duty for training" definition refers to training pursuant 
to 32 U.S.C. 502, and further, includes "authorized travel to or from such duty" as part of 
active duty for training. 
SSG Rice's affidavit which states Martinez was on duty from 12:00 a.m. January 
6, 2007 to 11:59 p.m. on January 7, 2007, is consistent with the definition of "active duty 
for training," as set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 101(22)). Based upon these statutory provisions, 
traveling to or from duty is considered active duty for training. I.C. § 6-904( 4) provides 
immunity for any claim arising out of activities of the Idaho National Guard, based upon 
training or duty as defined by specific sections of the United States Code. 
Based upon the undisputed facts of this case, Martinez was on duty until 11 :59 
p.m., and following orders of a superior by providing transportation to a fellow 
guardsman. While the Plaintiff suggests that the Defendant was simply traveling on her 
own, and had been dismissed from drills so that she was no longer on duty, these claims 
are speculative and not supported by affidavit. Based upon the definition of active duty 
for training, and the affidavits submitted in this case, Martinez was on duty at the time of 
the collision. Thus, I.C. § 6-904( 4) is applicable, and Martinez is immune from liability 
for any negligent actions which resulted in the collision with Teurlings. 
b. Coming and Going Rule 
Teurlings contends that Martinez was not within the course and scope of her duty 
with the Idaho National Guard when she was traveling home after being released from 
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drill for the weekend. Teurlings argument focuses on the fact that Martinez was traveling 
in a private vehicle, she was not required to take a specific route of travel, and she had to 
pay her own travel expenses. 
The "coming and going" rule is typically applied in worker's compensation cases, 
rather than in the context of a civil action. The rule states an employee is not within the 
course and scope of his employment when the employee is on his way to and from work 
The rule is discussed in detail in Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 155 P.3d 695, (2007). 
The Finholt Court also discussed two exceptions to the rule, the special errand exception, 
and the traveling employee exception. 
Cases in Idaho have articulated the "coming and going" rule, which 
states that an employee is not within the course and scope of his 
employment on his way to and from work. Ridgway v. Combined Ins. 
Companies of America, 98 Idaho 410,411,565 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1977). 
Typically these cases have arisen in the worker's compensation area rather 
than in the context of a civil action. In Bocock v. State Bd of Educ., 55 
Idaho 18, 37 P.2d 232 (1934), this Court found an exception from the 
coming and going rule for an employee who, "although not at his regular 
place of employment, even before or after customary working hours, is 
doing, is on his way home from performing, or on the way from his home 
to perform, some special service or errand or the discharge of some duty 
incidental to the nature of his employment in the interest of, or under 
direction of, his employer." Id. at 22, 37 P.2d at 234, quoting Scrivner v. 
Franklin Sch. Dist. No. 2, 50 Idaho 77, 80,293 P. 666, 667 (1930). The 
special errand exception is premised on the idea that an employee leaving 
his normal place of work to perform a special job for an employer is, 
nevertheless, still performing part of his normal job .... 
Separately, this Court has defined an exception to the coming and 
going rule for traveling employees. In Cheung v. Wasatch Electric, 136 
Idaho 895, 42 P.3d 688 (2002), we explained that "[w]hen an employee's 
work requires him to travel away from the employer's place of business or 
his normal place of work, the employee is covered by worker's 
compensation. This is known as the "traveling employee" rule .... " Id. at 
897, 42 P.3d at 690, citing Ridgway v. Combined Ins. Cos. Of America, 98 
Idaho 410, 411-12, 565 P.2d 1367, 1368-69 (1977). This Court has not 
applied the traveling employee theory outside the worker's compensation 
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context where it expands employer liability. Regardless, we need not reach 
the question of whether to apply the traveling employee exception to tort 
claims, because the theory would not apply to the facts presented by this 
case. 
The traveling employee exception applies to "[ e ]mployees whose work 
entails travel away from the employer's premises" and are required "to 
maintain [themselves] while traveling," giving rise to an employer's 
coverage of the employee while on the trip. Ridgway, 98 Idaho at 412, 565 
P.2d at 1369. In Ridgway, an Idaho employee was sent to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for a two-week training seminar, and during the trip was injured 
while en route to pick up lunch. The Industrial Commission found the 
relationship between the business trip and the injury too tenuous to hold 
the employer liable, but the Court reversed and remanded, directing the 
Commission to analyze the facts under the traveling employee exception. 
Id. Certainly, travel need not always be as significant as the two-week 
business trip in Ridgway to trigger the traveling employee exception. See 
Cheung, 136 Idaho at 898, 42 P.3d at 691. 
Id. at 898-899, 155 P.3d at 699- 700. 
In the case at hand, the special errand exception would apply to the facts 
presented in this case. Martinez presented affidavits which state she was transporting a 
fellow guardsman pursuant to orders from SSG Rice. While Teurlings has suggested that 
the guardsmen were simply traveling together to save expenses, Teurlings has not 
presented affidavits to create a genuine issue of fact. 
Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact. 
Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 (1986). 
However, while reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-
moving party, the non-moving party cannot rest upon mere speculation. 
Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175, 179, 16 P.3d 272,276 (2000). 
Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho at 897, 155 P.3d at 698. While Teurlings contends that the 
guardsmen had been released from duty, the affidavits presented in this case state that 
Martinez was on duty until 11 :59 p.m. on January 7, 2007. In addition, Martinez 
presented affidavits that she was following orders by transporting a fellow guardsman 
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home. These orders would fall under the special errand exception of the coming and 
going rule. 
There is no Idaho case which deals with whether traveling in order to attend a 
National Guard drill or training falls within the course and scope of employment with the 
Idaho National Guard. A similar issue was addressed in Colorado, where an individual 
was injured while traveling to and from training for the Civil Air Patrol. 
The general rule is that an employee injured while traveling to or from 
work is not entitled to compensation; however, this rule is subject to 
exception when special circumstances bring the accident within the course 
of employment. Martin K. Eby Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 151 Colo. 320,377 P.2d 745 (1963); Comstockv. Bivens, 78 
Colo. 107,239 P. 869 (1925). Among such special circumstances is the 
exception that an employer may agree, expressly or impliedly, that the 
employment relation shall continue during the period of coming and 
going. Martin K. Eby v. Industrial Commission, supra. Such an agreement 
may be inferred here. The C.A.P. commander testified that, under patrol 
regulations, its members are pursuing C.A.P. duties from the time they 
leave home to attend a meeting until they return. This testimony supports 
the finding of the Commission that "traveling to attend was included in the 
activity by necessity; the duty of claimant encompassed all of his activity 
from the moment of entering the aircraft to depart for the meeting, through 
the time of travel." 
Thus, when a claimant, at the time of his injury, is performing a duty 
with which he is charged as a part of his contract for service, or under the 
express or implied direction of his employer, he is within the course of his 
employment under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Berry's Coffee 
Shop, Inc. v. Palomba, 161 Colo. 369,423 P.2d 2 (1967). Hagan's travel to 
the required meeting was such a duty. 
Colorado Civil Air Patrol v. Hagans, 662 P.2d 194, 196 (Colo. App. 1983). 
The case before this Court is similar in nature to the Colorado Civil Air Patrol 
Case. SSG Rice provided an unrefuted affidavit which states that Martinez was on duty 
until January 7, 2007, and further, following orders to transport a fellow guardsman. 
Thus, in the alternative, this case falls into an exception to the coming and going rule. 
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Therefore, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted on this alternative 
basis. 
2. Motion to Intervene 
Swift Transportation Company filed a motion to intervene in this matter. Swift 
contends that it should be permitted to intervene on the ground that it paid Teurlings' 
worker's compensation benefits and is thus entitled to be subrogated to Teurlings' 
recovery against Martinez. Because summary judgment has been granted in favor of 
Martinez, the motion to intervene is moot. Therefore the motion to intervene is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant traveled to Lewiston, Idaho to participate in drill and training 
activities for the Idaho National Guard on January 6, 2007. On the return trip to her 
home in southern Idaho, the Defendant collided with a semi-truck that was driven by the 
Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was injured, and he claims the Defendant negligently caused the 
collision. 
The Defendant moved for summary dismissal of the case, based upon an 
exception to liability set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. See LC. § 6-904( 4). The 
Plaintiff argues that the Defendant was not on duty because the drill activities were 
completed and she was traveling home. It is undisputed that the Defendant was 
participating in drill pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502. This section defines training 
requirements that guardsmen must meet when they are not on active duty. 38 U.S.C. § 
101 (22) defines "active duty for training" and includes authorized travel to and from duty 
within the definition. Based upon these code sections, the Defendant was on duty at the 
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time the collision occurred. Thus, summary judgment is granted based upon the 
exception to liability set forth in LC. §6-904(4). 
In the alternative, the Plaintiff relies on the coming and going rule to assert 
that the Defendant was simply driving home after the completion of drill, and thus, 
not acting within the course and scope of her employment with the Idaho National 
Guard. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Defendant's travel falls under an 
exception to the coming and going rule. Therefore, summary judgment is 
appropriate on this alternative basis. 
Also pending before the Court is a motion to intervene filed by Swift 
Transportation Company. Swift paid worker's compensation benefits to Teurling 
as a result of the injuries he sustained in the collision. Swift's motion to intervene is 
premised on the argument that it is entitled to be subrogated to Teurlings' recovery 
against Martinez. Because summary judgment was granted in favor of Martinez, 
the motion to intervene is moot. 
ORDER 
The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. 
Swift Transportation Company's Motion to Intervene is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this /3tlday of July, 2012. 
' 
C) 
CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge 
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I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY illDGMENT AND SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 
COMPANY'S MOTION TO INTERVENE was: 
_ /_ faxed this / JJ,.__day of July, 2012, or 
__ hand delivered via court basket this __ day of July, 2012, or 
l mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this / 3,6---day of July, 
2012, to: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Andrea J. Rosholt 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields 
P.O. Box 829 
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Clearwater County District Court 
FAX: 208-476-8910 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
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Case No: CV09-420 
JUDGMENT 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on April 27, 2012. The Court considered the memoranda and 
affidavits submitted by the parties and heard oral argument on June 12, 2012. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that plaintiffs cause of action herein against defendant is hereby dismissed in 




by the parties. 
DATED this /,faay of July 2012. 
<l£3i 
CARL B. KERRICK 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the JC[ 'tiay of July 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
JUDGMENT 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
P. 0. Box 1510 
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NED A CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Plaintiff moves the Court to reconsider the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order on 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on July 13, 2012. This motion is brought 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(2)(B) and Rule 59(e), and is supported by the 
records and files in this action, as well as Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider. 
Oral argument is requested. 




Jul. 27. 2012 4:39PM No. 2853 P. 3 
DATED this zih day ofJuly, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that) on the date indicated below. I served a true and correct 
copy of this Motion to Reconsider on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method(s) 
indicated below; 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston. ID 83501 
Vin: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(v') Hand Delivered 
( ) Overoight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 271h day of July 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
No. 2853 P. 7 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MALLORY E, LARSON, 
Defendant. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Case No,: CV 09-420 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Ms. Larson's sutntnary judgment motion can be summarized thus: So long as Ms. 
Larson's supervisor asks her to carpool, the Idaho legislature allegedly grants Ms. Larson blanket 
immunity from all liability while driving on Idaho's public roads. This position is unsupported 
undei' either Idaho law or the facts of this case. 
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II. MOTION TO RECONSIDER STANDARD 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B) provides that a party may move the trial court 
to reconsider any interlocutory order any time prior to entry of final judgment and within 14 days 
of entry of final judgment. A party may move the trial court for reconsideration of any final 
order within 14 days of entry of that order. 
In Idaho, trial courts must take into consideration any new facts and any more 
comprehensive presentation of the law that bear on the correctness of the court's order. A party 
making a motion to reconsider is allowed to present new facts, but is not required to do so. 
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App., 2006). The Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated the purpose of a motion to reconsider as follows: 
A rehearing or reconsideration in the trial court usually involves new or additional 
facts, and a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact. Indeed, the 
chief vfrtue of a reconsideration is to obtain a full and complete presentation of all 
available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained, and justice done, as nearly as 
maybe. 
J. I. Case Co. v. McDonald, 280 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1955). Additionally, the trial court's 
reconsideration of the law and facts saves the parties the expense of appeal. "(A] reconsideration 
by the trial court will tend to reduce the number of appeals, with the attendant expense and 
delay." Id; See Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812,800 
P ,2d 1026 (1990), 
Rule 59( e ), covering motions to alter or amend a judgment, is similar to a motion to 
reconsider. Rule 59(e) affords the trial court 1'the opportunity to correct errors both of fact or law 
that had occurred in its proceedings; it thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action short 
of an appeal. Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259,263,646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1982). 
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III. DISCUSSION 
1. The Idaho legislature never explicitly exempted National Guard travel from 
liability while traveling to or from training or duty. 
Idaho Code§ 6,.904(4) states that government employees, "while acting within the course 
and scope of their employmenr are not liable for any claim which "[a]rises out of the activities 
of the Idaho National Guard when engaged in training or duty." 1 In this case, Plaintiffs claim 
arises out of Ms. Larson's negligent driving on Idaho's public roads after she had completed her 
training and duty-this case does not arise out of Ms. Larson's actions as an employee of the 
National Guard. 
Section 6-904(4) explicitly cites tile 32 of the United States Code, sections 316,502,503, 
504, 505 or 709, While these sections mention many activities that are considered "training and 
duty," the United States Congress did not see fit to include travel as part of a guardsman's 
''training and duty.'' 
This Court cited title 38 of the United States Code. Plaintiff respectfully disagrees with 
the use of this title in interpreting the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Title 38 is named "Veteran's 
Benefits." The definitions section specifically cited by the Court explicitly limits the definitions 
to Title 38, It begins, '1[f]or purposes of this title."2 The definition cited by the Court does not 
support Ms. Larson's position. 
Indeed, Title 38 supports Plaintiff's position. The fact that "travel" to and from National 
Guard training is entirely absent from Title 32, but is referenced in Title 38i indicates that the 
United States Congress is perfectly capable of including ''travel'' when it is so inclined. 
i Emphasis added. 
2 38 lJ.S.C. 101; emphasis added. 
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Neither the Idaho legislature nor the United States Congress has explicitly granted 
immunity to Ms. Larson when she is traveling to or from work on Idaho's public roads. 
2. The Idaho legislature has not inch:ided the special-errand doctrine as a 
condition to apply sovereign innnunity. 
Section 6-904(4) fails to mention the special-errand exception cited by the Court. Section 
6-904( 4) explicitly lists the activities Larson could engage in and be exe:rnpt from liability 
(training or duty under sections 316, 502. 503, 504, 505 or 709, title 32, United States Code). 
Had the Idaho legislature intended to exempt from liability all National Guard members while 
traveling to and from their duty station on the Idaho public roads. the legislature would have 
certainly included such explicit language. 
Neither has Ms. Larson cited any cases in Idaho where the special-errand doctrine has 
been applied in an action other than workers' compensation. Black's Law Dictionary defines the 
"special-errand doctrine" as follows: "The principle that an employee will be covered by 
workers' compensation for injuries occurring while the employee is on a journey or special duty 
for the employer away from the workplace. "3 
In its opinion, this Court cited Finholt v .. Cresto, 143 Idaho 89_4, 155 P.3d 695 (2007). 
' ' 
Finholr was a tort action. In Finholt the Idaho Supreme Court noted the special-errand doctrine, 
but did not find that it applied under the facts of the case. 
In this case, Ms, Larson seeks to use the special-errand doctrine in the context of 
sovereign immunity, Ms. Larson has failed to cite any authority in support of the position that the 
special~errand doctrine extends to provide sovereign immunity for state employees when they 
return borne from work. 
3 Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition. 
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This Court analogized this case to the Colorado Court of Appeals case Colorado Civil Air 
Patrol v. Hagans, 662 P.2d 194, 196 (Colo. App., 1983), The Colorado case cited by the Court is 
a workers' compensation case, The Colorado court reasoned, "Among such special 
circumstances is the exception that an employer may agree, expressly or impliedly, that the 
employment relation shall continue during the period of coming and going," The Colorado Court 
continued, "Thus, when a claimant, at the time of his injury> is performing a duty with which he 
is charged as a part of his contract for service, or under the express or implied direction of his 
employer, he is within the course of his employment under the Workmen's Compensation Act." 
Id. 
This reasoning collapses outside of the context of workers' compensation. According to 
the Colorado court, an employer cannot escape liability to its employee when the employer has 
agreed that certain actions fall within the employment relation. In short, it is reasonable for the 
special-emm.d doctrine to apply in the context of workers' compensation. 
This is not such a case. In this case, Mr. Teurlings was struck by Ms. Larson's vehicle on 
an Idaho public road, Mr. Teurlings had absolutely no notice that Ms. Larson's supervisor told 
her (''asked her"; see Ms. Larson's Insurance Statement attached as Exhibit F to the Affidavit of 
Ned A. Cannon) to carpool with another guardsman. In this case, Mr, Teurlings was not a party 
to any agreement between Ms. Larson and her employer. It is legal error to apply workers' 
compensation law to the facts of this case. 
3. Construing the facts in the record in Mr. Teurlings, favor, it is reasonable to 
infer that Ms. Larson was not acting within the "course and scope'' of her 
employment. 
This Court stated in its Memorand'Ulll Opinion that "[b]ased upon the undisputed facts of 
this case, Martinez was on duty until 11 :59 p.rn,, and following orders ·of a superior by providing 
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transportation to a fellow guardsman."~ This CoU1t stated, "While the Plaintiff suggests that the 
Defendant was simply traveling on her own, and had been dismissed from drills so that she was 
no longer on duty, these claims are speculative and not supported by affidavit.''5 Plaintiff 
respectfully disagrees with the Couct's interpretation of the record. Again, among other things, 
see Ms. Larson's Insurance Statement attached as Exhibit F to the Affidavit of Ned A. Cannon. 
Ms. Larson's self-serving claim that she was ''on duty" until 11 :59 p.rn. is rebutted by the 
fact that she was returning to her home afiet training had completed. Ms. Larson claims that she 
was "asked" by a superior to give a ride to a fellow guardsman. The facts of this case show that 
the ''request" was nothing more than carpooling for the sake of convenience. Consider the 
following facts submitted in the Affidavit of Ned A. Cannon: 
• In Exhibit F, Ms. Larson states that she was ''asked" by her commander and sergeant to 
transport her friend, Danielle. Later in an affidavit, she used the word "ordered". 
Ms. Larson was not reimbursed for her mileage for her travel to and from National Guard 
training. 
Ms. Larson and the passenger, she was allegedly "ordered" to transport, split the costs of 
the transportation, 
Ms. Larson and her passenger lived in the same gen~ral area:. 
Ms. Larson has submitted no evidence that the National Guard directed her route home 
from Lewiston to Boise. 
• Ms. Larson was driving her own vehicle home after completing her monthly training 
duty. 
• Ms. Larson has submitted no evidence that the National Guard provided her a car, 
approved of the car she was using, or performed any inspections of the car she was using 
on the day of the accident. 
• The National Guard did not control Ms. Larson's conduct at the time of the accident. She 
was free to take any route on her return trip home. 
4 Memorandum Opinion, p.8. 
5 Memorandum Opinion, p.8. 
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• Ms. Larson has submitted no evidence that she was hired by the National Guard to drive 
or transport other guardsmen. 
• Ms. Larson has submitted no evidence that the National Guai:d provided her training on 
safe travel from Boise to Lewiston and home again, 
• At the time of the accident, Ms. Larson was not driving between assignments. She was 
retuming home after completing training. 
Noticeably absent from the record is any indication as to how Ms. Larson's passenger first 
ai.Tived at the weekend training session. Did Ms. Larson give the passenger a ride to the training? 
If so, was she "asked'1 or "ordered" to do so? Plaintiff has moved under Rule 56(f) for an 
opportunity to seek further evidence regarding Ms. Lm:son's !(travel" if the Court is inclined to 
include "travel'' as part of Ms. Larson's training and duty. 
In Idaho, as noted above, a party making a motion to reconsider is allowed to present new 
facts, but is not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App., 
2006). In this case, Plaintiff respectfully petitions the Court to revisit the record and draw all 
reasonable inferences in his favor. In this case, it is more than reasonable that Ms. Larson had 
completed her ''training and duty" with the National Guard and was simply commuting home 
from work. Plaintiff respectfully submits that it is unprecedented for government employees to 
receive the benefits of sovereign immunity while commuting to work on public roads, at their 
own expense, in their own vehicles. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ms. Larson's argument that she was acting within the scope of employment can be 
summarized as follows: Ms. Larson's supervisor allegedly "asked" that Ms. Larson and another 
National Guard member carpool. Plaintiff respectfully petitions the Court to reconsider the law 
and facts of this case and deny Defendant's summary judgment motion. 
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DATED this 2J1h day of July, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC:E 
I, Ned A Carmon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider on Mallory Larson through he:r 
counsel via the method(s) indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNicho1s 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Po$tage Prepaid 
( ..f) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 27th day of July 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER 8 
 
353
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 






Case No.: CV 09-420 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff moves this Court to alter or amend its Judgment filed herein on July 19, 2012, 
under and pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 59(e). This motion is a companion motion to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider which was filed on July 27, 2012. The said motions are supported by the 
files and records herein, and Plaintiff's supporting memorandum. 
Oral argument is requested. 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 1 
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DATED this 31 st day of July, 2012. 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Motion to Reconsider on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method(s) 
indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
(v"') U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 31 ~t day of July 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 3 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 





TO: Mallory E. Larson 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
A.ND TO: Sonyait:e R. Nutsch, attorney of record. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment will 
be heard at the Nez Perce County Courthouse before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick on Tuesday, 
August 21 , 2012, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2012. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Notice of Hearing on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the method(s) 
indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
(v"') U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 31 st day of July 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 2 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendants. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
Case No.: CV 09-00420 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF SSG 
TONY RICE 
SSG Tony Rice, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, and make this 
supplemental Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
As referenced in the Report of Investigations attached as Exhibit A to my April 26, 2012, 
affidavit, SPC Mallory E. Larson ("Larson") was released early from the Idaho National Guard 
duty station at Lewiston, Idaho on January 7, 2007. On such day, Larson was involved in a 
SUPPLEMENT AL AFFIDAVIT 
OF SSG TONY RICE 1 
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vehicle collision while commuting to her home. I understood that her passenger, another 
national guardsman, helped pay for Larson's travel expenses. 
If an Idaho National Guard soldier, such as Larson, is on active weekend duty and is 
transporting personnel or materials for or upon order of her commander(s), she would be 
provided a government vehicle, with fuel, food, and lodging. The army pays the guardsmen's 
room and board while at their duty station if they live outside the commuting distance of 50 
miles, but commuting to and from such duty station is at the soie option, responsibility and 
expense of said commuters. 
Although I asked Larson to provide transportation for her passenger, PV2 Danielle Poe, 
and they were released from weekend duty station early on January 7, 2007, it does not alter the 
fact that commuting to and from their duty station in Lewiston, was solely at these guardsmen's 
option, responsibility, and expense. 
DATED: This JQ_ day of August, 2012. ~----
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ltY'hday of August, 2012. 
SUPPLEMENT AL AFFIDAVIT 
OF SSG TONY RJCE 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice on Defendant through her counsel via the 
method indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
(v") U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile -b}J__ ( ) Email (pdf attachment) 
Signed this ~ day of August, 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
SUPPLEMENT AL AFFIDAVIT 
OF SSG TONY RICE 3 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
Plaintiff, 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
TO: Mallory E. Larson 
AND TO: Sonyalee R. Nutsch, attorney of record. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment will be heard at the Nez Perce County Courthouse before the 
Honorable Carl B. Kerrick on Tuesday, August 28, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as 
counsel may be heard. 
DATED this 10th day of August, 2012. 
~~--Ned A. Cannon 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Amended Notice of Hearing on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the 
method(s) indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
(..I) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 10th day of August 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
~ -
i(redA. Cannon 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 2 
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~ V dCO Cf · 4 J._Q 
1 FiL.ED 1\;,1 "': ~s. 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
PM __ _ 
[ A~I~~. 2012 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB # 6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
C:c, k Dist. Court 
Cl·).:.r.·.13t2r C:111nt11. lrl2:10 v ..___ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Case No: CV09-420 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 7, 2007, Mallory Martinez fka Larson ("Ms. Martinez") was on 
duty with the Idaho Army National Guard when she was involved in an automobile accident 
with William Teurlings ("plaintiff'). On January 6, 2009, plaintiff filed his Complaint in this 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT -1-
 
364
matter alleging one state law claim of negligence against Ms. Martinez. On April 26, 2012, 
because National Guard members are exempted from liability for state law claims arising out 
of their activities when they acting, within the course and scope of their employment, in 
training or under duty, Ms. Martinez filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asking the Court 
to dismiss plaintiffs Complaint against her in its entirety. On July 13, 2012, this Court 
granted Ms. Martinez's Motion and Judgment was entered against plaintiff on July 19, 2012. 
On July 27, 2012, plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider and on August 1, 2012, 
plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment based on the same grounds presented in 
his Motion to Reconsider. Defendant submits this response in opposition to both of 
plaintiffs motions and hereby incorporates by reference all previous arguments, pleadings 
and affidavits submitted in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 
April 27, 2012. This response is also supported by the Affidavit of Mallory Martinez in 
Support of Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed herewith. 
As explained further below, because this Court correctly determined that Ms. 
Martinez was acting within the course and scope of her employment and in accordance to her 
duty or training with the National Guard at the time of the accident, plaintiffs motions 
should be denied. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND MOTION 





A. AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT ON JANUARY 7, 2007, MS. MARTINEZ WAS ON 
DUTY, BEING PAID BY THE NATIONAL GUARD AND ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE 
AND SCOPE OF HEREMPLOYMENTWITH THE NATIONAL GUARD. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-904: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the 
course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: ... 4. 
Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard when 
engaged in training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, 
505 or 709, title 32, United States Code. 
Idaho Code § 6-904 was last amended in 1988 and was therefore in force, as stated above, on 
January 7, 2007. See id. 
It is undisputed that on January 7, 2007, Ms. Martinez was traveling to Boise, 
Idaho from Lewiston, Idaho where she was required to attend a monthly training pursuant to 
32 U.S.C.A § 502. Plaintiff argues in his Motion to Reconsider that the "Idaho legislature 
never explicitly exempted National Guard travel from liability while traveling to or from 
training or duty. (See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary, 5/29/2012, p. 5). 
Ms. Martinez produced uncontroverted evidence that at the time of the accident she was on 
duty acting within the course and scope of her employment. She was not "traveling to or 
from training or duty" but was actually on duty and acting in accordance with instructions 
given to her by her superior officer while she was traveling. (See Affidavit of SSG Tony 
Rice, 4/26/2012, il il 5-6). This distinction is this reason this Court properly determined that 
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the exemption under Idaho Code§ 6-904(4) applied and granted Ms. Martinez's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Ms. Martinez's superior officer, SSG Tony Rice, explained in his affidavit that 
National Guard members are on duty until 11 :59 p.m. on the last day of the mandatory drill. 
(See Affidavit ofSSG Tony Rice, 4/26/2012, ,r 5). On January 7, 2007, Ms. Martinez was on 
duty with the National Guard. 
At the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez and the passenger she was 
transporting were in full uniform with their rank and military affiliation clearly displayed. 
(See Affidavit of Mallory E. Martinez in Support of Defendant's Response in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, 8/10/12, p. 2). 
Ms. Martinez road in the ambulance with plaintiff and he would have observed her in her 
military uniform. See id. 
Ms. Martinez was being paid by the National Guard when this accident 
occurred. (See Affidavit ofNed Cannon, 5/26/2012, Exh. F, p. 2; see also Rice Aff., ,-f 5). In 
citing Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 110 Idaho 871, 872, 719 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1986), 
plaintiff acknowledged that compensation of an employee while they are traveling will justify 
a finding that the employee is an employee acting within the course and scope of their 
employment. See id. 
It is likewise undisputed that at the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez was 
carrying out a specific order from her superior officer to transport a fellow guardsman to 
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Boise. (See Rice Aff., ,r 6; see also Martinez Aff., ,r 6). Plaintiff argues that because the 
other guardsman assisted in paying the gas expense incurred while traveling to Boise that it 
somehow negates the fact that that Ms. Martinez was complying with her superior officer's 
instruction. In Mortimer v. Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839, 840 P.2d 383 (1992), the 
Supreme Court of Idaho stated that "[a]n act done partly for personal reasons and partly to 
serve an employer is still within the scope of employment." Id. at 845, 840 P.2d at 389 
(internal citations omitted). 
Finally, the National Guard determined in its own investigation that Ms. 
Martinez was "in the line of duty" at the time of the accident on January 7, 2007 and paid for 
her medical expenses she incurred in the accident. (See Rice Aff., Exh. A; see also Affidavit 
of Mallory E. Martinez, 12/30/11, ,r 8). If Ms. Martinez had not been acting in accordance 
duty at the time of the accident, her medical bills would not have been paid by the National 
Guard. 
Ms. Martinez was acting within the course and scope of her employment with 
the Idaho National Guard and in accordance with her duty and training with the National 
Guard on January 7, 2007 when this accident occurred. Ms. Martinez's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was therefore properly granted by this Court. 
B. WORKER'S COMPENSATION PRICIPLES 
In plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, 
he argued that Ms. Martinez was not acting within the course and scope of her employment 
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with the National Guard when this accident occurred because of the application of a rule used 
in worker's compensation cases which "provides that an employee is ordinarily not in the 
course of employment when going to or coming from work." Casey v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 13, 
17,921 P.2d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 1996). The rule is commonly referred to as the coming and 
going rule. (See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, pp, 5-6). 
In response to plaintiffs argument, Ms. Martinez identified three of the 
numerous exceptions to the coming and going rule that applied to the facts of this case. They 
were the travelling employee, the special errand doctrine and an expressed or implied 
agreement by the employer that the employment relationship shall continue during the period 
of coming and going. (See Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 6/5/12, pp. 
4-9 citing Andrews v. Les Boise Masonry, Inc., 127 Idaho 65, 67, 896 P.2d 973,975 (1995); 
Ridgeway v. Combined Ins. Cos. of Am., 98 Idaho 410, 565 P.2d 1367 (1977); Finholdt v. 
Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 155 P.3d 695 (2007); and Colorado Civil Air Patrol v. Hagans, 662 
P.2d 194 (1983)). 
Plaintiff now argues in support of his Motion to Reconsider that the "Idaho 
legislature has not included the special-errand doctrine as a condition to apply sovereign 
immunity" and it has only been applied in worker's compensation cases. (See Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Reconsider, p. 4). Although plaintiff doesn't address the other two 
exceptions, all three exceptions, as well as the coming and going rule to which the exceptions 
relate, are only relevant if the Court determines that worker's compensation principles should 
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be applied to tort cases within the purview of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
In Casey v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 13, 17,921 P.2d 190, 194 (1996), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals stated that: 
In worker's compensation cases, Idaho courts have applied the 
"coming and going rule," which provides that an employee is 
ordinarily not in the course of employment when going to or 
coming from work .... While Idaho appellate courts have not yet 
applied this rule in cases involving third-party negligence 
actions, neighboring jurisdictions have. See e.g., Faul v. Jelco, 
Inc., 122 Ariz. 490, 595 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Ct.App.1979); 
Connell v. Carl's Air Conditioning, 97 Nev. 436,634 P.2d 673, 
674 (1981); Skinner v. Braum's Ice Cream Store, 890 P.2d 922, 
924 (Okl.1995); Runyan v. Pickerd, 86 Or.App. 542, 740 P.2d 
209, 210 (1987); Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801 
P.2d 934,936 (Utah 1989); Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash.2d 
457, 716 P.2d 814, 819 (1986). We see no reason not to apply 
the coming and going rule set forth in our worker's 
compensation cases to cases involving third-party negligence 
actions brought against employers based on a theory of 
respondeat superior. 
The court also discussed several exceptions to the coming and going rule. See id. at 18, 921 
P.2d at 194. 
Plaintiff is correct that the coming and going rule has never been applied by an 
Idaho court in the context of analyzing course and scope of employment under the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act. The Idaho Tort Claims Act does not contain a definition of"course and scope of 
employment" nor does it state anywhere in the act that worker's compensation principles 
should or should not be instructive when determining the issue. See LC. 6-901 et. seq. 
However, based on Casey, cited supra, it is probable the appellate court would "see no 
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reason not to apply the coming and going rule" in the analysis of course and scope under the 
Tort Claims Act. See Casey, 129 Idaho at 17, 921 P.2d at 194. 
The fact that we don't have definitive law on this point in Idaho is likely why 
this Court found "in the alternative" that if the coming and going rule applied in this case, an 
exception to the rule also applied. (See Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13 ). The Court was responding to the argument raised by 
plaintiff that the coming and going rule applied to show that Ms. Martinez was not acting 
with the course and scope of her employment. If the coming and going rule applies, as 
originally argued by plaintiff, then the exceptions to the coming and going rule must also be 
addressed. 
This Court only addressed one exception in its opinion but any one of the three 
exceptions raised by Ms. Martinez would be sufficient to defeat plaintiffs argument and 
support the determination that, even under worker's compensation principles, Ms. Martinez 
was acting within the course and scope of her employment and in accordance with her duty 
with the National Guard at the time of this accident. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Idaho National Guard members, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904(4), 
cannot be held liable for state law claims arising out of their activities when they are acting 
within the course and scope of their employment and pursuant to duty or training, Ms. 
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Martinez's Motion for Summary Judgment was properly granted and plaintiffs Complaint 
was appropriately dismissed. Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment should therefore be denied 
DATED this 10th day of August 2012. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
B~ (J_.,, £ t,"\;te -;-f ., 
. SONY~ EE R NUTSCH 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT -9-
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of August 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
ISB#6189 
Attorneys for Defendant 
c '·lo. CV cJ DO q · t/ t D 
ff_;d Y /JJ I~ 
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at IC .ci o"clock -ti- M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAMP. TEURLINGS, ) Case No: CV09-420 
) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF MALLORY 
) E. MARTINEZ IN SUPPORT 
vs. ) OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE 
) IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MALLORY E. LARSON, ) MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND 
) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
Defendant. ) JUDGMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Clearwater ) 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ formerly known as MALLORY E. LARSON, 
being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, over the age of 
twenty-one (21 ), competent to testify as a witness, make this affidavit on personal knowledge 
AFFIDAVIT OF MALLORY E. 
MARTINEZ IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF ' S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND 




and am the defendant in this matter, 
2. I am a member of the Idaho National Guard, 145th HHC Support 
Battalion, headquartered in Lewiston, Idaho. I have been a member of the Idaho National 
Guard for nine (9) years and have achieved the rank of E-5 - sergeant. 
3. At the time of the accident on January 7, 2007, I was on duty with the 
Idaho Natiqnal Guard and was acting under my superior's orders by transporting a fellow 
guardsman to Boise, Idaho. 
4. At the time of the accident on January 7, 2007, because I was still on 
duty, I was in full uniform. The uniform I was wearing was a distinct military camouflage 
uniform and contained patches that clearly identified the military branch I was on duty with 
as well as my rank. My pMsenger was in full uniform as well. I road in the ambulance with 
William Teurlings, the plaintiff in this case, and spoke with him at the hospital. The entire 
time I communicated with Mr. Teurlings, I was in ful!1unifonn. 
I 
ST~~, D swo ~·~~'::;. .. ,. ~ 
.. l "" .r, , ... I ::--:~TA·~· . .· \
! I •-•- . ·1 · 
\ ~ P.,UB\.\C, .,.· \ ,i!-. .e ' ... 0 . 
No~a. uh~~ for~tate of . 
residing at , , therein. 
My Commission Expii-es: / () ._ t; ... I ::S:: ' )I ........... t-"f,,,_-~ .. .,, 'h•· oc ,~ ~#. . '"« &; f' ' . ,, ... 
AFFIDA VI'ft,p~LORY E. 
MARTINEZ IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of August 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon PLLC 
508 8th Street 
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NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
F., ED Ji"1--i1.. ___ PM -~1-
~ 1 s 2012 l 
\ ,_ - - C :-rK IJ c. ~~!..--,/ 
c . - :_ n~v I ] rLf 1/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant. 
TO: Mallory E. Larson 
Case No.: CV 09-420 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF 
HEARING 
AND TO: Sonyalee R. Nutsch, attorney of record. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment will be heard at the Nez Perce County Courthouse before the 
Honorable Carl B. Kerrick on Tuesday, September 11, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as 
counsel may be heard. 
DATED this 13 th day of August, 2012. 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ned A. Cannon, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of this Second Amended Notice of Hearing on Mallory Larson through her counsel via the 
method(s) indicated below: 
Sonyalee Nutsch 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Via: 
( ./) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 13th day of August 2012, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING 2 
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND TIJDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




CARL B. KERRJCK 
Reporter 
LINDA CARL TON 
Date SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 



















SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: MTN TO RECONSIDER/MTN ALTER OR AMEND 
BE IT KNOWN, THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO-WIT: 
COURTROOM#l 
90229 Ned Cannon present. Sonyalee Nutsch present. 
90250 Mr. Cannon presents argument re: motion to reconsider and motion to alter or 
amend. 
92022 Ms. Nutsch presents argument re: motion to reconsider and motion to alter or 
amend. 
92654 Mr. Cannon presents rebuttal al'gument. 
93357 Court addresses counsel. 
93520 Court takes matter under advisement and will issue a written decision. 
93555 Mr. Cannon addresses Court re: additional affidavit. 
93606 Court indicates he has read the affidavit. 





1 Page of 1 Pages aa 
Presiding Judge 
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CASE NO. CV2009-420 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. The Plaintiff was represented by Ned Cannon, of 
the firm Smith and Cannon. The Defendant was represented by Sonyalee Nutsch, of the 
firm Clements, Brown & McNichols. The Court heard oral argument on September 11, 
2012. The Court, having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the 
matter, hereby renders its decision. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 1 
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO 




A detailed background of this case is located within the Memorandum Opinion 
and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Swift Transportation 
Company's Motion to Intervene, filed on July 13, 2012. The Plaintiff is seeking 
reconsideration of this Court's order which granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendant pursuant to the exception to liability set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act at 
I.C. § 6-904(4). In addition, if the Motion for Reconsideration is granted, the Plaintiff 
has filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment filed in this matter. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD 
On a motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), the court must 
take into account any new facts that may affect the correctness of the prior interlocutory 
order. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. Cazier, 127 Idaho 879, 884, 908 P.2d 572, 577 
(Ct. App. 1995), citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of North Idaho, 118 
Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). The burden is on the moving party to bring 
the new facts to the court's attention; the court is not required to search the record to 
determine whether there are any new facts that would affect its earlier decision. Coeur 
d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037. Finally, the decision to grant or 
deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). 
ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment was granted on the basis that the Defendant was on duty at 
the time of the collision, and thus, immune from liability pursuant to an exception set 
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forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. LC.§ 6-904(4) pertains to activities of the Idaho 
National Guard: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall 
not be liable for any claim which: 
4. Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard when engaged in 
training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504, 505 or 709, title 32, 
United States Code. 
Id. Martinez was participating in training exercises pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502. 
(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or the 
Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, each company, battery, 
squadron, and detachment of the National Guard, unless excused by the 
Secretary concerned, shall-
( 1) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target 
practice, at least 48 times each year; and 
(2) participate in training at encampments, maneuvers, outdoor 
target practice, or other exercises, at least 15 days each year. 
32 U.S.C. § 502(a)(l-2). 
Martinez states she was on duty with the Idaho National Guard and attending a 
regularly scheduled instruction drill in Lewiston, Idaho, on the day the accident occurred. 
Affidavit of Mallory E. Martinez. Martinez's supervisor, SSG Rice, attested that Martinez 
was attending drill pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502. Affidavit ofSSG Tony Rice, at 2. He 
further stated he ordered Martinez to provide transportation to a fellow guardsman, and 
thus, Martinez was following orders at the time she was in the collision. SSG Rice 
described the time on duty and his orders to Martinez1 as follows: 
5. January 7, 2007, was the final day of the 145th's regularly scheduled 
drill instructions in Lewiston, Idaho and SPC Mallory Larson was in 
attendance. SPC Larson was on duty from 12:00 a.m. on January 6, 2007 
to 11:59 p.m. on January 7, 2007. 
1 Within the affidavit, SSG Rice refers to the Defendant by her maiden name, Mallory Larson. 
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6. I was aware that SPC Larson lived in Boise, Idaho and another 
guardsman who was also a member of the 145th lived in that area as well. 
I instructed SPC Larson to provide transportation for her fellow 
guardsman to and from the drill that was completed on January 7, 2007. I 
understood that she had complied with my order. 
The central issue in this case is whether Martinez was on duty when the collision 
occurred, while she was traveling home after participating in drill activities. The Plaintiff 
has articulated several facts which might raise a question of material fact regarding 
whether the Defendant had been released from the weekend training or drill activities. 
However, the issue at hand surrounds the determination of whether the Defendant was on 
duty at the time of the collision. LC.§ 6-904(4) exempts guard members from liability 
when the liable act "[ a ]rises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard when 
engaged in training or duty .... " It is undisputed on this record that the Defendant was 
still on duty at the time the collision occurred, no new facts have been presented which 
create a material issue regarding whether Martinez was on duty. Thus, the Plaintiffs 
motion for reconsideration is denied. 
The Plaintiffs motion to alter or amend the judgment is contingent upon the court 
ruling in the Plaintiffs favor on the motion for reconsideration. Because the motion for 
reconsideration is denied, the motion to alter or amend is consequently denied as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is 
denied. Consequently, the Plaintiffs motion to alter or amend the judgment is also 
denied. 
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The Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The Plaintiffs 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this '-/ rz.day of October 2012. 
Qf}<J___:c7 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT was: 
_j_ faxed this Ljf'::day of October, 2012, or 
/ hand delivered via court basket this l(f!::.day of October, 2012, or 
/ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 1/f¾ay of October, 
2012, to: 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith & Cannon _ yVLC,l./(~( 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Clearwater County District Court 
FAX: 208-476-8910 
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NED A CANNON, ISB # 2331 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Facsimile: (208) 746-8421 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
v. 
MALLORY E. LARSON, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
TO: 
Case No. CV 09-420 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
The above named Respondent(s), MALLORY E. LARSON, and the party's 
attorney, Sonyalee R. Nutsch. 
AND TO: 
The Clerk of the above-entitled Court. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant(s), William P. Teurlings, appeals against the above 
named Respondent(s) to the Idaho Supreme Court from the following Final 
Judgment: Memorandum Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -1-
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Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment; entered in the above 
entitled action on the day of October 4, 2012; and Memorandum Opinion and 
Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Swift Transportation 
Company's Motion to Intervene, entered on July 13, 2012; Honorable Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick presiding. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rule 1 l(a) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal include, but are not limited to, 
the following: 
a. Whether the trial court improperly applied Idaho's summary judgment 
standard by the following: 
1. Determining that there were no genuine, material issues of fact; 
11. Improperly weighing the facts in the record; 
111. Failing to draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's 
favor; and 
1v. Construing disputed issues of fact in the moving party's favor? 
b. Whether genuine, material issues of fact exist as to whether Defendant 
was on "duty" at the time of the accident? 
c. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation and 
application of Idaho Code § 6-904, the Idaho Tort Claims Act? 
d. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted 
Defendant sovereign immunity for her negligence when she was driving 
her own vehicle on an Idaho public road after she had been dismissed 
from National Guard duty? 
e. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in its application and 
interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 101(22)? 
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f. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in its application of 
Idaho's "special-errand doctrine" to the Idaho Tort Claims Act and 
sovereign immunity? 
g. Whether the trial court misapplied Idaho law regarding Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider? 
h. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider and the Affidavit of Tony Rice in support of Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider? 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike? 
J. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal? 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. Reporter's Transcript 
a. No, a reporter's transcript is not requested. 
6. Clerk's Record. Appellant requests the clerk's record automatically included 
under Rule 28, I.A.R., along with all other documents, affidavits, briefs and 
filings of record in this case. 
7. Exhibits. There are no exhibits in this case. 
8. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal was not served on the reporter. 
b. That the clerk of the court was not paid an estimated fee for preparation 
of the reporter's transcript pursuant to I.AR. 24. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record 
has been paid pursuant to I.AR. 27. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid pursuant to I.A.R. 23. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to I.AR. 20. 




DATED this /.Sciay of November, 2012. 
SMITH & CANNON PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFI~ TE OF SERVICE ,_. \... 
I hereby certify that on the/-:> ay of November 2012, in accordance with 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
was served to the following individual(s) via the indicated method: 
Sonyalee R. Nutsch 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753 
Mark C. Peterson 
Andrea Rosholt 
Moffatt Thomas 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
ij U.S.P.S., first-class mail 
postage prepaid; 
[;,<J Fax Transmission; 
[ ] Hand Delivery; 
[ ] Courthouse Box; 
[ ] ECF Service; 
[ ] Other: 
~ U.S .P.S., first-class mail 
postage prepaid; 
[ ] Fax Transmission; 
[ ] Hand Delivery; 
[ ] Courthouse Box; 
[ ] ECF Service; 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
V. 
MALLORY E. LARSON nka 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 
) 40502-2012 
) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 





) _______________ ) 
I, Barbie Deyo, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at Orofino, Idaho this It)"":: day of December, 2012. 
CARRIE BIRD 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P . TEURLINGS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MALLORY E. LARSON nka 
MALLORY E. MARTINEZ, 
Defendant-Respondent . 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
40502 - 2012 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, Barbie Deyo, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that the above foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under 
my direction as, and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under 
Ru l e 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested 
by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in 
the District Court on the 15TH day of November, 2012. 
Dated this )& day of December, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
CARRIE BIRD, Clerk 
I 
By £ChU 11>J~ 
Deputy fc lerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRI CT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
WILLIAM P . TEURLINGS , 
Plaintiff-Appellant , 
V . 
MALLORY E . LARSON nka 
MALLORY E . MARTINEZ, 
Defendant-Respondent . 
SUPREME COURT NO . 
40502-2012 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Barbie Deyo , Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho , in and for the 
County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that copies of the 
Clerk's Record were placed in the United States mail and 
addressed to Ned A . Cannon , Smith & Cannon , 508 Eighth Street , 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 and Sonyalee R . Nutsch , Clements, Brown & 
McNichols , P . A . , P . O. Box 1510, Lewiston , Idaho 83501 this JO~ 
day of December , 2012 . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this ~ day of December , 2012 
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